29 U.S.C. § 109
Granting of restraining order or injunction as dependent on previous findings of fact; limitation on prohibitions included in restraining orders and injunctions
No restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction shall be granted in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except on the basis of findings of fact made and filed by the court in the record of the case prior to the issuance of such restraining order or injunction; and every restraining order or injunction granted in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall include only a prohibition of such specific act or acts as may be expressly complained of in the bill of complaint or petition filed in such case and as shall be expressly included in said findings of fact made and filed by the court as provided in this chapter.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 55
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1934–2025 · leading case: Kansas City S. Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Local Union 41, 126 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 1997).
Kansas City S. Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Local Union 41, 126 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 1997). “Finally, the Union claims that the injunction was improper for failing to satisfy the requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 109 that findings of fact be made and filed by the district court prior to the issuance of the injunction.”
Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO, 824 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2016). “the act or acts restrained or required”); 29 U.S.C. § 109 (requiring that findings of fact be “made and filed by the court” and that injunction *651 be limited to a prohibition of a “specific act or acts”).”
United Mine Workers of Am. Dist. No. 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806 (3rd Cir. 1981). “Appellants also contend that, assuming some injunctive relief was proper, the injunction issued by the District Court in this case was overbroad and vague, in violation of Section 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 109 , 8 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d).”
United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 534 F.2d 1063 (3rd Cir. 1976). “er the 1974 agreement, and thus no Boys Markets injunction was proper; (2) that the work stoppages were wildcat strikes of which the Local, District 5, and the UMW disapproved, and for which they should not be subjected to an injunction; (3) that the prospective injunction is…”
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employes, 143 F. Supp. 2d 672 (N.D. Tex. 2001). “[Section] 9 of the Norris-LaGuar-dia Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 109 ) must yield to the Railway Labor Act which authorizes injunctions to avert threatened interference with mandated mediation procedures.”
Int'l Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers, Afl-Cio v. E. Airlines, Inc., 849 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1988). “1980), and section 9 of the Norris-La-Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1982), 9 which together stand for the proposition that injunctions in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes must take a rifle-shot, rather than a shotgun, approach.”
Firebird Structures, LCC v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local Union No. 1505, 252 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (D.N.M. 2017). “Furthermore, as applicable in this case, the Norris-La Guardia Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 109 , provides: No restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction shall be granted in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except on the basis of findings of fact made and…”
Verizon New England, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 651 F.3d 176 (1st Cir. 2011). “29 U.S.C. § 109 ; Latas Libby’s, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 609 F.”
The Drummond Co., a Corp. v. Dist. 20, United Mine Workers of Am., 598 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1979). “While the district court’s findings of facts concerning the various disputes and work stoppages will be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, the interpretation of the scope of the injunctive orders is a question of law to be determined by the independent judgment of…”
Atlas Air, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of, 928 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2019). “29 U.S.C. § 109 . As the complaint, language of the injunction, and the court's underlying findings reflect, this case is about whether the Union violated the RLA by encouraging pilots to jointly engage in actions designed to obtain leverage in the negotiations for an amended…”
Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 518 F. Supp. 203 (S.D. Tex. 1981). “The defendant insists that the strict procedures required for the issuance of an injunction under Section 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 109 ) should be applicable for an injunction under the Railway Labor Act.”
Chicago & North W. Transp. Co., Cross-Appellant v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, Cross-Appellees, 908 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1990). “The unions argue that there is an even stronger requirement of specificity in a labor injunction, citing section 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 109—so strong a requirement, they say, that the failure to satisfy it renders the injunction void.”
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