10 U.S.C. § 120

Department of Defense executive aircraft controlled by Secretaries of military departments

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(a)In General.—The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Chief of the Air Force Special Air Mission Office is given the responsibility for coordination of scheduling all Department of Defense executive aircraft controlled by the Secretaries of the military departments in order to support required use travelers.(b)Responsibilities.—(1) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of each of the military departments shall execute a memorandum of understanding with the Air Force Special Air Mission Office regarding oversight and management of executive aircraft controlled by that military department.(2) The Secretary of Defense shall establish standards for prioritizing access to executive aircraft controlled by the Secretaries of the military departments among authorized users of such aircraft within the Federal Government.(3) The Secretary of Defense shall assign a career appointee (as that term is defined in section 3132(a) of title 5) in the Senior Executive Service of the Department of Defense to coordinate the efficient tasking of executive aircraft controlled by the Secretaries of the military departments and compliance with rules, regulations, policies, and guidance relating to such aircraft, including the standards established under paragraph (2). The career appointee shall, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, have knowledge and experience relating to executive aircraft, including familiarity with the executive aircraft fleets controlled by the Secretaries of the military departments and procedures for the prioritization of executive aircraft users.(4) The Secretary of a military department shall maintain overall authority for scheduling the required use travelers of that military department on executive aircraft controlled by the Secretary. When an executive aircraft controlled by the Secretary of a military department is not supporting required use travelers of that military department, the Secretary of the military department shall make such executive aircraft available for scheduling of other required use travelers.(c)Limitations.—(1) The Secretary of Defense may not establish a new command and control organization to support aircraft.(2) No executive aircraft controlled by the Secretary of a military department may be permanently stationed at any location without a required use traveler without the approval of the Secretary of Defense.(d)Definitions.—In this section:(1) The term “required use traveler” has the meaning given such term in Department of Defense directive 4500.56, as in effect on the date of the enactment of this section.(2) The term “executive aircraft” has the meaning given such term in Department of Defense directive 4500.43, as in effect on the date of the enactment of this section.(Added Pub. L. 116–92, div. A, title X, § 1051(a), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1590; amended Pub. L. 119–60, div. A, title I, § 161(b)(1), Dec. 18, 2025, 139 Stat. 767.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The date of the enactment of this section, referred to in subsecs. (b) and (d), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 116–92, which was approved Dec. 20, 2019.

Amendments

2025—Subsec. (b)(2) to (4). Pub. L. 119–60 added pars. (2) and (3), redesignated former par. (3) as (4), and struck out former par. (2) which read as follows: “The Secretary of Defense shall be responsible for prioritizing travel when requests exceed available executive airlift capability.”

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesTimelines

Pub. L. 119–60, div. A, title I, § 161(b)(2), Dec. 18, 2025, 139 Stat. 768, provided that: “The Secretary of Defense shall—“(A) establish the standards required by paragraph (2) of such section 120(b) (as amended by this section) not later than December 1, 2025; and“(B) assign the career appointee required by paragraph (3) of such section 120(b) (as amended by this section) not later than January 1, 2026.”

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1977–2022 · leading case: United States v. Sager, 76 M.J. 158 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. Sager, 76 M.J. 158 (C.A.A.F. 2017). · cites it 2× “Sager of one specification of abusive sexual contact, in violation of Article 120(d), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 120 (d) (2012). Consistent with his plea, Sager was acquitted of a separate specification of abusive sexual contact in alleged violation of…”
United States v. Alston, 69 M.J. 214 (C.A.A.F. 2010). “See 10 U.S.C. § 120 (a) (setting forth various acts constituting the offense of rape, including under paragraph (1), “caus[ing] another person of any age to engage in a sexual act by .”
United States v. Weymouth, 40 M.J. 798 (1994). “Hickson (legislative intent precluded convictions for both rape under Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 120 , and adultery under Article 134, UCMJ, for the same sexual intercourse).”
United States v. White, 3 M.J. 619 (1977). “GLASGOW, Judge: Consonant with his plea, the appellant stands convicted of two counts of rape and one count of forcible sodomy (three different victims at three separate times), in violation of Articles 120 and 125, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 120 ,125, and sentenced by general…”
United States v. McKeel, 63 M.J. 81 (C.A.A.F. 2006). “Appellant was charged with rape, in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 120 (2000). At a general court-martial composed of a military judge sitting alone, Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas, of the lesser included offense of…”
United States v. Washington (A.F.C.C.A. 2021). · cites it 2× “Article 120(g)(8)(A), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 120 (g)(8)(A); see also MCM, pt.”
United States v. Merritt (A.F.C.C.A. 2016). “SPERANZA, Judge: Consistent with Appellant’s pleas pursuant to a pretrial agreement, a military judge sitting as a general court-martial found Appellant guilty of two specifications of aggravated sexual contact with a child who had not attained the age of 12 years in violation…”
United States v. Gonzales (C.A.A.F. 2019). “” 10 U.S.C. § 120 (g) (2006 & Supp. IV). “Sexual contact” means, in relevant part, “the intentional touching .”
United States v. Private First Class DAYLON R. SANDERS (A.C.C.A. 2018). “A panel of officer and enlisted members sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant of two specifications of sexual assault in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 120 (2012). After findings, the military judge dismissed one specification after merging it with…”
United States v. Private E1 PIERRE C. T. SCOTT (A.C.C.A. 2017). “The military judge also convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of sexual assault in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 120 (2012). The judge sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge and confinement for nine years.”
United States v. Yates (A.F.C.C.A. 2019). “The sentence of an accused found guilty of, inter alia, sexual assault in vi- olation of Article 120(b), 10 U.S.C. § 120 (b), “shall include dismissal or dis- honorable discharge, as applicable” Article 56(b), UCMJ, 10 U.”
United States v. Sergeant First Class RICHARD W. GILLIAM (A.C.C.A. 2020). “SALUSSOLIA, Judge: A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas of one specification of rape of a child in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 120 (2008) [UCM]J].and one specification each of…”
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