29 U.S.C. § 8

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(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3) and subsection (b) and subject to the provisions of section 9, the Administrator shall make quarterly payments to an employer of a veteran participating in an approved program of job training under this Act. Subject to section 5(c) and paragraph (2), the amount paid to an employer on behalf of a veteran for any period of time shall be 50 percent of the product of (A) the starting hourly rate of wages paid to the veteran by the employer (without regard to overtime or premium pay), and (B) the number of hours worked by the veteran during that period.“(2) The total amount that may be paid to an employer on behalf of a veteran participating in a program of job training under this Act is $10,000.“(3) In order to relieve financial burdens on business enterprises with relatively few numbers of employees, the Administrator may make payments under this Act on a monthly, rather than quarterly, basis to an employer with a number of employees less than a number which shall be specified in regulations which the Administrator shall prescribe for the purposes of this paragraph.“(b) Payment may not be made to an employer for a period of training under this Act on behalf of a veteran until the Administrator has received—“(1) from the veteran, a certification that the veteran was employed full time by the employer in a program of job training during such period; and“(2) from the employer, a certification—“(A) that the veteran was employed by the employer during that period and that the veteran’s performance and progress during such period were satisfactory; and“(B) of the number of hours worked by the veteran during that period.With respect to the first such certification by an employer with respect to a veteran, the certification shall indicate the date on which the employment of the veteran began and the starting hourly rate of wages paid to the veteran (without regard to overtime or premium pay).“(c)(1)(A) Whenever the Administrator finds that an overpayment under this Act has been made to an employer on behalf of a veteran as a result of a certification, or information contained in an application, submitted by an employer which was false in any material respect, the amount of such overpayment shall constitute a liability of the employer to the United States.“(B) Whenever the Administrator finds that an employer has failed in any substantial respect to comply for a period of time with a requirement established under this Act (unless the employer’s failure is the result of false or incomplete information provided by the veteran), each amount paid to the employer on behalf of a veteran for that period shall be considered to be an overpayment under this Act, and the amount of such overpayment shall constitute a liability of the employer to the United States.“(2) Whenever the Administrator finds that an overpayment under this Act has been made to an employer on behalf of a veteran as a result of a certification by the veteran, or as a result of information provided to an employer or contained in an application submitted by the veteran, which was willfully or negligently false in any material respect, the amount of such overpayment shall constitute a liability of the veteran to the United States.“(3) Any overpayment referred to in paragraph (1) or (2) may be recovered in the same manner as any other debt due the United States. Any overpayment recovered shall be credited to funds available to make payments under this Act. If there are no such funds, any overpayment recovered shall be deposited into the Treasury.“(4) Any overpayment referred to in paragraph (1) or (2) may be waived, in whole or in part, in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in section 5302 of title 38, United States Code.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 26 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1939–2026 · leading case: Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 592 F.2d 595 (1st Cir. 1979).

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Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 592 F.2d 595 (1st Cir. 1979). · cites it 2× “2 The Board adopted the findings of the administrative law judge (ALJ), concluding that the Company violated section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 8 (a)(3) and (1), when it discharged account representative Agacinski and it violated section 8(a)(1) of…”

Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714 (1989). “See 29 U. S. C. §8 1341(a) and (b) (1982 ed., Supp.”

Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981). “29 U.S.C. § 8 (a)(1), (3), (5). Yet note the close parallel of this employer’s unfair labor practices to the classic “open shop” concept.”

Greene v. Mr. Wicke Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Conn. 1967). · cites it 7× “Wicke has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1), (2) and (3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 8 (a) (1), (2) and (3). (b) On or about December 12, 1966, the ILGWU, pursuant to the provisions of the Act, amended the charge originally…”

Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc., a Missouri Corp. v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local 655, 39 F.3d 191 (8th Cir. 1994). “Specifically, Foodland argues that because the Union’s picketing was recognitional as opposed to informational (alleged to be an unfair labor practice under the present facts), the Union “cannot stand behind the First Amendment to the U.”

United States v. Santiago-Davila, 26 M.J. 380 (1988). “In Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 950 (1977), one definition of "race” is "a division of mankind possessing traits that are transmissible by descent and sufficient to characterize it as a distinct human type.”

Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., & Elmsford Sheet Metal Works, Inc., Intervenor v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 38, 575 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1978). “Indeed, if submission of the dispute to the NJAB had been a legitimate form of “negotiation of an agreement,” the employer’s refusal to execute a writing incorporating such an agreement would have been an unfair labor practice.”

Fred W. Allnutt, Inc. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 421 A.2d 1360 (Md. 1980). “1976), a case arising under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §8 651-678 (1970). There, an inspector who had been refused entry to the Restland Cemetery applied to a federal district court for an inspection warrant.”

Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 626 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1980). “In November, 1975, a complaint was filed with the Board against San Juan alleging interference with employees’ right to organize and discriminatory discharge in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, ( 29 U.S.C. §§ 8 (a)(1) & (3)) during the…”

M & M Wood Working Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 101 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1939). · cites it 2× “I think, however, that the question is not foreclosed by the proviso in § 8 (3) of the Wagner Act, 29 U.S. C.A. § 8 (3). As is well known, employers and the public alike are made to suffer in these fratricidal conflicts.”

Babler Bros., Inc. v. Roberts, 761 F. Supp. 97 (D. Or. 1991). · cites it 2× “§ 8 (b)(2) which makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in order to encourage or discourage union membership.”

Pio v. Kelly, 552 P.2d 1301 (Or. 1976). “6 Such conduct would be unlawful, *591 according to defendants, because it would constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(7)(C) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC § 8 (b)(7)(C). To this contention plaintiffs respond that even if such a strike or picketing would…”

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— 29 U.S.C. § 8(a) — 1 case

Greene v. Mr. Wicke Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Conn. 1967). “Wicke has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1), (2) and (3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 8 (a) (1), (2) and (3). (b) On or about December 12, 1966, the ILGWU, pursuant to the provisions of the Act, amended the charge originally…”

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