U.S. Code » Title 18 » Part PART III— PRISONS AND PRISONERS › Chapter [CHAPTER 311— REPEALED]

18 U.S.C. § 3

REPORTS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

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“(a)In General.—Beginning in the year 1998, the Attorney General shall report to the Congress not later than May 1 of each year through the year 2002 on the status of the United States Parole Commission. Unless the Attorney General, in such report, certifies that the continuation of the Commission is the most effective and cost-efficient manner for carrying out the Commission’s functions, the Attorney General shall include in such report an alternative plan for a transfer of the Commission’s functions to another entity.“(b)Transfer Within the Department of Justice.—“(1)Effect of plan.—If the Attorney General includes such a plan in the report, and that plan provides for the transfer of the Commission’s functions and powers to another entity within the Department of Justice, such plan shall take effect according to its terms on November 1 of that year in which the report is made, unless Congress by law provides otherwise. In the event such plan takes effect, all laws pertaining to the authority and jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to individual offenders shall remain in effect notwithstanding the expiration of the period specified in section 2 of this Act.“(2)Conditional repeal.—Effective on the date such plan takes effect, paragraphs (3) and (4) of section 235(b) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 [Pub. L. 98–473, set out as a note under section 3551 of this title] (98 Stat. 2032) are repealed.”
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 522 cases (114 in the last 5 years), 1950–2026 · leading case: United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2007).
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United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). · cites it 32× “§ 2 (a) (allowing accessories before the fact to be punished as principals), with 18 U.S.C. § 3 (limiting accessories after the fact to one half of the principal's maximum punishment); see also Bollenbach v.”
Augustin Valenzuela Gallardo v. Loretta E. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2016). · cites it 36× “The IJ reasoned that the BIA had previously held that the federal crime of accessory after the fact, 18 U.S.C. § 3 , is an aggravated felony, that there was “no material difference” between § 3 and California Penal Code § 32, and that the BIA has not “limit[ed] the scope of the…”
Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011). · cites it 34× “Batista-Hernandez (decided two years before Espinoza-Gonzalez ) considered whether an immigrant who was convicted as an accessory after the fact pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 was removable because he had committed a crime relating to obstruction of justice.”
United States v. Hosvaldo Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2007). · cites it 8× “According to the government, “[i]t was reasonable to believe that the defendant was either the person involved in the earlier attempted shooting of the police officers or that he was an accessory after the fact, in violation of 18 U.”
Patricia Flores v. Attorney Gen. United States, 856 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2017). · cites it 12× “§ 3 , as a suitable basis with which to compare Flores’s accessory-after-the-fact conviction, rather than the obstruction-of-justice statutes in Chapter 73 31; and (2) even setting aside the federal accessory-after-the-fact statute, Flores’s conviction is connected to “a broad…”
Batista, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (BIA 1997). · cites it 23× “Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals (1) The offense of accessory after the fact to a drug-trafficking crime, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. V 1993), is not considered an inchoate crime and is not sufficiently related to a…”
United States v. Michael White, 771 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2014). · cites it 14× “The government charged that White violated 18 U.S.C. § 3 when he knowingly made a false and misleading statement to an insurance 4 We note White makes a related argument—which he does not raise separately but includes as part of his challenge to the government’s proof of the…”
Shahin v. Darling, 606 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D. Del. 2009). · cites it 8× “§ 241 and § 1512(c)(1) as an accessory after the fact pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 , as well as the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct.”
Agustin Valenzuela Gallardo v. William Barr, 968 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2020). · cites it 8× “955, 961 (BIA 1997), which held that the federal accessory after the fact offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3 , is an obstruction of justice aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(S) if a sentence of one year or more is imposed.”
United States v. Patrick Innie, 7 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1993). · cites it 8× “I In 1988, Patrick Innie failed to appear for sentencing after pleading guilty to being an accessory after the fact to the commission of murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3 . A warrant was issued for his arrest.”
United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2010). · cites it 6× “" 18 U.S.C. § 3 . The temporal boundary between principals and aiders and abettors, on the one hand, and accessories after the fact, on the other hand, thus remains important in federal criminal law.”
United States v. Vernon Snype, Marisa Hicks, 441 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2006). · cites it 4× “e Fourth Amendment; (3) the receipt into evidence of Snype’s marriage certificate violated due process because the' jury inferred a prior felony conviction from the certificate’s listing of Snype’s home address as “Fishkill CF”; (4) the district court erred in failing to…”
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