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U.S. CodeTitle 12Chapter 27— Real Estate Settlement Procedures

12 U.S.C. § 2617 (2026)

Authority of Bureau

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1982–2026 75citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 75 opinions since 1982, 10 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (2 cases).

(a) Issuance of regulations; exemptions

The Bureau is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations, to make such interpretations, and to grant such reasonable exemptions for classes of transactions, as may be necessary to achieve the purposes of this chapter.

(b) Liability for acts done in good faith in conformity with rule, regulation, or interpretation

No provision of this chapter or the laws of any State imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule, regulation, or interpretation thereof by the Bureau or the Attorney General, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such rule, regulation, or interpretation is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.

(c) Investigations; hearings; failure to obey order; contempt(1) The Secretary 11 Probably should be “The Bureau”. may investigate any facts, conditions, practices, or matters that may be deemed necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter, in prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in securing information to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation concerning real estate settlement practices. To aid in the investigations, the Bureau is authorized to hold such hearings, administer such oaths, and require by subpena the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and production of such documents as the Bureau deems advisable.(2) Any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which an inquiry is carried on may, in the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena of the Bureau issued under this section, issue an order requiring compliance therewith; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.(d) Delay of effectiveness of recent final regulation relating to payments to employees(1) In generalThe amendment to part 3500 of title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations contained in the final regulation prescribed by the Secretary and published in the Federal Register on June 7, 1996, which will, as of the effective date of such amendment—(A) eliminate the exemption for payments by an employer to employees of such employer for referral activities which is currently codified as section 3500.14(g)(1)(vii) of such title 24; and(B) replace such exemption with a more limited exemption in new clauses (vii), (viii), and (ix) of section 3500.14 of such title 24,shall not take effect before July 31, 1997.(2) Continuation of prior rule

The regulation codified as section 3500.14(g)(1)(vii) of title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations, relating to employer-employee payments, as in effect on May 1, 1996, shall remain in effect until the date the amendment referred to in paragraph (1) takes effect in accordance with such paragraph.

(3) Public notice of effective date

The Secretary shall provide public notice of the date on which the amendment referred to in paragraph (1) will take effect in accordance with such paragraph not less than 90 days and not more than 180 days before such effective date.

(Pub. L. 93–533, § 19, as added Pub. L. 94–205, § 10, Jan. 2, 1976, 89 Stat. 1159; amended Pub. L. 98–181, title I [title IV, § 461(e)], Nov. 30, 1983, 97 Stat. 1232; Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title II, § 2103(f), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–401; Pub. L. 111–203, title X, § 1098(11), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2104.)Editorial NotesAmendments

2010—Pub. L. 111–203, § 1098(11)(A), substituted “Bureau” for “Secretary” in section catchline.

Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 111–203, § 1098(11)(B), substituted “Bureau” for “Secretary”.

Subsecs. (b), (c). Pub. L. 111–203, § 1098(11)(C), substituted “the Bureau” for “the Secretary” wherever appearing.

1996—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 104–208 added subsec. (d).

1983—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98–181 added subsec. (c).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2010 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 111–203 effective on the designated transfer date, see section 1100H of Pub. L. 111–203, set out as a note under section 552a of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

Effective Date of 1983 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–181 effective Jan. 1, 1984, see section 461(f) of Pub. L. 98–181, set out as a note under section 2602 of this title.

Effective Date

Section effective Jan. 2, 1976, see section 12 of Pub. L. 94–205, set out as an Effective Date of 1976 Amendment note under section 2602 of this title.

