28 U.S.C. § 1712

Coupon settlements

Read at: OLRCuscode.house.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov JustiaTitle 28 CasesGoogle Scholar
(a)Contingent Fees in Coupon Settlements.—If a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery of coupons to a class member, the portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed.(b)Other Attorney’s Fee Awards in Coupon Settlements.—(1)In general.—If a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery of coupons to class members, and a portion of the recovery of the coupons is not used to determine the attorney’s fee to be paid to class counsel, any attorney’s fee award shall be based upon the amount of time class counsel reasonably expended working on the action.(2)Court approval.—Any attorney’s fee under this subsection shall be subject to approval by the court and shall include an appropriate attorney’s fee, if any, for obtaining equitable relief, including an injunction, if applicable. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit application of a lodestar with a multiplier method of determining attorney’s fees.(c)Attorney’s Fee Awards Calculated on a Mixed Basis in Coupon Settlements.—If a proposed settlement in a class action provides for an award of coupons to class members and also provides for equitable relief, including injunctive relief—(1) that portion of the attorney’s fee to be paid to class counsel that is based upon a portion of the recovery of the coupons shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (a); and(2) that portion of the attorney’s fee to be paid to class counsel that is not based upon a portion of the recovery of the coupons shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (b).(d)Settlement Valuation Expertise.—In a class action involving the awarding of coupons, the court may, in its discretion upon the motion of a party, receive expert testimony from a witness qualified to provide information on the actual value to the class members of the coupons that are redeemed.(e)Judicial Scrutiny of Coupon Settlements.—In a proposed settlement under which class members would be awarded coupons, the court may approve the proposed settlement only after a hearing to determine whether, and making a written finding that, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members. The court, in its discretion, may also require that a proposed settlement agreement provide for the distribution of a portion of the value of unclaimed coupons to 1 or more charitable or governmental organizations, as agreed to by the parties. The distribution and redemption of any proceeds under this subsection shall not be used to calculate attorneys’ fees under this section.(Added Pub. L. 109–2, § 3(a), Feb. 18, 2005, 119 Stat. 6.)Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Section applicable to any civil action commenced on or after Feb. 18, 2005, see section 9 of Pub. L. 109–2, set out as an Effective Date of 2005 Amendment note under section 1332 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 87 cases (28 in the last 5 years), 2005–2025 · leading case: Steve Chambers v. Whirlpool Corp., 980 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2020).
Steve Chambers v. Whirlpool Corp., 980 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2020). · cites it 10× “” See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (a). Nor did the district court use a lodestar methodology completely divorced from the coupon portion of the settlement, as permitted under In re Easysaver Rewards Litigation, 906 F.”
Jane Doe v. Deja Vu Consulting, Inc., 925 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 2019). · cites it 6× “See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 . The Objectors' main support for that proposition, In re Easysaver Rewards Litig.”
Chambers v. Whirlpool Corp., 214 F. Supp. 3d 877 (C.D. Cal. 2016). · cites it 9× “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (a), “[i]f a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery of coupons to a class member, the portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based on the value to class members…”
Josue Romero v. Provide Com., Inc., 906 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 2018). · cites it 6× “See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 . Congress targeted such settlements for heightened scrutiny out of a concern that the full value of coupons was being used to support large awards of attorney’s fees regardless of whether class members had any interest in using the coupons.”
Baerbel McKinney-drobnis v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 16 F.4th 594 (9th Cir. 2021). · cites it 6× “ORESHACK use the value of the redeemed vouchers in awarding fees, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (a). The panel next addressed Oreshack’s contention that, independent of CAFA’s applicability to the fee award, the district court erred by approving the settlement as “fair,…”
Nicklos Ciolino v. Theodore Frank, 716 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2013). · cites it 7× “The panel held that the attorneys’ fee award to class counsel violated the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), and specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (a)-(c), which governs the calculation of attorneys’ fees in class action cases containing a coupon component.”
Sarah Murphy v. Sfbsc Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2019). · cites it 3× “17 The Class Action Fairness Act sets forth several requirements and protections applicable specifically to “coupon settlements,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1712 , with the goal of “preventing settlements that award excessive [attorneys’] fees while leaving class members with ‘nothing more…”
Vicki Linneman v. Vita-Mix Corp., 970 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2020). · cites it 5× “The district court held—and neither party meaningfully disputes—that the gift cards in this case qualify as “coupons” under CAFA and thus that § 1712 applies.”
Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D. Mass. 2015). · cites it 15× “” 28 U.S.C. § 1712 . Given that CAFA imposes more onerous restrictions on settlements that award class members coupons, 11 it is unsurprising that class counsel here argues that the vouchers the proposed settlement agreement awards to class members are not coupons for purposes…”
Radosti v. Envision Emi, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2010). · cites it 5× “” 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (e). In considering whether to ap *51 prove a proposed class action settlement, the court must strike a balance between a rubber stamp approval and “the detailed and thorough investigation that it would undertake if it were actually trying the case.”
In Re New Mexico Indirect Purchasers Microsoft Corp., 149 P.3d 976 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4× “18, 2005) (adding 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (a), (e) (Supp.2006)), in support of the position that the fee award must be measured against the actual benefit to the Class.”
Theodore H. Frank v. Netflix, Inc., 779 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2015). · cites it 2× “28 U.S.C. § 1712 (e); see also In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig.”
— 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) — 2 cases
Steve Chambers v. Whirlpool Corp., 980 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2020). “” See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (a). Nor did the district court use a lodestar methodology completely divorced from the coupon portion of the settlement, as permitted under In re Easysaver Rewards Litigation, 906 F.”
Lonardo v. Travelers Indem. Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d 766 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
— 28 U.S.C. § 1712(c) — 1 case
Steve Chambers v. Whirlpool Corp., 980 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2020). “” See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (a). Nor did the district court use a lodestar methodology completely divorced from the coupon portion of the settlement, as permitted under In re Easysaver Rewards Litigation, 906 F.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.