42 U.S.C. § 16915

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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 41 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 2009–2022 · leading case: United States v. Juv. Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Juv. Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012). · cites it 3× “Each jurisdiction must make public the contents of its sex offender registry, including each registrant’s name, address, photograph, criminal history, and status of parole, probation, or supervised release. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16914 (b), 16918(a).”
State v. Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d 1127 (Kan. 2016). · cites it 2× “But SORNA imposes a 25-year registration requirement on Tier II offenders and a lifetime requirement on Tier III offenders, 42 U.S.C. § 16915 (2012), and the federal courts addressing this issue have upheld SORNA based on Smith.”
United States v. Del-Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2015). · cites it 4× “42 U.S.C. § 16915 requires a registration period of fifteen years for tier I sex offenders, twenty-five years for tier II and lifetime for tier III.”
United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013). · cites it 2× “For purposes of federal law, SORNA re- duced the duration of Kebodeaux’s registration require- ment to 25 years from the lifetime requirement imposed by Texas law, compare 42 U. S. C. §16915 (a) (2006 ed.) with App.”
State v. Moir, 794 S.E.2d 685 (N.C. 2016). · cites it 4× “Among other things, 42 U.S.C. § 16915 provides that “[a] sex offender shall keep the registration current for the full registration period (excluding any time the sex offender is in custody or civilly committed) unless the offender is allowed a reduction under” 42 U.”
State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130 (Me. 2009). · cites it 2× “See 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 16915 , 16916 (2008). [13] In Smith , the majority opinion cited empirical research regarding the duration of the risk of recidivism, noting that, "`contrary to conventional wisdom, most reoffenses do not occur within the first several years after release,'…”
In Re Hamilton, 725 S.E.2d 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 3× “See 42 U.S.C. § 16915 (2011) (titled “Duration of registration requirement”).”
United States v. Charles Mulverhill, 833 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016). · cites it 2× “” 42 U.S.C. § 16915 (a). Mulverhill argues that the district court plainly erred in accepting his guilty plea to failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of § 2250(a), because, using a categorical approach, neither of his two convictions under California Penal Code §…”
United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2015). “42 U.S.C. § 16915 (a). Tier I offenders must register for 15 years after being convicted of a sex offense; tier II offenders must register for 25 years; and tier III offenders must register for life.”
Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Saf. & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123 (Md. 2013). “Like SORNA, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 16915 , 16916, Maryland requires Tier III offenders, such as Petitioner, to register in person every three months for life, Md.”
United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2012). “For example, 42 U.S.C. § 16915 (a) lists different durations of the registration requirement based on the severity of the offense.”
MARK J. HORTON v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent., 462 S.W.3d 770 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 3× “” Among other facts alleged in the petition are that Petitioner “has duly registered” and “[u]nder Section 16915(a)(1) of SOR-NA ( 42 U.S.C. § 16915 ), [Petitioner] no longer has a duty to register.”
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