The 20 cases that cite 12 U.S.C. § 2617 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBettina J. Schuetz v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 292 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002).
cites § 2617 4×cited by 78 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“12 U.S.C. § 2617 (a). HUD has issued regulations pursuant to this authority.”
The case’s holding
HUD policy statements interpreting RESPA are entitled to Chevron deference even if they are not the result of formal rulemaking or adjudication.
Later courts cite it for
“congress enacted respa in 1974 to protect home buyers from inflated prices in the home purchasing process.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENStewart Title Guar. Co. v. Am. Abstract & Title Co., 215 S.W.3d 596 (Ark. 2005).
cites § 2617 4×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“2001), Article 2, Section 19 of the Arkansas Constitution, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2617 (a) (1994). Specifically, Abstract alleged that Guaranty entered into "sham transactions," or alleged kickback schemes, involving Real Estate…”
The case’s holding
Intent is established when a party knows that a breach is substantially certain to result from their conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“any prospective business relationship that would be of pecuniary value constitutes a valid business expectancy.” · 5 citing courts
3
GREENNedzad Krzalic v. Repub. Title Co., 314 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2002).
cites § 2617 3×cited by 93 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“But in response to our decision, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which Congress has authorized to “prescribe such regulations, to make such interpretations, and to grant such reasonable exemptions for classes of transactions, as may be necessary to achieve the…”
The case’s holding
A mere announcement of an agency policy lacking formal and deliberative procedures does not merit Chevron deference.
Later courts cite it for
“preserves language as an effective medium of communication from legislatures to courts” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENWeatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank of Fox Valley, N.A., 713 N.E.2d 543 (Ill. 1999).
cites § 2617 4×cited by 121 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“(1998)), the regulation prescribed by HUD to interpret and implement RESPA, provides further support for the conclusion that a lender is not required to itemize all charges relating to settlement in the good-faith estimate.”
The case’s holding
Compliance with federal requirements under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act precludes liability under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.
Later courts cite it for
“actions specifically authorized by respa satisfy section 10b (1) of the consumer fraud act because they are 'actions or transactions specifically authorized by laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the united states .” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENCohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2007).
cites § 2617 2×cited by 164 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“12 U.S.C. § 2617 . In these circumstances, Pension Benefit does not permit us to conclude, merely from the absence of an example of undivided charges in RESPA’s legislative history, that Congress thereby expressed its clear intent that § 8(b) not protect consumers from any…”
The case’s holding
A fee collected in violation of federal or state law may satisfy the misleading element of New York's deceptive practices statute.
Later courts cite it for
“has three elements: (1) the defendant's challenged acts or practices must have been directed at consumers, (2) the acts or practices must have been misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff must have sustained injury as a result.” · 10 citing courts
6
GREENMichael Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 915 F.3d 987 (5th Cir. 2019).
cites § 2617 1×cited by 107 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“" 12 U.S.C. § 2617 (repealed 2011). With that authority, HUD issued the cited regulation.”
The case’s holding
A movant for summary judgment need not set forth evidence when the nonmovant bears the burden of persuasion at trial.
Later courts cite it for
“a movant for summary judgment need not set forth evidence when the nonmovant bears the burden of persuasion at trial.” · 17 citing courts
7
GREENMcKell v. Washington Mut., Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457 (Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 2617 2×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“' 12 U.S.C. § 2617 (a)." ( Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.”
The case’s holding
California law does not recognize a standalone cause of action for unjust enrichment.
8
GREENFrancisco J. Echevarria v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 256 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2001).
cites § 2617 2×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“12 U.S.C. § 2617 (a) bestows upon HUD broad power to “prescribe such rules and regulations, [and] to make such interpretations .”
The case’s holding
A title company violates RESPA Section 8(b) only if it shares or accepts unearned fees with a third party rather than simply retaining an overcharge.
Later courts cite it for
“absent a formal commitment by hud to an opposing position, we decline to overrule our established respa 8(b) case law.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENJohnson v. Matrix Fin. Servs. Corp., 820 N.E.2d 1094 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
cites § 2617 2×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“2002), quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2617 (a) (2000)), have gone back and forth on the proper standard for assessing the legality of a particular YSP See Dominguez v.”
The case’s holding
A consumer fraud claim based on a RESPA violation fails if the complaint does not allege ultimate facts showing the compensation was unreasonable or violated the statute.
Later courts cite it for
“the pleader is required to set out ultimate facts that support the cause of action.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENBlock v. Seneca Mortg. Servicing, 221 F. Supp. 3d 559 (D.N.J. 2016).
cites § 2617 1×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“See 12 U.S.C. § 2617 (a). These rules are codified at 12 C.”
The case’s holding
A servicer is not a debt collector under the FDCPA, and a complaint fails to state a claim, unless it plausibly alleges the loan was in default when servicing was assigned.
Later courts cite it for
“the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to show that the defendant was assigned the plaintiff's loan after it had gone into default, and was therefore a 'debt collector' subject to the fdcpa.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENBerneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 708 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2013).
