15 U.S.C. § 1691d

Applicability of other laws

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(a) Requests for signature of husband and wife for creation of valid lien, etc.

A request for the signature of both parties to a marriage for the purpose of creating a valid lien, passing clear title, waiving inchoate rights to property, or assigning earnings, shall not constitute discrimination under this subchapter: Provided, however, That this provision shall not be construed to permit a creditor to take sex or marital status into account in connection with the evaluation of creditworthiness of any applicant.

(b) State property laws affecting creditworthiness

Consideration or application of State property laws directly or indirectly affecting creditworthiness shall not constitute discrimination for purposes of this subchapter.

Any provision of State law which prohibits the separate extension of consumer credit to each party to a marriage shall not apply in any case where each party to a marriage voluntarily applies for separate credit from the same creditor: Provided, That in any case where such a State law is so preempted, each party to the marriage shall be solely responsible for the debt so contracted.

(d) Combining credit accounts of husband and wife with same creditor to determine permissible finance charges or loan ceilings under Federal or State laws

When each party to a marriage separately and voluntarily applies for and obtains separate credit accounts with the same creditor, those accounts shall not be aggregated or otherwise combined for purposes of determining permissible finance charges or permissible loan ceilings under the laws of any State or of the United States.

(e) Election of remedies under subchapter or State law; nature of relief determining applicability

Where the same act or omission constitutes a violation of this subchapter and of applicable State law, a person aggrieved by such conduct may bring a legal action to recover monetary damages either under this subchapter or under such State law, but not both. This election of remedies shall not apply to court actions in which the relief sought does not include monetary damages or to administrative actions.

(f) Compliance with inconsistent State laws; determination of inconsistency

This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with, the laws of any State with respect to credit discrimination, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. The Bureau is authorized to determine whether such inconsistencies exist. The Bureau may not determine that any State law is inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter if the Bureau determines that such law gives greater protection to the applicant.

(g) Exemption by regulation of credit transactions covered by State law; failure to comply with State law

The Bureau shall by regulation exempt from the requirements of sections 1691 and 1691a of this title any class of credit transactions within any State if it determines that under the law of that State that class of transactions is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed under this subchapter or that such law gives greater protection to the applicant, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement. Failure to comply with any requirement of such State law in any transaction so exempted shall constitute a violation of this subchapter for the purposes of section 1691e of this title.

(Pub. L. 90–321, title VII, § 705, as added Pub. L. 93–495, title V, § 503, Oct. 28, 1974, 88 Stat. 1523; amended Pub. L. 94–239, § 5, Mar. 23, 1976, 90 Stat. 253; Pub. L. 111–203, title X, § 1085(1), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2083.)Editorial NotesAmendments

2010—Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 111–203 substituted “Bureau” for “Board” wherever appearing.

1976—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 94–239, § 5(1), substituted provisions requiring an election of remedies in legal actions involving the recovery of monetary damages, for provisions specifying a general election of remedies.

Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 94–239, § 5(2), added subsecs. (f) and (g).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2010 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 111–203 effective on the designated transfer date, see section 1100H of Pub. L. 111–203, set out as a note under section 552a of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

Effective Date of 1976 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 94–239 effective Mar. 23, 1976, see section 708 of Pub. L. 90–321, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1691 of this title.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 24 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case: Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).

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Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). · cites it 2× “§1691 (a)(1) (Equal Credit Oppor- tunity Act)  15 U. S. C. §1691d(a) (Equal Credit Oppor- tunity Act)  15 U.”

Kellie Ballard v. Bank of Am., N.A., 734 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2013). · cites it 3× “” 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a) (2006). ECOA regulations clarify that, in an application for secured credit, “a creditor may require the signature of the applicant’s spouse .”

Gonzalez v. NAFH Nat'l Bank, 93 So. 3d 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). · cites it 2× “15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a) (emphasis added); see also 12 C.”

In Re DiPietro, 135 B.R. 773 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992). · cites it 2× “(“the ECOA”), Specifically, they alleged a violation of those provisions of the ECOA which prohibit a creditor from taking the “sex or marital status” of a borrower “into account in connection with the evaluation of the creditworthiness of any applicant,” 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a),…”

High v. McLean Fin. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561 (D.D.C. 1987). “§ 1691a. Moreover, both the statute and its legislative history explicitly state that the ECOA was not designed to preempt complementary state laws or causes of action.”

United States v. Itt Consum. Fin. Corp., & Aetna Fin. Co., Delaware Corporations, 816 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987). · cites it 2× “The defendants contend that the community property laws of equal management community property states do not permit a married applicant to obligate his or her spouse’s future earnings to repay a loan because those future earnings are not community property.”

Cadc 79-145 Jerry W. Markham & Marcia J. Harris, A/K/A Marcia Markham v. Colonial Mortg. Serv. Co., Assocs., Inc., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979). “Presumably the district court believed that this excused Illinois Federal under 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(b), which allows a creditor to take “[sjtate property laws directly or indirectly affecting creditworthiness” into consideration in making credit decisions.”

Ward v. Grant, 401 N.E.2d 160 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). “93-495, § 705(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a). 3 After Ward obtained a judgment on the notes, he recorded his execution, seizing all of Robert’s interest in the realty.”

Ware v. Indymac Bank, FSB, 534 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Ill. 2008). “15 U.S.C. § 1691d (e). Because plaintiffs have chosen to pursue an ECOA claim, they cannot also pursue an ICFA claim.”

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gregor, 872 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D.N.Y 1994). “15 U.S.C. § 1691d(f). The court concluded, however, that only the federal Bank Board had the power to enforce such state-conferred rights.”

Cragin v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 379 (D. Nev. 1980). “15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a). *383 Regulation B greatly enlarges upon the provisions of the Act.”

Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 994 F. Supp. 82 (D.N.H. 1998). “In support of that position, defendant points to 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a), which provides that: A request for the signature of both parties to a marriage for the purpose of creating a valid lien, passing clear title, waiving inchoate rights to property, or assigning earnings, shall…”

Show all 24 citing cases →

— 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a) — 14 cases

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). “§1691 (a)(1) (Equal Credit Oppor- tunity Act)  15 U. S. C. §1691d(a) (Equal Credit Oppor- tunity Act)  15 U.”

Kellie Ballard v. Bank of Am., N.A., 734 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2013). “” 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a) (2006). ECOA regulations clarify that, in an application for secured credit, “a creditor may require the signature of the applicant’s spouse .”

Gonzalez v. NAFH Nat'l Bank, 93 So. 3d 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). “15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a) (emphasis added); see also 12 C.”

In Re DiPietro, 135 B.R. 773 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992). “(“the ECOA”), Specifically, they alleged a violation of those provisions of the ECOA which prohibit a creditor from taking the “sex or marital status” of a borrower “into account in connection with the evaluation of the creditworthiness of any applicant,” 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a),…”

— 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(b) — 2 cases

United States v. Itt Consum. Fin. Corp., & Aetna Fin. Co., Delaware Corporations, 816 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987). “The defendants contend that the community property laws of equal management community property states do not permit a married applicant to obligate his or her spouse’s future earnings to repay a loan because those future earnings are not community property.”

— 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(e) — 3 cases

Nat'l State Bank, Elizabeth, NJ v. Long, 469 F. Supp. 1068 (D.N.J. 1979).

Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2009).

Castellanos-Hernandez v. Suburban Subaru Inc (D. Conn. 2024).

— 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(f) — 2 cases

Conf. of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979).

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