(a) No State law in effect on December 30, 1969 or which may become effective thereafter shall be superseded by any provision of this chapter or order issued or any mandatory health or safety standard, except insofar as such State law is in conflict with this chapter or with any order issued or any mandatory health or safety standard.(b) The provisions of any State law or regulation in effect upon the operative date of this chapter, or which may become effective thereafter, which provide for more stringent health and safety standards applicable to coal or other mines than do the provisions of this chapter or any order issued or any mandatory health or safety standard shall not thereby be construed or held to be in conflict with this chapter. The provisions of any State law or regulation in effect on December 30, 1969, or which may become effective thereafter, which provide for health and safety standards applicable to coal or other mines for which no provision is contained in this chapter or in any order issued or any mandatory health or safety standard, shall not be held to be in conflict with this chapter.(Pub. L. 91–173, title V, § 506, Dec. 30, 1969, 83 Stat. 803; Pub. L. 95–164, title III, § 303(e), Nov. 9, 1977, 91 Stat. 1321.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original “this Act”, meaning Pub. L. 91–173, Dec. 30, 1969, 83 Stat. 742, known as the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 801 of this title and Tables.
Orr v. State, 2004 MT 354, 106 P.3d 100. · cites it 2דntent vis-à-vis preemption, we note the following provision in the FMNMSA: (a) Conflict with this chapter No State or territorial law in effect upon the effective date of this chapter or which may become effective thereafter, shall be superseded by any provision of this chapter,…”
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). · cites it 2דState laws inconsistent with the federal act are suspended; but state laws which provide more stringent standards or controls survive, § 506, 30 U. S. C. § 955 . A close reading of this Act convinces me that it must displace all agreements to arbitrate safety conditions.”
Big Ridge, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Saf. & Health Review Comm'n, 715 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2013). “” 30 U.S.C. § 955 (a). Petitioners argue that this section does not apply here because the Part 50 audits are not “mandatory health or safety standards.”
Troy Gold Indus., Ltd. v. Occupational Saf. & Health Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. App. 3d 379 (Ct. App. 1986). “( 30 U.S.C. § 955 .) Rather, it is a question of the extent to which the California Legislature intended the Division to duplicate the efforts of other agencies in the arena of occupational *388 health and safety.”
Davis v. Eagle Coal & Dock Co., 640 S.E.2d 81 (W. Va. 2006). · cites it 3ד[ 30 U.S.C.A. § 955 ] (footnotes added). We disagree with the defendant and find that field preemption does not exist in this case.”
S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Cal. Occupational Saf. & Health Appeals Bd., 58 Cal. App. 4th 200 (Ct. App. 1997). “( 30 U.S.C. § 955 .) The Court of Appeal in Troy Gold made it clear that a different analysis would be required if federal preemption had not been expressly limited.”
Short v. MV Transp., Inc., No. 1:24-cv-03019 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2025). “3d at 657 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 955 (a)). prohibiting release of the information unless specifically authorized.”
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