U.S. Code » Title 33 » Chapter CHAPTER 26— WATER POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL › Subchapter SUBCHAPTER I— RESEARCH AND RELATED PROGRAMS

33 U.S.C. § 3

DEFINITIONS.

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“In this Act, the following definitions apply:“(1)Administrator.—The term ‘Administrator’ means the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.“(2)Advisory committee.—The term ‘Advisory Committee’ means the Long Island Sound Stewardship Advisory Committee established by section 8.“(3)Region.—The term ‘Region’ means the Long Island Sound Stewardship Initiative Region established by section 4(a).“(4)State.—The term ‘State’ means each of the States of Connecticut and New York.“(5)Stewardship.—The term ‘stewardship’ means land acquisition, land conservation agreements, site planning, plan implementation, land and habitat management, public access improvements, site monitoring, and other activities designed to enhance and preserve natural resource-based recreation and ecological function of upland areas.“(6)Stewardship site.—The term ‘stewardship site’ means any area of State, local, or tribal government, or privately owned land within the Region that is designated by the Administrator under section 5(a).“(7)Systematic site selection.—The term ‘systematic site selection’ means a process of selecting stewardship sites that—“(A) has explicit goals, methods, and criteria;“(B) produces feasible, repeatable, and defensible results;“(C) provides for consideration of natural, physical, and biological patterns;“(D) addresses replication, connectivity, species viability, location, and public recreation values;“(E) uses geographic information systems technology and algorithms to integrate selection criteria; and“(F) will result in achieving the goals of stewardship site selection at the lowest cost.“(8)Qualified applicants.—The term ‘qualified applicant’ means a non-Federal person that owns title to property located within the borders of the Region.“(9)Threat.—The term ‘threat’ means a threat that is likely to destroy or seriously degrade a conservation target or a recreation area.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases, 1951–2004 · leading case: Carlos Romero-Barcelo, Etc. v. Harold Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981).
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Carlos Romero-Barcelo, Etc. v. Harold Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981). · cites it 5× “234 , unreasonably restrict the food fishing industry of Vieques contrary to 33 U.S.C. § 3 ? 5. Do the Navy’s training activities generate such noise as to create a public nuisance in violation of Puerto Rico’s criminal nuisance statute, P.”
United States v. Zenon, 285 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.P.R. 2003). · cites it 9× ““Food Fishing Proviso” Issue First, Defendants contend that the Court erred in its finding of guilt because the charged entry into a denominated danger zone must be prosecuted under 33 U.S.C. § 3 , and not under 18 U.S.C. § 1382 .”
United States v. Pedro Saade, United States of Am. v. Carlos Zenon Rodriguez, 652 F.2d 1126 (1st Cir. 1981). · cites it 3× “234 pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 3 , 4 but instead erroneously invoked 33 *1131 U.”
United States v. Zenón-Encarnación, 387 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2004). · cites it 8× “Applicability of the statute Appellants challenge their convictions on the ground that entry into a danger zone can be prosecuted only under 33 U.S.C. § 3 , and not under 18 U.S.C. § 1382 or any other statute, because the regulation establishing the danger zone, 33 C.”
United States v. Holmes, 414 F. Supp. 831 (D. Maryland 1976). · cites it 2× “” 33 U.S.C. § 3 . Ill The arguments of the State and of the defendant have in large part confused and overlooked the important distinction between the acquisition by the Federal Government of title to real property through deed or through the exercise of the power of eminent…”
Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979). “33 U.S.C. § 3 . As previously indicated in this opinion, the pertinent regulations respecting the target range at Vieques Island are promulgated at 33 C.”
United States v. Zenón-Rodríguez, 289 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2002). · cites it 6× “§ 1 , and that it should have been promulgated under 33 U.S.C. § 3 , which requires that the regulation will not “unreasonably .”
United States v. Pedro Saade, United States of Am. v. Carlos Zenon-Rodriguez, 800 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1986). · cites it 2× “234 , was valid only if promulgated under the authority of 33 U.S.C. § 3 . That statute authorizes the Secretary of the Army to prescribe regulations “for the use .”
Todd v. United States, 292 F.2d 841 (Ct. Cl. 1961). “892 , 33 U.S.C. § 3 . Defendant’s actions here were an unreasonable interference.”
Jackson v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1019 (Ct. Cl. 1952). “On February 19, 1943, the Government having leased Spesutie Island from its private owners, the Secretary of War, acting under authority of the Act of July 9, 1918, 33 U.S.C.A. § 3 , redefined the restricted areas of the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland, by enlarging…”
Blake v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 584 (E.D. Va. 1960). “§ 1497 and 33 U.S.C.A. § 3 favoring oyster ground planters and fishing interests in general.”
Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 298 (D. Maryland 1951). · cites it 3× “The regulations were continued after the war, pursuant to the authority of 33 U.S.C.A. § 3 and the regulations published at 33 C.”
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