U.S. Code » Title 10 » Subtitle Subtitle A— General Military Law › Part PART II— PERSONNEL › Chapter CHAPTER 47A— MILITARY COMMISSIONS › Subchapter SUBCHAPTER IV— TRIAL PROCEDURE

10 U.S.C. § 949b

Unlawfully influencing action of military commission and United States Court of Military Commission Review

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(a)Military Commissions.—(1) No authority convening a military commission under this chapter may censure, reprimand, or admonish the military commission, or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the military commission, or with respect to any other exercises of its or their functions in the conduct of the proceedings.(2) No person may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence—(A) the action of a military commission under this chapter, or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case;(B) the action of any convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to their judicial acts; or(C) the exercise of professional judgment by trial counsel or defense counsel.(3) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply with respect to—(A) general instructional or informational courses in military justice if such courses are designed solely for the purpose of instructing members of a command in the substantive and procedural aspects of military commissions; or(B) statements and instructions given in open proceedings by a military judge or counsel.(b)United States Court of Military Commission Review.—(1) No person may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence—(A) the action of a judge on the United States Court of Military Commissions Review in reaching a decision on the findings or sentence on appeal in any case; or(B) the exercise of professional judgment by trial counsel or defense counsel appearing before the United States Court of Military Commission Review.(2) No person may censure, reprimand, or admonish a judge on the United States Court of Military Commission Review, or counsel thereof, with respect to any exercise of their functions in the conduct of proceedings under this chapter.(3) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply with respect to—(A) general instructional or informational courses in military justice if such courses are designed solely for the purpose of instructing members of a command in the substantive and procedural aspects of military commissions; or(B) statements and instructions given in open proceedings by a judge on the United States Court of Military Commission Review, or counsel.(4) No appellate military judge on the United States Court of Military Commission Review may be reassigned to other duties, except under circumstances as follows:(A) The appellate military judge voluntarily requests to be reassigned to other duties and the Secretary of Defense, or the designee of the Secretary, in consultation with the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which the appellate military judge is a member, approves such reassignment.(B) The appellate military judge retires or otherwise separates from the armed forces.(C) The appellate military judge is reassigned to other duties by the Secretary of Defense, or the designee of the Secretary, in consultation with the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which the appellate military judge is a member, based on military necessity and such reassignment is consistent with service rotation regulations (to the extent such regulations are applicable).(D) The appellate military judge is withdrawn by the Secretary of Defense, or the designee of the Secretary, in consultation with the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which the appellate military judge is a member, for good cause consistent with applicable procedures under chapter 47 of this title (the Uniform Code of Military Justice).(c)Prohibition on Consideration of Actions on Commission in Evaluation of Fitness.—In the preparation of an effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency report or any other report or document used in whole or in part for the purpose of determining whether a commissioned officer of the armed forces is qualified to be advanced in grade, or in determining the assignment or transfer of any such officer or whether any such officer should be retained on active duty, no person may—(1) consider or evaluate the performance of duty of any member of a military commission under this chapter; or(2) give a less favorable rating or evaluation to any commissioned officer because of the zeal with which such officer, in acting as counsel, represented any accused before a military commission under this chapter.(Added Pub. L. 111–84, div. A, title XVIII, § 1802, Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2583; amended Pub. L. 112–81, div. A, title X, § 1034(b), Dec. 31, 2011, 125 Stat. 1573.)Editorial NotesPrior Provisions

A prior section 949b, added Pub. L. 109–366, § 3(a)(1), Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2609, related to unlawfully influencing action of military commission, prior to the general amendment of this chapter by Pub. L. 111–84.

Amendments

2011—Subsec. (b)(1)(A). Pub. L. 112–81, § 1034(b)(1), substituted “a judge on” for “a military appellate judge or other duly appointed judge under this chapter on”.

Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 112–81, § 1034(b)(2), substituted “a judge on” for “a military appellate judge on”.

