U.S. Code » Title 33 » Chapter CHAPTER 18— LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

33 U.S.C. § 918

Collection of defaulted payments; special fund

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(a) In case of default by the employer in the payment of compensation due under any award of compensation for a period of thirty days after the compensation is due and payable, the person to whom such compensation is payable may, within one year after such default, make application to the deputy commissioner making the compensation order or 11 So in original. Probably should be “for”. a supplementary order declaring the amount of the default. After investigation, notice, and hearing, as provided in section 919 of this title, the deputy commissioner shall make a supplementary order, declaring the amount of the default, which shall be filed in the same manner as the compensation order. In case the payment in default is an installment of the award, the deputy commissioner may, in his discretion, declare the whole of the award as the amount in default. The applicant may file a certified copy of such supplementary order with the clerk of the Federal district court for the judicial district in which the employer has his principal place of business or maintains an office, or for the judicial district in which the injury occurred. In case such principal place of business or office or place where the injury occurred is in the District of Columbia, a copy of such supplementary order may be filed with the clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Such supplementary order of the deputy commissioner shall be final, and the court shall, upon the filing of the copy, enter judgment for the amount declared in default by the supplementary order if such supplementary order is in accordance with law. Review of the judgment so entered may be had as in civil suits for damages at common law. Final proceedings to execute the judgment may be had by writ of execution in the form used by the court in suits at common law in actions of assumpsit. No fee shall be required for filing the supplementary order nor for entry of judgment thereon, and the applicant shall not be liable for costs in a proceeding for review of the judgment unless the court shall otherwise direct. The court shall modify such judgment to conform to any later compensation order upon presentation of a certified copy thereof to the court.(b) In cases where judgment cannot be satisfied by reason of the employer’s insolvency or other circumstances precluding payment, the Secretary of Labor may, in his discretion and to the extent he shall determine advisable after consideration of current commitments payable from the special fund established in section 944 of this title, make payment from such fund upon any award made under this chapter, and in addition, provide any necessary medical, surgical, and other treatment required by section 907 of this title in any case of disability where there has been a default in furnishing medical treatment by reason of the insolvency of the employer. Such an employer shall be liable for payment into such fund of the amounts paid therefrom by the Secretary of Labor under this subsection; and for the purpose of enforcing this liability, the Secretary of Labor for the benefit of the fund shall be subrogated to all the rights of the person receiving such payment or benefits as against the employer and may by a proceeding in the name of the Secretary of Labor under this section or under subsection (c) of section 921 of this title, or both, seek to recover the amount of the default or so much thereof as in the judgment of the Secretary is possible, or the Secretary may settle and compromise any such claim.(Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 18, 44 Stat. 1434; June 25, 1936, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921; June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 32(b), 62 Stat. 991; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 127, 63 Stat. 107; July 26, 1956, ch. 735, § 6, 70 Stat. 655; Pub. L. 98–426, § 27(b), Sept. 28, 1984, 98 Stat. 1654.)Editorial NotesCodification

As originally enacted, subsec. (a) contained a reference to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Act June 25, 1936, substituted “the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia” for “the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia”, and act June 25, 1948, as amended by act May 24, 1949, substituted “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” for “district court of the United States for the District of Columbia”.

Amendments

1984—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98–426 struck out “, including the right of lien and priority provided for by section 917 of this title,” after “shall be subrogated to all the rights of the person receiving such payment or benefits”.

1956—Act July 26, 1956, designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1984 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–426 effective Sept. 28, 1984, see section 28(e)(1) of Pub. L. 98–426, set out as a note under section 901 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 96 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1929–2025 · leading case: A-Z Int'l Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Michael James Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2003).
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A-Z Int'l Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Michael James Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2003). · cites it 3× “at 555; 33 U.S.C. § 918 (a). Second, under § 921(d), 5 district courts have jurisdiction to enforce any order awarding workers’ compensation.”
Byrge ex rel. Est. v. Premium Coal Co., 301 F. Supp. 3d 785 (E.D. Tenn. 2017). · cites it 7× “The Defendants explain that a plaintiff may seek to enforce an award through the district court by two avenues: 33 U.S.C. § 918 or § 921. The Defendants argue that § 918 has a one-year window, which would bar the instant suit.”
Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, United States Dep't of Labor & Constance Kain, 765 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1985). · cites it 6× “The respondent Director (“respondent”) adopting the position of the Board and the Fifth Circuit in Tidelands, 1 argues that § 914(f) penalty orders are to be treated as orders entered under 33 U.S.C. § 918 . Section 918 orders are final when issued and are not subject to review…”
Furnell Severin v. Exxon Corp., 910 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1990). · cites it 6× “Because the supplemental order was not entered “in accordance with law” as required by section 18(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 918 (a), we affirm. II. Severin was working for Exxon on an offshore drilling platform when he fell and sustained injuries.”
Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2012). · cites it 2× “In contrast, although the Longshore Act also estab- lishes a “special fund,” 33 U.S.C. § 918 , the money in the fund “shall not be money or property of the United States,” id.”
Schmit v. Fed. Elec. Int'l, 780 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1991). · cites it 15× “Introduction Plaintiff William Schmit instituted this action pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 918 (a) to enforce a supplementary order issued by a deputy commissioner of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (“OWCP”) of the United States Department of Labor.”
Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, United States Dep't of Labor v. Opal Bivens, George Hill, 757 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1985). · cites it 4× “Additionally, Congress incorporated 33 U.S.C. § 918 (b), which allows the Secretary of Labor to sue as a subrogee to recover from a defaulting employer the amounts the Secretary has paid to a claimant out of the special fund established in 33 U.”
Serv. Employees Int'l, Inc. v. Dir., Off. of Workers Comp. Prog., 595 F.3d 447 (2d Cir. 2010). · cites it 2× “Because injuries compensable under the DBA occurred only in overseas locations and not within any judicial district in the United States, § 3(b) of the DBA included the following specific provision: Judicial proceedings provided under section 18 and 21 of the Longshore and…”
Crowe Ex Rel. Crowe v. Zeigler Coal Co., 646 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2011). · cites it 2× “Accord, 33 U.S.C. §§ 918 , 921(a) (during judicial review, payment of amounts required by an award shall not be stayed pending final decision, unless ordered by the court on showing of threat of irreparable injury).”
Eva Q. Jourdan, Widow of Elliot Jourdan, Deceased Emp. v. Equitable Equip. Co., 889 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1989). · cites it 4× “Equitable contends that the district court erred in entering judgment because the requirements of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, section 18(a) of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 918 (a), and due process were not satisfied.”
Andre P. Lazarus v. Chevron Usa, Inc., 958 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1992). · cites it 3× “He argues that the district court erred in finding that medical benefits are not included in compensation for the purposes of enforcement proceedings under § 18(a) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 918 (a). We find that compensation under § 18(a)…”
Nowlin v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 266 F. Supp. 2d 502 (N.D.W. Va. 2003). · cites it 4× “33 U.S.C. § 918 (a). Under the Act, an award is effective when it is filed in the District Director’s office.”
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— 33 U.S.C. § 918(a) — 1 case
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Brooke, 219 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1963).
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