Sec. 42.04. DEFENSE WHEN CONDUCT CONSISTS OF SPEECH OR OTHER EXPRESSION. (a) If conduct that would otherwise violate Section 42.01(a)(5) (Unreasonable Noise), 42.03 (Obstructing Passageway), or 42.055 (Funeral Service Disruptions) consists of speech or other communication, of gathering with others to hear or observe such speech or communication, or of gathering with others to picket or otherwise express in a nonviolent manner a position on social, economic, political, or religious questions, the actor must be ordered to move, disperse, or otherwise remedy the violation prior to his arrest if he has not yet intentionally harmed the interests of others which those sections seek to protect.
(b) The order required by this section may be given by a peace officer, a fireman, a person with authority to control the use of the premises, or any person directly affected by the violation.
(c) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 42.01(a)(5), 42.03, or 42.055:
(1) that in circumstances in which this section requires an order no order was given;
(2) that an order, if given, was manifestly unreasonable in scope; or
(3) that an order, if given, was promptly obeyed.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Amended by:
Acts 2006, 79th Leg., 3rd C.S., Ch. 2 (H.B. 97), Sec. 2, eff. May 19, 2006.
Notes of Decisions
Jonathan Davidson v. City of Stafford, Texas, et a, 848 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2017).
· cites it 3× “Nevertheless, the district court determined that the officers were entitled to summary judgment because (1) Davidson had been ordered to move under Texas Penal Code § 42.04 and (2) Flagg and Jones “at least arguably had probable cause because [they] reasonably believed that…”
State v. Holcombe, 145 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.04 (Vernon 2003).”
State v. Johnson, Terence, 475 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
“]” Tex. Penal Code § 42.04(a), (c). . It seems to me that the chances that law enforcement officials would attempt to apply this statute against an individual in violation of the First Amendment as construed By the United States Supreme Court have been substantially diminished…”
Reed v. State, 794 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App. 1990).
“or of gathering with others to picket or otherwise express in a nonviolent manner a position on social, economic, political or religious questions, the actor must be ordered to move, disperse, or otherwise remedy the violation prior to his arrest if he has not yet intentionally…”
Blanco v. State, 761 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App. 1988).
“Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 42.04 (Vernon 1974).”
Olvera v. State, 806 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
“[12] Somewhat like the Boos police dispersal requirement, the Legislature has provided a dispersal requirement for Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 42.03 (obstructing passageway) as a defense where the obstruction involves speech.”
Barron v. State, 43 S.W.3d 719 (Tex. App. 2001).
“13 Under Texas Penal Code section 42.04, if conduct that would otherwise violate the statute consists of speech or other communication, of gathering with others to hear or observe such speech or communication, or of gathering with others to picket or otherwise express in a…”
Robles v. State, 803 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App. 1991).
“Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 42.04 (Vernon 1989) provides, in pertinent part: Defense When Conduct Consists of Speech or Other Expression (a) If conduct that would otherwise violate Section 42.”
Jonathan Davidson v. City of Stafford, Texas, et a (5th Cir. 2017).
· cites it 3× “Nevertheless, the district court determined that the officers were entitled to summary judgment because (1) Davidson had been ordered to move under Texas Penal Code § 42.04 and (2) Flagg and Jones “at least arguably had probable cause because [they] reasonably believed that…”
Olvera v. State, 806 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
“Somewhat like the Boos police dispersal requirement, the Legislature has provided a dispersal requirement for Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 42.03 (obstructing passageway) as a defense where the obstruction involves speech.”
Gaston v. State, 276 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.04 (Vernon Supp.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 42.04(a) — 5 cases
Jonathan Davidson v. City of Stafford, Texas, et a, 848 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2017).
“Nevertheless, the district court determined that the officers were entitled to summary judgment because (1) Davidson had been ordered to move under Texas Penal Code § 42.04 and (2) Flagg and Jones “at least arguably had probable cause because [they] reasonably believed that…”
State v. Johnson, Terence, 475 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
“]” Tex. Penal Code § 42.04(a), (c). . It seems to me that the chances that law enforcement officials would attempt to apply this statute against an individual in violation of the First Amendment as construed By the United States Supreme Court have been substantially diminished…”
Jonathan Davidson v. City of Stafford, Texas, et a (5th Cir. 2017).
“Nevertheless, the district court determined that the officers were entitled to summary judgment because (1) Davidson had been ordered to move under Texas Penal Code § 42.04 and (2) Flagg and Jones “at least arguably had probable cause because [they] reasonably believed that…”
— Tex. Penal Code § 42.04(a)(2) — 1 case
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