15 U.S.C. § 3006
Civil action
The host State, the host racing association, or the horsemen’s group may commence a civil action against any person alleged to be in violation of this chapter, for injunctive relief to restrain violations and for damages in accordance with section 3005 of this title.
In any civil action under this section, the host State, the host racing association and horsemen’s group, if not a party, shall be permitted to intervene as a matter of right.
A civil action may not be commenced pursuant to this section more than 3 years after the discovery of the alleged violation upon which such civil action is based.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to permit a State to be sued under this section other than in accordance with its applicable laws.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1987–2025 · leading case: Kentucky Div. v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, 20 F.3d 1406 (6th Cir. 1994).
Kentucky Div. v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, 20 F.3d 1406 (6th Cir. 1994). “The KTA subsequently intervened pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 3006 (b) (“In any civil action under this section, the host State, the host racing association and horsemen’s group, if not a party, shall be permitted to intervene as a matter of right.”
Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Ltd. P'ship v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, 989 F.2d 1266 (1st Cir. 1993). “And, moreover, the statute employs a damage calculation formula, see id.”
New England Horsemen's Benevolent & Prot. Ass'n v. Massachusetts Thoroughbred Horsemen's Ass'n, 210 F. Supp. 3d 270 (D. Mass. 2016). “It contends that MassTHA is not “the horsemen’s group” as defined by § 3002 and, therefore, is not authorized under § 3004 to consent on behalf of horsemen to interstate off-track wagering. Section 3006 of the statute authorizes “the horsemen’s group” to “commence a civil action…”
Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Ltd. P'ship v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, 802 F. Supp. 662 (D.R.I. 1992). “The enforcement provision of the law states: “The host State, the host racing association, or the horsemen’s group may commence a civil action against any person alleged to be in violation of this chapter, for injunctive relief to restrain violations and for damages in…”
New Suffolk Downs Corp. v. Rockingham Venture, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.H. 1987). “8 15 U.S.C. § 3006 (a). Concurrent jurisdiction over such civil actions is had in both federal and state courts.”
Hialeah, Inc. v. Florida Horsemen's Benevolent & Prot. Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Fla. 1995). “The past and continuing violations of the IHA stated above entitles coun-terplaintiff FHBPA to relief under 15 U.S.C. § 3006 _” (Am.Counterclaim ¶¶ 11-12.”
Churchill Downs Tech. Initiatives Co. v. Michigan Gaming Control Bd., 767 F. Supp. 3d 556 (W.D. Mich. 2025). “15 U.S.C. § 3006 (d). The cause of action is related to noncompliance with the IHA’s acceptance procedure, not the implied cause of action for equitable relief based on preemption.”
New Mexico Horsemen's Ass'n v. Sunray Gaming of New Mexico, LLC, No. 1:24-cv-00235 (D.N.M. Mar. 5, 2025). “See 15 U.S.C. § 3006 (a). NMHA must also state a cognizable violation of the IHA; namely, that the Racetracks accepted off-track wagers without the consent of the relevant horsemen’s group.”
Churchill Downs Tech. Initiatives Co. v. Michigan Gaming Control Bd., No. 1:25-cv-00047 (W.D. Mich. May 9, 2025). “Lawsuit Against the State Defendants, citing 15 U.S.C. § 3006 (d), argue that the IHA bars this claim against state defendants.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.