cites § 2617 1×cited by 133 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“21 , pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking, which granted servicers the authority to designate an exclusive address for receipt of QWRs under (e)(1) of the implementing regulations of RESPA.”
The case’s holding
A servicer's duties under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act are triggered only when a qualified written request is received at the designated address.
Later courts cite it for
“generally, a court considers only the contents of the complaint when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion.” · 14 citing courts
12
GREENLage v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, 145 F. Supp. 3d 1172 (S.D. Fla. 2015).
cites § 2617 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“See 12 U.S.C. § 2617 (a). One such implementing' regulation, Regulation X, places various obligations on mortgage servicers when a borrower submits a loss mitigation application.”
Later courts cite it for
“however, there exists a subtle yet noteworthy distinction between 'new arguments and evidence, on the one hand, and rebuttal arguments and evidence, on the other.' while raising new arguments on reply is generally inappropriate, reply evidence 'may contain facts not previously mentioned in the opening brief, as long as the facts rebut elements of the opposition memorandum and do not raise wholly new factual issues.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENKruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2004).
cites § 2617 4×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“” 12 U.S.C. § 2617 (a). 9 The *60 Policy Statement, which was published in the Federal Register, see 66 Fed.”
Later courts cite it for
“we conclude that section 8(b) clearly and unambiguously does not extend to overcharges.” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENJanet G. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Co., 277 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002).
cites § 2617 1×cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“See 12 U.S.C. § 2617 . 5 . See 40 Fed.Reg. 22451, 22459 and 22460 (information booklet); 22453-56 (settlement statement) (May 22, 1975).”
The case’s holding
A federal statute specifically relates to the business of insurance if its language refers specifically to insurance, even if it does not relate predominantly to insurance.
15
GREENTrust v. Barua, 184 A.D.3d 140 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2020).
cites § 2617 1×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“Indeed, for residential mortgage loans subject to the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (hereinafter RESPA), the rules promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection Board pursuant to RESPA require the issuance of statements for each periodic billing period ( see…”
The case’s holding
The voluntary discontinuance of a foreclosure action does not constitute an affirmative act of revoking a prior acceleration of debt without clear and unambiguous evidence of de-acceleration.
Later courts cite it for
“repeatedly held that a lender's mere act of discontinuing an action, without more, does not constitute, in and of itself, an affirmative act of revoking an earlier acceleration of the debt” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENTualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2008).
cites § 2617 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“3d at 1012 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2617 (a)). Second, the Policy Statement was published in the Federal Register.”
Later courts cite it for
“suggests that congress implicitly ratified” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENMcKell v. Washington Mut., Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457 (Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 2617 2×cited by 162 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“’ 12 U.S.C. § 2617 (a).” (Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.”
The case’s holding
California law does not recognize a standalone cause of action for unjust enrichment.
Later courts cite it for
“a business practice is unfair within the meaning of the ucl if it violates established public policy or if it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits.” · 37 citing courts
18
GREENLonnie Glover Dawn Glover v. Stand. Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2002).
cites § 2617 1×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“” 12 U.S.C. § 2617 (a). HUD promulgated rules under RESPA at 24 C.”
The case’s holding
Determining whether a yield spread premium violates RESPA requires a loan-by-loan inquiry into whether the payment was for services actually furnished and whether the amount was reasonable.
Later courts cite it for
“permissive language of section 8(c) . . . clearly states that reasonable payments for goods, facilities or services actually furnished are not prohibited by respa, even when done in connection with the referral of a particular loan to a particular lender” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENMartinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 598 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2010).
cites § 2617 1×cited by 61 cases
The case’s holding
The National Bank Act preempts state claims regarding unfair or fraudulent fee-setting and cost disclosure that impair a national bank's federally authorized lending powers.
Later courts cite it for
“state laws of general application, which merely require all businesses (including national banks) to refrain from fraudulent, unfair, or illegal behavior, do not necessarily impair a bank's ability to exercise its federally-authorized powers.” · 7 citing courts
20
GREENSteven Bivens v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 868 F.3d 915 (11th Cir. 2017).
cites § 2617 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 2617
“” 12 U.S.C. § 2617 (repealed 2011). Under this authority, the Secretary promulgated Regulation X, 24, C.”
Later courts cite it for
“respa is a consumer protection statute that imposes a duty on servicers of mortgage loans to acknowledge and respond to inquiries from borrowers.” · 6 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198220042026

One bar per year. Tallest: 10 cases in 2002. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
11th Cir.79th Cir.5S.D. Fla.5Ill. App. Ct.55th Cir.47th Cir.46th Cir.3D. Md.3

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 37 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)2 cases
Rhonda J. Clark v. HSBC Bank USA, 664 F. App'x 810 (11th Cir. 2016).
Yeh Ho v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 9:15-cv-81522 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2020).

Show all 75 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments
(Pub. L. 93–533, § 19, as added Pub. L. 94–205, § 10, Jan. 2, 1976, 89 Stat. 1159; amended Pub. L. 98–181, title I [title IV, § 461(e)], Nov. 30, 1983, 97 Stat. 1232; Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title II, § 2103(f), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–401; Pub. L. 111–203, title X, § 1098(11), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2104.)
Amendment years (notes): 2010, 1996, 1983
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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