10 U.S.C. § 926

Art. 126. Arson; burning property with intent to defraud

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(a)Aggravated Arson.—Any person subject to this chapter who, willfully and maliciously, burns or sets on fire an inhabited dwelling, or any other structure, movable or immovable, wherein, to the knowledge of that person, there is at the time a human being, is guilty of aggravated arson and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.(b)Simple Arson.—Any person subject to this chapter who, willfully and maliciously, burns or sets fire to the property of another is guilty of simple arson and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.(c)Burning Property With Intent to Defraud.—Any person subject to this chapter who, willfully, maliciously, and with intent to defraud, burns or sets fire to any property shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 74; Pub. L. 114–328, div. E, title LX, § 5440, Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2953.)

Historical and Revision Notes

Revised section

Source (U.S. Code)

Source (Statutes at Large)

926(a)

926(b)

50:720(a).

50:720(b).

May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1 (Art. 126), 64 Stat. 141.

In subsection (b), the words “of this section” are omitted as surplusage.

Editorial NotesAmendments

2016—Pub. L. 114–328 amended section generally. Prior to amendment, section related to the offenses of aggravated arson and simple arson.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2016 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 114–328 effective on Jan. 1, 2019, as designated by the President, with implementing regulations and provisions relating to applicability to various situations, see section 5542 of Pub. L. 114–328 and Ex. Ord. No. 13825, set out as notes under section 801 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 58 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1961–2026 · leading case: United States v. Gray, 780 F.3d 458 (1st Cir. 2015).
United States v. Gray, 780 F.3d 458 (1st Cir. 2015). · cites it 2× “, 10 U.S.C. § 926 ; 18 U.S.C., §§ 1363 , 1368, 1991; Me.”
United States v. Desha, 23 M.J. 66 (1986). · cites it 3× “Opinion of the Court SULLIVAN, Judge: In accordance with his guilty pleas, appellant was convicted of aggravated arson, in violation of Article 126(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 926 (a). The military judge, sitting alone at this general court-martial,…”
United States v. Lowry, 2 M.J. 55 (1976). “OPINION OF THE COURT COOK, Judge: Contrary to his pleas, the appellant was convicted by general court-martial, with members, of four specifications alleging arson, and two specifications alleging attempted arson, in violation of Articles 126 and 80, Uniform Code of Military…”
United States v. Grooters, 39 M.J. 269 (1994). “He was acquitted of charges of aggravated arson and larceny, in violation of Articles 126 and 121, UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 926 and 921, respectively. Appellant was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 4 years, total forfeitures, and reduction to Private E-l.”
United States v. Johanns, 17 M.J. 862 (1983). “, Article 126, 10 U.S.C. § 926 . In the latter category were the Navy’s per se custom of the service offenses of: (1) scandalous conduct, see Naval Courts and Boards, section 59 (although no specific model specification in the M.”
United States v. Schake, 30 M.J. 314 (1990). “Contrary to his pleas, he was found guilty of aggravated arson, in violation of Article 126, UCMJ, 10 USC § 926 . He was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 4 years, total forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade.”
United States v. Woolheater, 40 M.J. 170 (1994). “Opinion of the Court CRAWFORD, Judge: After 5 hours of deliberations, the members convicted appellant of arson, in violation of Article 126, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 926 . He was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 12 months, total…”
United States v. Jones, 34 M.J. 899 (1992). “At the early stages of the investigation, it was prudent for Special Agent Weimer to advise the appellant of the most serious of the offenses that he was suspected of committing.”
United States v. Acevedo-Velez, 17 M.J. 1 (1983). “Opinion of the Court EVERETT, Chief Judge: Consistent with his pleas of guilty, appellant was convicted by a military judge, sitting as a general court-martial, on a charge of arson with three specifications, in violation of Article 126, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10…”
United States v. James, 5 M.J. 382 (1978). “Appellant was found guilty by a general court-martial, contrary to his pleas, of arson, in violation of Article 126, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 926 . This finding and the sentence to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement and total forfeitures for 2 years, and…”
United States v. James K. Mariea & Jerry M. Smith, United States of Am. v. James K. Mariea, 795 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir. 1986). “Defendants argue that if this court finds concurrent jurisdiction between the district court and the military court martial, their cases should nonetheless be heard in the military forum.”
United States v. Roach, 26 M.J. 859 (1988). “§ 910 ; and arson, in violation of Article 126, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 926 . Appellant pled guilty to the violations of Articles 90 and 110 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.