Subsec. (b)(3)(B). Pub. L. 112–81, § 1034(b)(3), substituted “a judge on” for “an appellate military judge or a duly appointed appellate judge on”.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 2011–2025 · leading case: In re Al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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In re Al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71 (D.C. Cir. 2016). · cites it 2× “10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(4). Because removal is “a powerful tool for control,” Edmond, 520 U.”
United States v. Ortiz, 76 M.J. 189 (C.A.A.F. 2017). “We specified an additional issue, asking whether Colonel Mitchell’s appointment to the USCMCR made him a principal officer in light of 10 U.S.C. § 949b(4)(C), (D) (2012), which authorize the Secretary of Defense to reassign or withdraw appellate military judges from the USCMCR.”
In re: Omar Khadr, 823 F.3d 92 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(l)(A). In line with that statutory prohibition, the Department of Defense has expressly represented to this Court that it may not pay Judge Pollard any special bonus (including a retention incentive payment) for his work.”
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States, 967 F.3d 858 (D.C. Cir. 2020). “” See 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(2)(B) (2006). Yet such insulation was also present in Edmond: The judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals are removable at will only by the Judge Advocate General, who is prohibited from “influenc[ing] (by threat of removal or otherwise) the outcome of…”
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States, 77 F.4th 918 (D.C. Cir. 2023). “at 873 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(2)(B) (2006)). All those factors weighed in favor of concluding that the convening authority was an inferior officer.”
United States v. Carter, 76 M.J. 130 (C.A.A.F. 2017). “MITCHELL WAS IN FACT A PRINCIPAL OFFICER FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY COMMISSION REVIEW IN LIGHT OF THE PROVISIONS OF 10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(4)(C) AND (D), AUTHORIZING-REASSIGNMENT OR WITHDRAWAL OF APPELLATE MILITARY JUDGES SO…”
United States v. Mohammad, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (Regl. Rail Reorg. Act 2019). · cites it 2× “See 10 U.S.C. § 949b(4). In contrast, the CMCR's predecessor was an agency review panel created by the 2006 MCA.”
In re: United States of Am. (D.C. Cir. 2025). · cites it 2× “See 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(2)(B) (“No person may attempt to coerce or, by any 16 unauthorized means, influence … the action of any convening … authority with respect to their judicial acts.”
In re: United States of Am. (D.C. Cir. 2025). · cites it 2× “See 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(2)(B) (“No person may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence … the action of any convening … authority with respect to their judicial acts.”
Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Al-Nashir v. (D.C. Cir. 2015). · cites it 2× “Despite these similarities, however, there are key differences between CMCR judges and their CCA counterparts. While the Judge Advocates General can remove CCA judges without cause, the Defense Secretary can remove military judges from the CMCR for “good cause” or “military…”
Bin Lep v. Trump (D.D.C. 2021). “” 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(1). Providing government habeas counsel with the necessary information to offer this Court a complete and honest assessment of the status of Bin Lep’s commission proceedings, including any foreseeable sources of delay, does not contravene this provision.”
United States v. Ortiz, 76 M.J. 46 (C.A.A.F. 2016). “MITCHELL WAS IN FACT A PRINCIPAL OFFICER FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY COMMISSION REVIEW IN LIGHT OF THE PROVISIONS OF 10 U.S.C. § 949b(4)(C) AND (D), AUTHORIZING REASSIGNMENT OR WITHDRAWAL OF APPELLATE MILITARY JUDGES SO…”
Show all 14 citing cases →
— 10 U.S.C. § 949b(4) — 1 case
United States v. Mohammad, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (Regl. Rail Reorg. Act 2019). “See 10 U.S.C. § 949b(4). In contrast, the CMCR's predecessor was an agency review panel created by the 2006 MCA.”
— 10 U.S.C. § 949b(4)(C) — 2 cases
United States v. Ortiz, 76 M.J. 189 (C.A.A.F. 2017). “We specified an additional issue, asking whether Colonel Mitchell’s appointment to the USCMCR made him a principal officer in light of 10 U.S.C. § 949b(4)(C), (D) (2012), which authorize the Secretary of Defense to reassign or withdraw appellate military judges from the USCMCR.”
United States v. Ortiz, 76 M.J. 46 (C.A.A.F. 2016). “MITCHELL WAS IN FACT A PRINCIPAL OFFICER FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY COMMISSION REVIEW IN LIGHT OF THE PROVISIONS OF 10 U.S.C. § 949b(4)(C) AND (D), AUTHORIZING REASSIGNMENT OR WITHDRAWAL OF APPELLATE MILITARY JUDGES SO…”
— 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(1) — 1 case
Bin Lep v. Trump (D.D.C. 2021). “” 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(1). Providing government habeas counsel with the necessary information to offer this Court a complete and honest assessment of the status of Bin Lep’s commission proceedings, including any foreseeable sources of delay, does not contravene this provision.”
— 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(2)(B) — 5 cases
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States, 967 F.3d 858 (D.C. Cir. 2020). “” See 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(2)(B) (2006). Yet such insulation was also present in Edmond: The judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals are removable at will only by the Judge Advocate General, who is prohibited from “influenc[ing] (by threat of removal or otherwise) the outcome of…”
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States, 77 F.4th 918 (D.C. Cir. 2023). “at 873 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(2)(B) (2006)). All those factors weighed in favor of concluding that the convening authority was an inferior officer.”
In re: United States of Am. (D.C. Cir. 2025). “See 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(2)(B) (“No person may attempt to coerce or, by any 16 unauthorized means, influence … the action of any convening … authority with respect to their judicial acts.”
In re: United States of Am. (D.C. Cir. 2025). “See 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(2)(B) (“No person may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence … the action of any convening … authority with respect to their judicial acts.”
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States (D.C. Cir. 2023).
— 10 U.S.C. § 949b(b) — 2 cases
United States v. Mohammad, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (Regl. Rail Reorg. Act 2019). “See 10 U.S.C. § 949b(4). In contrast, the CMCR's predecessor was an agency review panel created by the 2006 MCA.”
United States v. Al Bahlul, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (M.C. 2011).
— 10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(4) — 2 cases
In re Al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(4). Because removal is “a powerful tool for control,” Edmond, 520 U.”
Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Al-Nashir v. (D.C. Cir. 2015). “Despite these similarities, however, there are key differences between CMCR judges and their CCA counterparts. While the Judge Advocates General can remove CCA judges without cause, the Defense Secretary can remove military judges from the CMCR for “good cause” or “military…”
— 10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(4)(C) — 1 case
United States v. Carter, 76 M.J. 130 (C.A.A.F. 2017). “MITCHELL WAS IN FACT A PRINCIPAL OFFICER FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY COMMISSION REVIEW IN LIGHT OF THE PROVISIONS OF 10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(4)(C) AND (D), AUTHORIZING-REASSIGNMENT OR WITHDRAWAL OF APPELLATE MILITARY JUDGES SO…”
— 10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(l)(A) — 1 case
In re: Omar Khadr, 823 F.3d 92 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(l)(A). In line with that statutory prohibition, the Department of Defense has expressly represented to this Court that it may not pay Judge Pollard any special bonus (including a retention incentive payment) for his work.”
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