29 U.S.C. § 252

Relief from certain existing claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the Walsh-Healey Act, and the Bacon-Davis Act

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(a) Liability of employerNo employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.] the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act 11 See References in Text note below. (in any action or proceeding commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947), on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any activity of an employee engaged in prior to May 14, 1947, except an activity which was compensable by either—(1) an express provision of a written or nonwritten contract in effect, at the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-bargaining representative and his employer; or(2) a custom or practice in effect, at the time of such activity, at the establishment or other place where such employee was employed, covering such activity, not inconsistent with a written or nonwritten contract, in effect at the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-bargaining representative and his employer.(b) Compensable activity

For the purposes of subsection (a), an activity shall be considered as compensable under such contract provision or such custom or practice only when it was engaged in during the portion of the day with respect to which it was so made compensable.

In the application of the minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], of the Walsh-Healey Act, or of the Bacon-Davis Act,¹ in determining the time for which an employer employed an employee there shall be counted all that time, but only that time, during which the employee engaged in activities which were compensable within the meaning of subsections (a) and (b) of this section.

(d) Jurisdiction

No court of the United States, of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, shall have jurisdiction of any action or proceeding, whether instituted prior to or on or after May 14, 1947, to enforce liability or impose punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], under the Walsh-Healey Act, or under the Bacon-Davis Act,¹ to the extent that such action or proceeding seeks to enforce any liability or impose any punishment with respect to an activity which was not compensable under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.

(e) Assignment of actions

No cause of action based on unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act,¹ which accrued prior to May 14, 1947, or any interest in such cause of action, shall hereafter be assignable, in whole or in part, to the extent that such cause of action is based on an activity which was not compensable within the meaning of subsections (a) and (b).

(May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 2, 61 Stat. 85.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, referred to in subsecs. (a), (c) to (e), is act June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, which is classified generally to chapter 8 (§ 201 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 201 of this title and Tables.

The Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts, referred to in subsecs. (a), (c) to (e), are defined for purposes of this chapter in section 262 of this title.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 71 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1947–2025 · leading case: Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).

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Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). “1187 (overruled by 29 U.S.C. §§ 252 , 254). The employer was thus presumptively liable to all employees because they all claimed to work 40 hours per week.”

IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005). “85 (codified at 29 U. S. C. § 252 (a)). 3 The regulation provides in full: “Section 4- of the Portal Act does not affect the computation of hours worked within the ‘workday’ proper, roughly described as the period ‘from whistle to whistle,' and its provisions have nothing to do…”

Stoetzl v. Dept. of Human Resources, 443 P.3d 924 (Cal. 2019). · cites it 2× “That exclusion is a result of Congress's enactment, in 1947, of the Portal-to-Portal Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 252 et seq. ). The Portal-to-Portal Act states that, except when a contract or custom provides otherwise, "no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the…”

Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010). “In 1947, Congress limited the FLSA by enacting the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 ( 29 U.S.C. § 252 et seq.), which relieved employers of the obligation to compensate employees for time spent travel-ling to the worksite, even in an employer’s vehicle, and for time spent in *60…”

Adams v. United States, 471 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “Prior to this litigation, though, the plaintiffs and other officers in the positions and grades at issue were classified as exempt from FLSA and were therefore not paid for their commutes.”

Guerrero v. Superior Court, 20 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). “In 1947, Congress limited the FLSA by enacting the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 ( 29 U.S.C. § 252 et seq.), which relieved employers of the obligation to compensate employees for time spent travelling to the worksite, even in an employer’s vehicle, and for time spent in…”

Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956). “either— “(1) an express provision of a written or nonwritten contract in effect, at the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-bargaining representative and his employer; or “ (2) a custom or practice in effect, at the time of such activity, at…”

In Re: M.P., 487 Md. 53 (Md. 2024). “Specifically, that statute states that [n]o court of the United States, of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, shall have jurisdiction of any 30 at 292-93 (Scalia, J.”

Tara Osborn v. JAB Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 126 F.4th 1250 (7th Cir. 2025). “at 690–93 (overruled by 29 U.S.C. §§ 252 , 254). So, accounting for that additional time, the employees necessarily worked more than forty hours per week.”

Markert v. Swift & Co., 173 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1949). · cites it 2× “, can be rescued through the pleading of additional facts from the bar of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S. C.A. § 252, retroactively applicable to all actions.”

Culkin v. Glenn L. Martin Nebraska Co., 97 F. Supp. 661 (D. Neb. 1951). · cites it 3× “Even the application of Section 2 of the Portal Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 252 , which the defendant contends deprives' this court of jurisdiction, depends in some degree upon questions of fact.”

Galvin v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 82 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). · cites it 6× “213 , which this court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 252 (d). However, plaintiffs emphasize certain factual differences which they assert are sufficiently significant to warrant the denial of the present motions.”

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— 29 U.S.C. § 252(a) — 3 cases

Tobin v. Alma Mills, 92 F. Supp. 728 (W.D.S.C. 1950).

Bumpus v. Remington Arms Co., Inc, 183 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1950).

Medrick v. Textile Mach. Works, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Pa. 1948).

— 29 U.S.C. § 252(b) — 1 case

Abbott v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 9 F.R.D. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).

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