33 U.S.C. § 913

Filing of claims

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(a) Time to file

Except as otherwise provided in this section, the right to compensation for disability or death under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefore is filed within one year after the injury or death. If payment of compensation has been made without an award on account of such injury or death, a claim may be filed within one year after the date of the last payment. Such claim shall be filed with the deputy commissioner in the compensation district in which such injury or death occurred. The time for filing a claim shall not begin to run until the employee or beneficiary is aware, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been aware, of the relationship between the injury or death and the employment.

(b) Failure to file(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) failure to file a claim within the period prescribed in such subsection shall not be a bar to such right unless objection to such failure is made at the first hearing of such claim in which all parties in interest are given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), a claim for compensation for death or disability due to an occupational disease which does not immediately result in such death or disability shall be timely if filed within two years after the employee or claimant becomes aware, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence or by reason of medical advice should have been aware, of the relationship between the employment, the disease, and the death or disability, or within one year of the date of the last payment of compensation, whichever is later.(c) Effect on incompetents and minors

If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the provisions of subsection (a) shall not be applicable so long as such person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but shall be applicable in the case of a person who is mentally incompetent or a minor from the date of appointment of such guardian or other representative, or in the case of a minor, if no guardian is appointed before he becomes of age, from the date he becomes of age.

(d) Tolling provision

Where recovery is denied to any person, in a suit brought at law or in admiralty to recover damages in respect of injury or death, on the ground that such person was an employee and that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of this chapter and that such employer had secured compensation to such employee under this chapter, the limitation of time prescribed in subsection (a) shall begin to run only from the date of termination of such suit.

(Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 13, 44 Stat. 1432; Pub. L. 92–576, § 12(b), Oct. 27, 1972, 86 Stat. 1259; Pub. L. 98–426, § 12, Sept. 28, 1984, 98 Stat. 1649.)Editorial NotesAmendments

1984—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98–426 designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).

1972—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 92–576 inserted “Except as otherwise provided in this section” and provided that the time for filing a claim shall not begin to run until the employee or beneficiary is aware, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been aware, of the relationship between the injury or death and the employment.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1984 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–426 effective Sept. 28, 1984, and applicable both with respect to claims filed after such date and to claims pending on such date, see section 28(a) of Pub. L. 98–426, set out as a note under section 901 of this title.

Effective Date of 1972 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 92–576 effective 30 days after Oct. 27, 1972, see section 22 of Pub. L. 92–576, set out as a note under section 902 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 173 cases, 1930–2020 · leading case: Bath Iron Works Corp. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 336 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2003).
Bath Iron Works Corp. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 336 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2003). · cites it 8× “33 U.S.C. § 913 (b)(2). This subsection creates a “discovery rule” of accrual, deferring the commencement of the statute of limitations until an employee or claimant has or should have an awareness “of the relationship between the employment, the disease, and the death or…”
Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016). · cites it 2× “, at 197 (quoting 33 U. S. C. §913 (a) (1952)). The Court held that the 1-year period began at the time of injury, not when the employee later became disabled as a result of the injury and concluded that “Congress meant what it said when it limited recovery to one year from date…”
United Brands Co. v. Thad Melson, & the Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, United States Dep't of Labor, 594 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1979). · cites it 9× “§ 912 (a) and 33 U.S.C. § 913 (a). Section 912(a) 2 requires an employee to give written notice to the employer and to the deputy commissioner within thirty days after the employee knew, or reasonably should have known, that his illness is work- *1071 related.”
U. S. Indus./Fed. Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 455 U.S. 608 (1982). · cites it 4× “See 33 U. S. C. § 913 . On standard form LS-203, in response to the direction to "[d]escribe in full how the accident occurred," [3] Riley wrote that on November 19, 1975, he was "[l]ifting duct work with co-worker, weighing approximately 500 pounds, felt sharp pain in neck and…”
Mark Munns v. John F. Kerry, 782 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2015). · cites it 2× “See 33 U.S.C. §§ 913 (a), 921(c); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.”
Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997). · cites it 2× “§ 13(a), 33 U. S. C. § 913 (a); Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co.”
Pool Co. v. Otis L Cooper, 274 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2001). · cites it 2× “33 U.S.C. § 913 (a). Pool and Signal acknowledge that Cooper received his last disability benefit payment on April 25, 1994, and filed his LS-203 seeking additional compensation on February 25, 1995, less than one year later.”
Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 125 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1997). · cites it 3× “Birmingham resisted Acord’s federal claim on multiple grounds: that the claim, filed almost five years after the incident, was barred by the federal one-year statute of limitations, 33 U.S.C. § 913 ; that collateral estoppel precluded Acord from claiming permanent injury based…”
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 519 U.S. 248 (1997). · cites it 2× “33 U. S. C. § 913 (a) (1-year limitation period).”
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Parker, 935 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1991). · cites it 3× “33 U.S.C. § 913 (a). In the view of Newport News, the plain language of § 13(a) establishes that the statute of limitations for a traumatic injury begins to run when an employee is aware or should be aware that he has sustained a work-related injury.”
Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947). · cites it 2× “[22] 33 U.S.C. § 913 (a). [23] American moved the Circuit Court of Appeals for an order allowing the parties to take proof and to submit it to the court as to the intent of the parties respecting the indemnity clause of the contract, or in the alternative for an order remanding…”
Day v. James Marine, Inc., 518 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. 2008). · cites it 2× “33 U.S.C. § 913 (a). The deputy commissioner conducts an independent investigation into the employee's claim.”
— 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) — 8 cases
Kobilkin v. Pillsbury, 103 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1939).
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Brown, 47 F.2d 265 (N.D. Ill. 1930).
Globe Indem. Co. v. Calbeck, 230 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
Belton v. Traynor, 381 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1967).
— 33 U.S.C. § 913(b) — 1 case
Gragg v. WM Harris & Son, 284 S.E.2d 183 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.