U.S. Code » Title 15 » Chapter CHAPTER 1— MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE

15 U.S.C. § 26a

Restrictions on the purchase of gasohol and synthetic motor fuel

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(a) Limitations on the use of credit instruments; sales, resales, and transfersExcept as provided in subsection (b), it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, directly or indirectly to impose any condition, restriction, agreement, or understanding that—(1) limits the use of credit instruments in any transaction concerning the sale, resale, or transfer of gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel of equivalent usability in any case in which there is no similar limitation on transactions concerning such person’s conventional motor fuel; or(2) otherwise unreasonably discriminates against or unreasonably limits the sale, resale, or transfer of gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel of equivalent usability in any case in which such synthetic or conventional motor fuel is sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States.(b) Credit fees; equivalent conventional motor fuel sales; labeling of pumps; product liability disclaimers; advertising support; furnishing facilities(1) Nothing in this section or in any other provision of law in effect on December 2, 1980, which is specifically applicable to the sale of petroleum products shall preclude any person referred to in subsection (a) from imposing a reasonable fee for credit on the sale, resale, or transfer of the gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel referred to in subsection (a) if such fee equals no more than the actual costs to such person of extending that credit.(2) The prohibitions in this section shall not apply to any person who makes available sufficient supplies of gasohol and other synthetic motor fuels of equivalent usability to satisfy his customers’ needs for such products, if the gasohol and other synthetic fuels are made available on terms and conditions which are equivalent to the terms and conditions on which such person’s conventional motor fuel products are made available.(3) Nothing in this section shall—(A) preclude any person referred to in subsection (a) from requiring reasonable labeling of pumps dispensing the gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel referred to in subsection (a) to indicate, as appropriate, that such gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel is not manufactured, distributed, or sold by such person;(B) preclude such person from issuing appropriate disclaimers of product liability for damage resulting from use of the gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel;(C) require such person to provide advertising support for the gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel; or(D) require such person to furnish or provide, at such person’s own expense, any additional pumps, tanks, or other related facilities required for the sale of the gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel.(c) “United States” defined

As used in this section, “United States” includes the several States, the District of Columbia, any territory of the United States, and any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States.

(Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 26, as added Pub. L. 96–493, § 2, Dec. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 2568.)Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesShort Title

For short title of Pub. L. 96–493 as the “Gasohol Competition Act of 1980”, see section 1 of Pub. L. 96–493, set out as a Short Title of 1980 Amendment note under section 1 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3 cases, 1991–1993 · leading case: Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1993). · cites it 2× “§§ 15 , 26 (1988), alleging that the companies violated, inter alia, the Gasohol Competition Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 26a (1988). The district court granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs on the ground that they lacked antitrust standing.”
Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 828 F. Supp. 794 (D. Nev. 1991). · cites it 2× “Count Two of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is based on the federal Gasohol Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26a(a)(2). Count Four is based on the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Nevada Revised Statute section 598.”
Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 790 F. Supp. 804 (C.D. Ill. 1992). · cites it 3× “It is claimed that: (A) each Defendant engaged in conduct that unreasonably discriminated against or limited the sale, resale, or transfer of gasohol, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 26a; (B) Defendants unlawfully limited the use of credit card instruments in transactions involving…”
— 15 U.S.C. § 26a(a) — 1 case
Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 790 F. Supp. 804 (C.D. Ill. 1992). “It is claimed that: (A) each Defendant engaged in conduct that unreasonably discriminated against or limited the sale, resale, or transfer of gasohol, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 26a; (B) Defendants unlawfully limited the use of credit card instruments in transactions involving…”
— 15 U.S.C. § 26a(a)(2) — 1 case
Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 828 F. Supp. 794 (D. Nev. 1991). “Count Two of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is based on the federal Gasohol Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26a(a)(2). Count Four is based on the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Nevada Revised Statute section 598.”
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