15 U.S.C. § 1679a

Definitions

Read at: OLRCuscode.house.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov JustiaTitle 15 CasesGoogle Scholar
For purposes of this subchapter, the following definitions apply:(1) Consumer

The term “consumer” means an individual.

(2) Consumer credit transaction

The term “consumer credit transaction” means any transaction in which credit is offered or extended to an individual for personal, family, or household purposes.

(3) Credit repair organizationThe term “credit repair organization”—(A) means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails to sell, provide, or perform (or represent that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration, for the express or implied purpose of—(i) improving any consumer’s credit record, credit history, or credit rating; or(ii) providing advice or assistance to any consumer with regard to any activity or service described in clause (i); and(B) does not include—(i) any nonprofit organization which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of title 26;(ii) any creditor (as defined in section 1602 of this title), with respect to any consumer, to the extent the creditor is assisting the consumer to restructure any debt owed by the consumer to the creditor; or(iii) any depository institution (as that term is defined in section 1813 of title 12) or any Federal or State credit union (as those terms are defined in section 1752 of title 12), or any affiliate or subsidiary of such a depository institution or credit union.(4) Credit

The term “credit” has the meaning given to such term in section 1602(e) 11 See References in Text note below. of this title.

(Pub. L. 90–321, title IV, § 403, as added Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title II, § 2451, Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–455.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

Section 1602(e) of this title, referred to in par. (4), was redesignated section 1602(f) of this title by Pub. L. 111–203, title X, § 1100A(1)(A), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2107.

