Notes of Decisions
Dean Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2016).
· cites it 5× “They instead raise a series of affirmative defenses, contending that (1) ILSA’s statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 1711 , bars Plaintiffs’ UCL claim; (2) ILSA does not apply because Plaintiffs’ condominium units are not considered qualifying “lots” under ILSA, see 12 C.”
Veneklase v. Bridgewater Condos, L.C., 670 F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 2012).
· cites it 3× “15 U.S.C.A. § 1711 . The few federal courts that have addressed the issue squarely have struggled to reconcile § 1711’s three-year statute of limitations with § 1703’s two-year rescission period.”
Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
· cites it 4× “However, it is undisputed that the cause of action would not be time-barred under the four year statute of limitations under the UCL because the limitations period commences after the cause of action accrued, not from the date of the signing of the contract.”
Bodansky v. Fifth on the Park Condo, LLC, 635 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2011).
· cites it 3× “15 U.S.C. § 1711 (a)(1), (b). In contrast, the statute of limitations is “three years after discovery of the violation or after discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence” for claims that, inter alia, a developer or agent (1) employed a device,…”
Kirkendall v. Dep't of the Army, 479 F.3d 830 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
· cites it 2× “1980) (the decision predates Irwin , and the statute at issue, 15 U.S.C. § 1711 , is analogous to that in Lampf, i.”
Adams v. Cavanagh Communities Corp., 847 F. Supp. 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
· cites it 5× “See 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1976). 13 That section said: No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 1709(a) or (b)(2) of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery…”
Nahigian v. Juno-loudoun, LLC, 677 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 2012).
· cites it 4× “15 U.S.C. § 1711 (a)(1) ("No action shall be maintained under section 1709 of this title with respect to a violation of subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2)(D) of section 1703 of this title more than three years after the date of signing of the contract of sale or lease.”
Joseph P. Cange v. Stotler & Co., Inc., 826 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1987).
· cites it 2× “There we held that the federal statute of limitations, or more accurately the statute of repose, in the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1711 , which then stated, “In no event shall any such action be brought by a purchaser more than three years after the…”
Nahigian v. Juno Loudoun, LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 731 (E.D. Va. 2010).
· cites it 2× “Plaintiffs argue that the general statute of limitations for the Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 1711 ) should apply allowing three years to bring ILSA claims.”
Taylor v. Holiday Isle, LLC, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (S.D. Ala. 2008).
· cites it 2× “” 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (b) (emphasis added). As the Court understands it, Holiday Isle’s position is that rescission is an available remedy under the ILSFDA only if a plaintiff invokes such remedy within two years after he or she signs the purchase agreement.”
Nickell v. Beau View of Biloxi, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2011).
“(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (a)(2)). The Second Circuit also contrasted ILSA’s 12-month exemption, which exempts a purchased lot “if 12 or fewer lots in the subdivision ‘are sold .”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1711(a)(2) — 2 cases
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