All lands and easements heretofore and hereafter conveyed to the United States by the States of Mississippi, Alabama, and Tennessee for the right-of-way for the projected parkway between Natchez, Mississippi, and Nashville, Tennessee, together with sites acquired or to be acquired for recreational areas in connection therewith, and a right-of-way for said parkway of a width sufficient to include the highway and all bridges, ditches, cuts, and fills appurtenant thereto, but not exceeding a maximum of two hundred feet through Government-owned lands (except that where small parcels of Government-owned lands would otherwise be isolated, or where topographic conditions or scenic requirements are such that bridges, ditches, cuts, fills, parking overlooks, and landscape development could not reasonably be confined to a width of two hundred feet, the said maximum may be increased to such width as may be necessary, with the written approval of the department or agency having jurisdiction over such lands) as designated on maps heretofore or hereafter approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall be known as the Natchez Trace Parkway and shall be administered and maintained by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service, subject to the provisions of the Act of Congress approved August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535), entitled “An Act to establish a National Park Service, and for other purposes”,11 See References in Text note below. the provisions of which Act, as amended and supplemented, are extended over and made applicable to said parkway: Provided, That the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Interior, to connect with said parkway such roads and trails as may be necessary for the protection, administration, or utilization of adjacent and nearby national forests and the resources thereof: And provided further, That the Forest Service and the National Park Service shall, insofar as practicable, coordinate and correlate such recreational developments as each may plan, construct, or permit to be constructed, on lands within their respective jurisdictions, which, by mutual agreement, should be given special treatment for recreational purposes.
Notes of Decisions
Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008).
· cites it 4× “The opinion cites 16 U.S.C. § 460 l -22 in support, but that statute is wholly irrelevant, as it solely concerns land transfers initiated by the Secretary of Interior, whereas the land exchange in question here was directly authorized by Congress.”
City of Kenai v. Burnett, 860 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1993).
· cites it 3× “The ordinance required federal approval of the easement pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 460 l -8(f)(3) (1982). [10] In their motion for summary judgment, the Burnetts argued that the National Park Service delegated its authority to approve the easement to the State, and that the State…”
Comm. of 100 On Fed. City v. Hodel, 611 F. Supp. 547 (D.D.C. 1985).
· cites it 12× “Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the proposed exchange of interests between Washington Harbour and the Park Service on the grounds that it violates a 1977 amendment to the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. § 460 /-9(c). In…”
Boston v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
· cites it 3× “Defendant Thomas Kleppe is the Secretary of the Department of the Interior of the United States, which is a federal agency with ultimate administrative authority and control with respect to the Land and Water Conservation Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. § 460 l -4 et seq. Defendant…”
Jimmie D. Oyler v. Fred Allenbrand & the Attorney Gen. of Kansas, 23 F.3d 292 (10th Cir. 1994).
“at 2317 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 460 (d)). The Court concluded that “we cannot explain § 10 of the Cheyenne River Act and § 4 of the Flood Control Act except as indications that Congress sought to divest the Tribe of its right to ‘absolute and undisturbed use and occupation’ of the…”
Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Huffman, 705 S.E.2d 806 (W. Va. 2010).
“See 16 U.S.C. § 460 /-6 (1961). 6 . Although the basis for this Court's affirmance of the circuit court's decision is slightly different than the reasons relied upon by the circuit court in rendering its ruling, such a divergence is permitted.”
Friends of Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1985).
· cites it 5× “This case presents the novel question whether amendment of a conservation easement acquired in part with federal funds under the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460 /-4 to 460/-11 (1982), so as to permit expansion ' of a golf course with…”
Murray D. Stringer & Nellie Hearon Stringer v. United States, 471 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1973).
· cites it 2× “16 U.S.C.A. § 460 . In addition to their homesite, the Stringers own a fifteen-foot wide appurtenant easement between their property and the Parkway, which provides ingress into and egress from the Parkway and is the principal means of access to their property.”
Sportsmen's Wildlife Def. Fund v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 949 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Colo. 1996).
· cites it 2× “” 16 U.S.C. § 460 ( -8(d). The LWCF Act also states that “[p]ayments for all projects shall be made by the Secretary to the Governor of the State or to a State official or agency designated by the Governor or by State law having authority and responsibility to accept and to…”
Fund for Animals v. Mainella, 335 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2004).
“Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the federal defendants had an obligation to: (1) promulgate hunting regulations pursuant to *22 the Delaware Gap Enabling Act, 16 U.S.C. § 460 ; (2) ensure that the hunting would not impair park resources or result in “wanton…”
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