cites § 7806 4×cited by 256 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “14, 17-20; see also 26 U. S. C. § 7806 (b) ("No inference, implication, or presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any particular section or provision or portion of this title").”
- The case’s holding
- A court determines whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty by looking at the operation of the provision rather than the label placed upon it.
- Later courts cite it for
- “in every one of those cases the court looked behind the label placed on the exaction and rested its answer directly on the operation of the provision using the term in question.” · 12 citing courts
cites § 7806 2×cited by 250 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “That approach is expressly *204 foreclosed, in any event, by § 7806 (b) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 7806 (b), providing that no inference shall be drawn by reason of the location or grouping of any particular section or portion of the tax title of the Code.”
- The case’s holding
- A notice of deficiency is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a taxpayer to bring a suit in tax court for redetermination of tax liability.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the 'assessment,' essentially a bookkeeping notation, is made when the secretary or his delegate establishes an account against the taxpayer on the tax rolls.” · 15 citing courts
cites § 7806 2×cited by 53 cases
Reversed in part by the U.S. Supreme Court in this case: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012).
- The case’s holding
- The Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to compel individuals to purchase health insurance, but such a mandate is severable from the rest of the statute.
- Later courts cite it for
- “defendants do not dispute that plaintiff brown's challenge to the minimum coverage provision is justiciable.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 7806 2×cited by 278 cases
Superseded by statute on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds and 1 says in part.
- Where it cites § 7806
- “26 U. S. C. § 7806 (b). The general mandate to canvass and inquire, now found in § 7601, is derived from § 3172 of the Revised Statutes of 1874.”
- The case’s holding
- Federal courts must scrutinize summonses issued to third parties with extra care (holding that federal courts should scrutinize summonses issued to third parties with extra care).
- Later courts cite it for
- “there is legal compulsion, to be sure, but basically the government depends upon the good faith and integrity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant to tax liability.” · 11 citing courts
cites § 7806 1×cited by 80 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “Evidently aware that this is a significant weakness in Alcoa’s theory, amicus Entergy Corporation argues that the restoration requirement is satisfied because the aim of CERCLA was “to restore to the public the income attributable to the producers’ environmental consumption.”
- The case’s holding
- To qualify for a section 1341 deduction, a taxpayer must restore income to a rightful owner under the same circumstances, terms, and conditions as the original receipt.
- Later courts cite it for
- “we review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard the district court applied.” · 5 citing courts
cites § 7806 2×cited by 18 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “” 26 U.S.C. § 7806 (b). The Commonwealth emphasizes that the best evidence of congressional intent is the language chosen by that legislative body.”
cites § 7806 1×cited by 35 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “861-8 (1979), the Secretary of the Treasury exercised his rulemaking authority under 26 U. S. C. § 7806 (a), which gives the Secretary general authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the Internal Revenue Code.”
- The case’s holding
- An interpretive regulation is entitled to deference if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the fact that congress did not legislatively override a regulation in enacting an associated statute serves as persuasive evidence that congress regarded that regulation as a correct implementation of its intent.” · 1 citing court
cites § 7806 1×cited by 32 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “In fact, while the penalty is placed under the “Excise Taxes” heading of the Code, at the same time Congress specifically exempted and divorced the penalty from all the traditional enforcement and collection methods used by the Internal Revenue Service, such as tax liens,…”
- The case’s holding
- The individual mandate penalty is a penalty rather than a tax because Congress intended it to be a regulatory sanction rather than a revenue-raising measure.
- Later courts cite it for
- “i conclude that the individual mandate penalty is not a 'tax.' it is (as the act itself says) a penalty.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 7806 1×cited by 24 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “” However, section 7806(b) of the Code strictly instructs that the heading of a section is utterly without legal significance, stating: [n]o inference, implication, or presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any…”
- The case’s holding
- The partnership-item assessment provision establishes a minimum period that supplements rather than replaces the general three-year statute of limitations for assessing tax.
- Later courts cite it for
- “although they file information returns under section 701 of the code,” · 2 citing courts
cites § 7806 1×cited by 22 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “26 U.S.C. § 7806 (b). Even more importantly, the assessments function as regulatory penalties—they encourage compliance with the Act by imposing a punitive expense on conduct that offends the Act.”
- The case’s holding
- Present or near-future costs of complying with a statute that has not yet gone into effect can be an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the present or near-future costs of complying with a statute that has not yet gone into effect can be an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 7806 1×cited by 20 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “1978); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7806 (b). Secondly, the word "financial" does not exclude the concept of property, and the words of the section itself demonstrate that.”
- The case’s holding
- A thrift acquiring failing institutions in a supervisory merger has a cost basis in intangible rights received as consideration, equal to a portion of the excess liabilities.
cites § 7806 1×cited by 14 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “The court, however, does not attach independent significance to this title, see 26 U.S.C. § 7806 (b) (descriptive matter in Code not to be given legal effect); cf.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “amounts originally collected were excessive or otherwise unneeded” · 2 citing courts
cites § 7806 1×cited by 13 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “" 26 U.S.C. § 7806 (b); see also Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.”
cites § 7806 1×cited by 11 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “In fact, while the penalty is placed under the “Excise Taxes” heading of the Code, at the same time Congress specifically exempted and divorced the penalty from all the traditional enforcement and collection methods used by the Internal Revenue Service, such as tax liens,…”
cites § 7806 1×cited by 21 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “” 26 U.S.C. § 7806 (a). Also, this particular cross-reference provision uses the term “civil actions” and is located in a subchapter entitled “PERIODS OF LIMITATION IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “is the collection of amounts owed, not the assessment of them, that may be properly termed 'enforcement.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 7806 1×cited by 4 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “26 U.S.C. § 7806 (b). Nor is the IRS’s initial characterization of the payment as an “EXCISE” tax on its proof of claim determinative.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “the supreme court's nfib analysis is not dispositive in the bankruptcy context, but we find it persuasive. based on the functional examination of the shared responsibility payment's actual effects and operation, we conclude that the payment is a tax for bankruptcy purposes.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 7806 1×cited by 22 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “The parallelism to the title of chapter 68 may be suggestive of the defendant’s view, but we are expressly cautioned by the Internal Revenue Code not to make too much of the location or grouping of any particular section, or of tables of contents, analyses, and descriptive…”
- The case’s holding
- Accumulated earnings tax is an addition to the tax under § 6601(f)(3), so no interest accrues unless unpaid ten days after notice and demand.
cites § 7806 1×cited by 6 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “The Internal Revenue Code itself provides that nothing is to be inferred from the grouping or indexing of any particular section, 26 U.S.C. § 7806 (b), and this court has held that the title of a statute cannot limit the plain meaning of its text.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “the title of a statute cannot limit the plain meaning of its text.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 7806 1×cited by 6 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “The Halls counter that argument by pointing out that 26 U.S.C. § 7806 (b) states that “[n]o inference, implication, or presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any particular section or provision or portion of this…”
cites § 7806 1×cited by 3 cases
- Where it cites § 7806
- “” 26 U.S.C. § 7806 (b); see also Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.”
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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.