1 U.S.C. § 8
“Person”, “human being”, “child”, and “individual” as including born-alive infant
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20
cases (8 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: Jose Gomez-Fernandez v. William Barr, 969 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2020).
Jose Gomez-Fernandez v. William Barr, 969 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2020). “” Further, the panel explained that Congress has defined the term “human being,” in 1 U.S.C. § 8 (a), for purposes of determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, to “include every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development.”
United States v. Samantha Flute, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019). “1 U.S.C. § 8 (a). The Act further defines “born alive” as the complete expulsion or extraction from his or her mother of that member, at any stage of development, who after such expulsion or extraction breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite…”
Raskin v. Dallas Indep Sch Dist, 69 F.4th 280 (5th Cir. 2023). “” 1 U.S.C. § 8 (a). That’s presumably why Dallas ISD concedes that “minor children have the same statutory right under 28 U.”
United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2011). “In 2002, Congress enacted 1 U.S.C. § 8 , which states that “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, .”
Tiffany Janis v. United States, 73 F.4th 628 (8th Cir. 2023). “See generally 1 U.S.C. § 8 (a) (a “person” or “human being” is an individual who is “born alive”); 18 U.”
State of Texas v. Becerra, 89 F.4th 529 (5th Cir. 2024). “Citing the Dictionary Act, see 1 U.S.C. § 8 (a), HHS claims that the word individual does not include the fetus.”
Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006). “Congress has defined “child” to include “every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive,” 1 U.S.C. § 8 (a), and has defined “born alive” to mean “the complete expulsion or extraction from his or her mother of that member, at any stage of development, who after…”
DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 106 (D.R.I. 1993). “may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void.”
Moyle v. United States, 603 U.S. 324 (2024). “” 1 U. S. C. § 8 (a). But it goes on to provide that this def- nition is not to “be construed to .”
Dupuch-Carron v. Hhs (Fed. Cir. 2020). “” 1 U.S.C. § 8 (a). Though they acknowledge the definition’s applicability, Appellants point out that 1 U.”
Moyle v. United States, 603 U.S. 324 (2024). “” 1 U. S. C. §8 (a). But it goes on to provide that this defi- nition is not to “be construed to .”
United States v. Adams, 40 F.4th 1162 (10th Cir. 2022). “The Dictionary Act contains a provision bearing on the meaning of administrative regulations like the sentencing guidelines: 1 U.S.C. § 8 (a). 5 Mr. Adams also argues that we should consider the Model Penal Code, dictionary definitions, and the common law.”
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