38 U.S.C. § 903

Uniform allowance

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(a) The Secretary may pay an allowance under this section for the purchase of uniforms to any Department police officer who is required to wear a prescribed uniform in the performance of official duties.(b)(1) The amount of the allowance that the Secretary may pay under this section is the lesser of—(A) the amount currently allowed as prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management; or(B) estimated costs or actual costs as determined by periodic surveys conducted by the Department.(2) During any fiscal year no officer shall receive more for the purchase of a uniform described in subsection (a) than the amount established under this subsection.(c) The allowance established under subsection (b) shall be paid at the beginning of a Department police officer’s employment for those appointed on or after October 1, 2010. In the case of any other Department police officer, an allowance in the amount established under subsection (b) shall be paid upon the request of the officer.(d) A police officer who resigns as a police officer less than one year after receiving an allowance in an amount established under this section shall repay to the Department a pro rata share of the amount paid, based on the number of months the officer was actually employed as such an officer during the twelve-month period following the date on which such officer began such employment or the date on which the officer submitted a request for such an allowance, as the case may be.(e) An allowance may not be paid to a Department police officer under this section and under section 5901 of title 5 for the same fiscal year.(Added Pub. L. 102–83, § 2(a), Aug. 6, 1991, 105 Stat. 398; amended Pub. L. 111–163, title X, § 1002, May 5, 2010, 124 Stat. 1182.)Editorial NotesPrior Provisions

Prior section 903 was renumbered section 2303 of this title.

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 218(c) of this title prior to repeal by Pub. L. 102–83, § 2(a).

Amendments

2010—Subsecs. (b), (c). Pub. L. 111–163 added subsecs. (b) and (c) and struck out former subsecs. (b) and (c) which read as follows:

“(b) The amount of the allowance that the Secretary may pay under this section—

“(1) may be based on estimated average costs or actual costs;

“(2) may vary by geographic regions; and

“(3) except as provided in subsection (c), may not exceed $200 in a fiscal year for any police officer.

“(c) The amount of an allowance under this section may be increased to an amount up to $400 for not more than one fiscal year in the case of any Department police officer. In the case of a person who is appointed as a Department police officer on or after January 1, 1990, an allowance in an amount established under this subsection shall be paid at the beginning of such person’s employment as such an officer. In the case of any other Department police officer, an allowance in an amount established under this subsection shall be paid upon the request of the officer.”

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 5 cases, 1982–2013 · leading case: Melson v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 334 (Vet. App. 1991).

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Melson v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 334 (Vet. App. 1991). · cites it 3× “This regulation is based on 38 U.S.C. § 903 (a) (1988) which provides that a burial allowance and transportation costs will be paid [w]hen a veteran dies in a [VA] facility (as defined in section 601(4) of this title) to which the deceased was properly admitted for hospital,…”

Rodriguez-Flores v. U.S. Coatings, Inc., 133 So. 3d 874 (Ala. 2013). “The LHWCA came ashore when its coverage provision was amended to include injuries ‘occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an…”

Robert E. Blake Inc. v. Excel Env't, 104 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1997). “(West 1989), for about nine months, and then subsequently received higher benefits under the Longshore & Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 38 U.S.C. § 903 (1986). The district court ruled that the contract was governed not by admiralty law but by state law because the Cape Bover…”

Wellsville Terminals Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 610 A.2d 520 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). “In Sun Ship, the Supreme Court interpreted the status of the law, prior to 1972, with respect to jurisdiction over marine-related injuries, as follows: Before 1972, then, marine-related injuries fell within one of three jurisdictional spheres as they moved landward.”

Beverly v. Action Marine Servs., Inc., 422 So. 2d 623 (La. Ct. App. 1982). “‘Maritime but local’ injuries ‘upon the navigable waters of the United States,’ 38 U.S.C. § 903 (a), could be compensated under the LHWCA or under state law.”

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