1 U.S.C. § 4

“Vehicle” as including all means of land transportation

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The word “vehicle” includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on land.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases, 1931–2014 · leading case: Green v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 754 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2014).
Green v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 754 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2014). “1996) (per cu-riam), 1 U.S.C. § 4 , and Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-103(a).”
United States v. John Gordon McGlamory, 441 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1971). · cites it 2× “Support for McGlamory’s position is also allegedly drawn from the language of 1 U.S.C.A. § 4 (1927), which reads: The word “vehicle” includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on-land.”
United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Mass. 2002). · cites it 2× “It states that “[t]he word ‘vehicle’ includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on land.”
Baltimore Transit Co. v. Metro. Transit Auth., 194 A.2d 643 (Md. 1963). · cites it 2× “§ 4; 1 U.S.C.A. § 4 (Aircraft excluded. 44 Stat.”
R.R. Comm'n v. Texas & New Orleans R., 42 S.W.2d 1091 (Tex. App. 1931). “§ 4 (1 USCA § 4) intended, the Government suggests, rather to enlarge than to restrict the definition, vehicle includes every contrivance capable of being used ‘as a means of transportation on land.”
Schachter v. Fall (In Re Fall), 192 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995). “” 1 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West 1985). The result is the same under New Hampshire law.”
Illinois Marine Towing, Inc. v. Barnick (In Re Barnick), 353 B.R. 233 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006). “1 U.S.C. § 4 . The DEBTOR contends that application of the Dictionary Act renders Section 523(a)(9) unambiguously limited to motor vehicles used for land transportation, thereby excluding motorboats from its scope.”
Schwartz v. Dunn (In Re Dunn), 203 B.R. 414 (E.D. Mich. 1996). · cites it 2× “§ 703 (1) (defining motor vehicle as any self-propelled vehicle designed for use on highways); and 1 U.S.C. § 4 (defining vehicle as including all means of land transportation).”
Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004). · cites it 2× “In 1 U.S.C. § 4 , a provision of the Dictionary Act, Congress has provided that “[t]he word ‘vehicle’ includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on land.”
First Bank & Trust Co. v. Feuquay, 405 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1969). “§ 4 [1 U.S. C.A. § 4] intended, the Government suggests, rather to enlarge than to restrict the definition, vehicle includes every contrivance capable of being used ‘as a means of transportation on land.”
United States v. Kiff, 377 F. Supp. 2d 586 (E.D. La. 2005). “Both parties cite 1 U.S.C. § 4 , which provides that the term “vehicle” includes “every description of carriage or artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on land.”
Lee & Palmer, Inc. v. Employers Com. Union Ins., 360 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). “We do not agree with ECU that the policy’s reference (at “Definitions” — “mobile equipment”) to “land vehicle” implies the possibility of the existence of “water vehicles”.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.