Notes of Decisions
Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
· cites it 2× “In its principal substantive provisions, the CROA prohibits certain practices, §1679b, establishes certain requirements for contracts with consumers, §1679d, and gives consumers a right to cancel, §1679e. Enforcement is achieved through the Act’s provision of a private cause of…”
Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010).
· cites it 3× “” A “credit repair organization” is defined by the act as: any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails to sell, provide, or perform (or represent that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of…”
Hillis v. Equifax Consum. Servs., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
· cites it 4× “The failure to define "credit record, credit history, or credit rating” is puzzling given Congress's inclusion of other definitions in 15 U.S.C. § 1679a, including a definition for "consumer credit transaction” even though that phrase is not mentioned elsewhere in the statute.”
Laverne Jones v. Bernaldo Dancel, 792 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2015).
· cites it 2× “” 10 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3). ’ Given the absence of binding precedent requiring a contrary result, we conclude that the arbitrator’s determination, that “amount[s] paid” under the Act were limited to sums paid by the plaintiffs in return for the defendants’ services, did not…”
Greene v. CCDN, LLC, 853 F. Supp. 2d 739 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
· cites it 4× “Plaintiffs seek to resolve their lawsuit against Defendants in one fell swoop, moving for summary judgment on the following four issues: (1) Whether each of the Defendants is a “credit repair organization” under the CROA, 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3), and whether each of the Defendants…”
Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 409 F.3d 473 (1st Cir. 2005).
· cites it 8× “See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(i). The question we face is whether an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination that an entity is tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) is sufficient to bring the entity within the statutory exclusion set forth in § 1679(a)(3)(B)(i).”
Enriquez v. Countrywide Home Loans, FSB, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D. Haw. 2011).
· cites it 3× “; Count XVII — violation of the right to privacy under the Hawai’i Constitution; Count XVIII- — violation of “Equal Credit Opportunity (Regulation B)”; and Count XIX — violations of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679a, et seq. (“CROA”). Plaintiff seeks the…”
Schnell v. Bank of New York Mellon, 828 F. Supp. 2d 798 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
· cites it 2× “ent that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration, for the express or implied purpose of— (i) improving any consumer’s credit record, credit history, or credit rating; or (ii) providing…”
Plattner v. Edge Solutions, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
· cites it 3× “2d at 727 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)). The allegations of the complaint do not suggest that Edge was a credit repair organization when it provided the Debt Melt Down Program.”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(2) — 1 case
Enriquez v. Countrywide Home Loans, FSB, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D. Haw. 2011).
“; Count XVII — violation of the right to privacy under the Hawai’i Constitution; Count XVIII- — violation of “Equal Credit Opportunity (Regulation B)”; and Count XIX — violations of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679a, et seq. (“CROA”). Plaintiff seeks the…”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3) — 26 cases
Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
“In its principal substantive provisions, the CROA prohibits certain practices, §1679b, establishes certain requirements for contracts with consumers, §1679d, and gives consumers a right to cancel, §1679e. Enforcement is achieved through the Act’s provision of a private cause of…”
Laverne Jones v. Bernaldo Dancel, 792 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2015).
“” 10 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3). ’ Given the absence of binding precedent requiring a contrary result, we conclude that the arbitrator’s determination, that “amount[s] paid” under the Act were limited to sums paid by the plaintiffs in return for the defendants’ services, did not…”
Hillis v. Equifax Consum. Servs., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
“The failure to define "credit record, credit history, or credit rating” is puzzling given Congress's inclusion of other definitions in 15 U.S.C. § 1679a, including a definition for "consumer credit transaction” even though that phrase is not mentioned elsewhere in the statute.”
Greene v. CCDN, LLC, 853 F. Supp. 2d 739 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
“Plaintiffs seek to resolve their lawsuit against Defendants in one fell swoop, moving for summary judgment on the following four issues: (1) Whether each of the Defendants is a “credit repair organization” under the CROA, 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3), and whether each of the Defendants…”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A) — 30 cases
Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010).
“” A “credit repair organization” is defined by the act as: any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails to sell, provide, or perform (or represent that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of…”
Greene v. CCDN, LLC, 853 F. Supp. 2d 739 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
“Plaintiffs seek to resolve their lawsuit against Defendants in one fell swoop, moving for summary judgment on the following four issues: (1) Whether each of the Defendants is a “credit repair organization” under the CROA, 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3), and whether each of the Defendants…”
Plattner v. Edge Solutions, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
“2d at 727 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)). The allegations of the complaint do not suggest that Edge was a credit repair organization when it provided the Debt Melt Down Program.”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A)(i) — 1 case
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B) — 2 cases
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(i) — 7 cases
Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 409 F.3d 473 (1st Cir. 2005).
“See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(i). The question we face is whether an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination that an entity is tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) is sufficient to bring the entity within the statutory exclusion set forth in § 1679(a)(3)(B)(i).”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(ii) — 1 case
Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 409 F.3d 473 (1st Cir. 2005).
“See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(i). The question we face is whether an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination that an entity is tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) is sufficient to bring the entity within the statutory exclusion set forth in § 1679(a)(3)(B)(i).”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(iii) — 3 cases
Schnell v. Bank of New York Mellon, 828 F. Supp. 2d 798 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
“ent that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration, for the express or implied purpose of— (i) improving any consumer’s credit record, credit history, or credit rating; or (ii) providing…”
Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 409 F.3d 473 (1st Cir. 2005).
“See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(i). The question we face is whether an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination that an entity is tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) is sufficient to bring the entity within the statutory exclusion set forth in § 1679(a)(3)(B)(i).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.