20 U.S.C. § 1713
Priority of remedies
Section effective on and after sixtieth day after
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14
cases, 1975–2019 · leading case: Tallulah Morgan v. John J. Kerrigan, Boston Home & Sch. Ass'n, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant, Kevin H. White, Etc., 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976).
Tallulah Morgan v. John J. Kerrigan, Boston Home & Sch. Ass'n, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant, Kevin H. White, Etc., 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976). “20 U.S.C. § 1713 (a), (b), § 1714. Revision of attendance zones and grade structures, construction of new schools and the closing of old schools, a controlled transfer policy with limited exceptions and the creation of magnet schools have been used in the formulation of the plan…”
Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln High Sch., 618 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2010). “The inference that Congress was focused on relief other than damages is strengthened by § 1713, which directs a court to consider the efficacy of several equitable remedies “in correcting” a denial of equal educational opportunity.”
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975). “This use of specialized programs originated in this case with proposals in the plan submitted by the defendant school committee, as strengthened and clarified by the masters.”
Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Mich. 1976). “In 20 U.S.C. § 1713 , Congress has declared a priority of remedies for segregation.”
Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1976). “, 20 U.S.C. § 1713 ; and Tr. at 2492-96, 2504-06.”
United States v. Hinds Cnty. Sch. Bd., United States of Am. v. Amite Cnty. Sch. Dist., 560 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1977). “See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1713 , 1755.”) Amite County contends that the test we set forth in United States v.”
United States v. State of Tex., 523 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Tex. 1981). “The decree, defendants assert, therefore violates 20 U.S.C. § 1713 (g), which requires that any plan to remedy a denial of Equal Protection or equal educational opportunity be "educationally sound and administratively feasible".”
United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 984 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). “We set forth in the margin the text of 20 U.S.C. § 1713 3 which provides that in adopt *692 ing any remedy pursuant to the EEOA which may involve directly or indirectly the transportation of students, a court shall consider and make specific findings on the efficacy in…”
Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975). “93-380, § 214(f), 20 U.S.C. § 1713 (f), and as strengthened by the court’s guidelines will be sufficiently attractive to serve the dual purpose of providing quality education and voluntary desegregation.”
United States v. Texas, 523 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Tex. 1981). “The decree, defendants assert, therefore violates 20 U.S.C. § 1713 (g), which requires that any plan to remedy a denial of Equal Protection or equal educational opportunity be “educationally sound and administratively feasible”.”
United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976). “See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1713 , 1755. In the case before us, however, we find that crosstown busing is the only desegregation method that will work.”
United States v. City of Yonkers, 888 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). “Similarly, section 256 of the EEOA provides that no court may order the implementation of any plan to remedy a finding of de jure segregation which involves the transportation of students unless it first finds that “all alternative remedies are inadequate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1755 .”
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