Prior Provisions

For a prior section 403 of Pub. L. 90–321, see note set out under section 1679 of this title.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Section applicable after the end of the 6-month period beginning on Sept. 30, 1996, except with respect to contracts entered into by a credit repair organization before the end of such period, see section 413 of Pub. L. 90–321, as added by Pub. L. 104–208, set out as a note under section 1679 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 58 cases (15 in the last 5 years), 1998–2026 · leading case: Baker v. Fam. Credit Counseling Copr., 440 F. Supp. 2d 392 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
Baker v. Fam. Credit Counseling Copr., 440 F. Supp. 2d 392 (E.D. Pa. 2006). · cites it 4× “15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3). Various acts are prohibited under the CROA.”
Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). · cites it 2× “In its principal substantive provisions, the CROA prohibits certain practices, §1679b, establishes certain requirements for contracts with consumers, §1679d, and gives consumers a right to cancel, §1679e. Enforcement is achieved through the Act’s provision of a private cause of…”
Zimmermann v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Mass. 2008). · cites it 5× “15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A). Defendants argue that they do not fall within this broad category.”
Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010). · cites it 3× “” A “credit repair organization” is defined by the act as: any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails to sell, provide, or perform (or represent that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of…”
Hillis v. Equifax Consum. Servs., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. Ga. 2006). · cites it 4× “The failure to define "credit record, credit history, or credit rating” is puzzling given Congress's inclusion of other definitions in 15 U.S.C. § 1679a, including a definition for "consumer credit transaction” even though that phrase is not mentioned elsewhere in the statute.”
Laverne Jones v. Bernaldo Dancel, 792 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2015). · cites it 2× “” 10 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3). ’ Given the absence of binding precedent requiring a contrary result, we conclude that the arbitrator’s determination, that “amount[s] paid” under the Act were limited to sums paid by the plaintiffs in return for the defendants’ services, did not…”
Philip Rannis v. Peter Recchia, 380 F. App'x 646 (9th Cir. 2010). · cites it 2× “” 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A). Recchia meets these requirements.”
Greene v. CCDN, LLC, 853 F. Supp. 2d 739 (N.D. Ill. 2011). · cites it 4× “Plaintiffs seek to resolve their lawsuit against Defendants in one fell swoop, moving for summary judgment on the following four issues: (1) Whether each of the Defendants is a “credit repair organization” under the CROA, 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3), and whether each of the Defendants…”
Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 409 F.3d 473 (1st Cir. 2005). · cites it 8× “See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(i). The question we face is whether an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination that an entity is tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) is sufficient to bring the entity within the statutory exclusion set forth in § 1679(a)(3)(B)(i).”
Enriquez v. Countrywide Home Loans, FSB, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D. Haw. 2011). · cites it 3× “; Count XVII — violation of the right to privacy under the Hawai’i Constitution; Count XVIII- — violation of “Equal Credit Opportunity (Regulation B)”; and Count XIX — violations of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679a, et seq. (“CROA”). Plaintiff seeks the…”
Schnell v. Bank of New York Mellon, 828 F. Supp. 2d 798 (E.D. Pa. 2011). · cites it 2× “ent that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration, for the express or implied purpose of— (i) improving any consumer’s credit record, credit history, or credit rating; or (ii) providing…”
Plattner v. Edge Solutions, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Ill. 2006). · cites it 3× “2d at 727 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)). The allegations of the complaint do not suggest that Edge was a credit repair organization when it provided the Debt Melt Down Program.”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(2) — 1 case
Enriquez v. Countrywide Home Loans, FSB, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D. Haw. 2011). “; Count XVII — violation of the right to privacy under the Hawai’i Constitution; Count XVIII- — violation of “Equal Credit Opportunity (Regulation B)”; and Count XIX — violations of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679a, et seq. (“CROA”). Plaintiff seeks the…”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3) — 26 cases
Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). “In its principal substantive provisions, the CROA prohibits certain practices, §1679b, establishes certain requirements for contracts with consumers, §1679d, and gives consumers a right to cancel, §1679e. Enforcement is achieved through the Act’s provision of a private cause of…”
Laverne Jones v. Bernaldo Dancel, 792 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2015). “” 10 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3). ’ Given the absence of binding precedent requiring a contrary result, we conclude that the arbitrator’s determination, that “amount[s] paid” under the Act were limited to sums paid by the plaintiffs in return for the defendants’ services, did not…”
Baker v. Fam. Credit Counseling Copr., 440 F. Supp. 2d 392 (E.D. Pa. 2006). “15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3). Various acts are prohibited under the CROA.”
Hillis v. Equifax Consum. Servs., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. Ga. 2006). “The failure to define "credit record, credit history, or credit rating” is puzzling given Congress's inclusion of other definitions in 15 U.S.C. § 1679a, including a definition for "consumer credit transaction” even though that phrase is not mentioned elsewhere in the statute.”
Greene v. CCDN, LLC, 853 F. Supp. 2d 739 (N.D. Ill. 2011). “Plaintiffs seek to resolve their lawsuit against Defendants in one fell swoop, moving for summary judgment on the following four issues: (1) Whether each of the Defendants is a “credit repair organization” under the CROA, 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3), and whether each of the Defendants…”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A) — 30 cases
Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010). “” A “credit repair organization” is defined by the act as: any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails to sell, provide, or perform (or represent that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of…”
Philip Rannis v. Peter Recchia, 380 F. App'x 646 (9th Cir. 2010). “” 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A). Recchia meets these requirements.”
Zimmermann v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Mass. 2008). “15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A). Defendants argue that they do not fall within this broad category.”
Greene v. CCDN, LLC, 853 F. Supp. 2d 739 (N.D. Ill. 2011). “Plaintiffs seek to resolve their lawsuit against Defendants in one fell swoop, moving for summary judgment on the following four issues: (1) Whether each of the Defendants is a “credit repair organization” under the CROA, 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3), and whether each of the Defendants…”
Plattner v. Edge Solutions, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Ill. 2006). “2d at 727 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)). The allegations of the complaint do not suggest that Edge was a credit repair organization when it provided the Debt Melt Down Program.”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A)(i) — 1 case
Zimmerman v. Puccio (1st Cir. 2010).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B) — 2 cases
Poskin v. TD Banknorth, N.A., 687 F. Supp. 2d 530 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
Lopez v. ML 3, LLC, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2009).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(i) — 7 cases
Baker v. Fam. Credit Counseling Copr., 440 F. Supp. 2d 392 (E.D. Pa. 2006). “15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3). Various acts are prohibited under the CROA.”
Zimmermann v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Mass. 2008). “15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A). Defendants argue that they do not fall within this broad category.”
Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 409 F.3d 473 (1st Cir. 2005). “See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(i). The question we face is whether an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination that an entity is tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) is sufficient to bring the entity within the statutory exclusion set forth in § 1679(a)(3)(B)(i).”
Polacsek v. Debticated Consum. Counseling, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 539 (D. Maryland 2005).
Limpert v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 360 (E.D.N.Y 2004).
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(ii) — 1 case
Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 409 F.3d 473 (1st Cir. 2005). “See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(i). The question we face is whether an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination that an entity is tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) is sufficient to bring the entity within the statutory exclusion set forth in § 1679(a)(3)(B)(i).”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(iii) — 3 cases
Schnell v. Bank of New York Mellon, 828 F. Supp. 2d 798 (E.D. Pa. 2011). “ent that such person can or will sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration, for the express or implied purpose of— (i) improving any consumer’s credit record, credit history, or credit rating; or (ii) providing…”
Karakus v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 941 F. Supp. 2d 318 (E.D.N.Y 2013).
Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 409 F.3d 473 (1st Cir. 2005). “See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(B)(i). The question we face is whether an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination that an entity is tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) is sufficient to bring the entity within the statutory exclusion set forth in § 1679(a)(3)(B)(i).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.