42 U.S.C. § 7550

Definitions

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As used in this part—(1) The term “manufacturer” as used in sections 7521, 7522, 7525, 7541, and 7542 of this title means any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of new motor vehicles, new motor vehicle engines, new nonroad vehicles or new nonroad engines, or importing such vehicles or engines for resale, or who acts for and is under the control of any such person in connection with the distribution of new motor vehicles, new motor vehicle engines, new nonroad vehicles or new nonroad engines, but shall not include any dealer with respect to new motor vehicles, new motor vehicle engines, new nonroad vehicles or new nonroad engines received by him in commerce.(2) The term “motor vehicle” means any self-propelled vehicle designed for transporting persons or property on a street or highway.(3) Except with respect to vehicles or engines imported or offered for importation, the term “new motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle the equitable or legal title to which has never been transferred to an ultimate purchaser; and the term “new motor vehicle engine” means an engine in a new motor vehicle or a motor vehicle engine the equitable or legal title to which has never been transferred to the ultimate purchaser; and with respect to imported vehicles or engines, such terms mean a motor vehicle and engine, respectively, manufactured after the effective date of a regulation issued under section 7521 of this title which is applicable to such vehicle or engine (or which would be applicable to such vehicle or engine had it been manufactured for importation into the United States).(4) The term “dealer” means any person who is engaged in the sale or the distribution of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines to the ultimate purchaser.(5) The term “ultimate purchaser” means, with respect to any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine, the first person who in good faith purchases such new motor vehicle or new engine for purposes other than resale.(6) The term “commerce” means (A) commerce between any place in any State and any place outside thereof; and (B) commerce wholly within the District of Columbia.(7)Vehicle curb weight, gross vehicle weight rating, light-duty truck, light-duty vehicle, and loaded vehicle weight.—The terms “vehicle curb weight”, “gross vehicle weight rating” (GVWR), “light-duty truck” (LDT), light-duty vehicle,11 So in original. Probably should be set off by quotation marks. and “loaded vehicle weight” (LVW) have the meaning provided in regulations promulgated by the Administrator and in effect as of November 15, 1990. The abbreviations in parentheses corresponding to any term referred to in this paragraph shall have the same meaning as the corresponding term.(8)Test weight.—The term “test weight” and the abbreviation “tw” mean the vehicle curb weight added to the gross vehicle weight rating (gvwr) and divided by 2.(9)Motor vehicle or engine part manufacturer.—The term “motor vehicle or engine part manufacturer” as used in sections 7541 and 7542 of this title means any person engaged in the manufacturing, assembling or rebuilding of any device, system, part, component or element of design which is installed in or on motor vehicles or motor vehicle engines.(10)Nonroad engine.—The term “nonroad engine” means an internal combustion engine (including the fuel system) that is not used in a motor vehicle or a vehicle used solely for competition, or that is not subject to standards promulgated under section 7411 of this title or section 7521 of this title.(11)Nonroad vehicle.—The term “nonroad vehicle” means a vehicle that is powered by a nonroad engine and that is not a motor vehicle or a vehicle used solely for competition.(July 14, 1955, ch. 360, title II, § 216, formerly § 208, as added Pub. L. 89–272, title I, § 101(8), Oct. 20, 1965, 79 Stat. 994; renumbered § 212, and amended Pub. L. 90–148, § 2, Nov. 21, 1967, 81 Stat. 503; renumbered § 213, and amended Pub. L. 91–604, §§ 8(a), 10(d), 11(a)(2)(A), Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1694, 1703, 1705; renumbered § 214, Pub. L. 93–319, § 10, June 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 261; renumbered § 216, Pub. L. 95–95, title II, § 224(d), Aug. 7, 1977, 91 Stat. 767; Pub. L. 101–549, title II, § 223, Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 2503.)Editorial NotesCodification

Section was formerly classified to section 1857f–7 of this title.

Amendments

1990—Par. (1). Pub. L. 101–549, § 223(b), inserted references to new nonroad vehicles or new nonroad engines.

Pars. (7) to (11). Pub. L. 101–549, § 223(a), added pars. (7) to (11).

1970—Pub. L. 91–604, § 11(a)(2)(A), substituted “part” for “subchapter”.

Par. (1). Pub. L. 91–604, § 10(d)(1), inserted reference to section 7521 of this title.

Par. (3). Pub. L. 91–604, § 10(d)(2), inserted provisions which defined such terms with respect to imported vehicles or engines.

1967—Pub. L. 90–148 inserted “as used in sections 7522, 7525, 7541, and 7542 of this title” after “manufacturer” in par. (1).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 23 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1986–2024 · leading case: Epc of Hillsborough Cty. v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., 959 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2020).

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Epc of Hillsborough Cty. v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., 959 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2020). “After a new motor vehicle is sold “to an ultimate purchaser,” 42 U.S.C. § 7550 (3), the express preemption clause no longer applies.”

Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. U.S. Env't Prot. Agency, 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996). · cites it 4× “42 U.S.C. § 7550 (10) (1994) (amended by Pub.”

Truck Trailer Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 17 F.4th 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2021). · cites it 2× “” 42 U.S.C. § 7550 (2). That makes a self-propelled tractor a “motor vehicle” long before a trailer is ever attached.”

Pers. Watercraft Coalition v. Marin Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). “” ( 42 U.S.C. § 7550 (10) & (11).) 9 We note that federal authorities have seen fit to ban personal watercraft in marine sanctuaries such as Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary ( 15 C.”

Am. Road & Transp. Builders Ass'n v. Env't Prot. Agency, 865 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.D.C. 2012). “42 U.S.C. § 7550 (10). Most of the provisions concerning nonroad engines also apply to nonroad vehicles, defined as "a vehicle that is powered by a non-road engine and that is not a motor vehicle or a vehicle used solely for competition," id.”

Sierra Club v. Env't Prot. Agency, 325 F.3d 374 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “The statute defines “motor vehicle” separately from “new motor vehicle,” see 42 U.S.C. § 7550 (2), (3), suggesting that any use of the term “motor vehicle” simpliciter encompasses in-use vehicles; but as “subsection (a)(1)” authorizes regulations only for “new motor vehicles,”…”

United States v. Navistar Int'l Corp., 240 F. Supp. 3d 789 (N.D. Ill. 2017). “Part 10681 The governmént argues that the on-highway regulations plainly and unambiguously provide that an engine is only considered “produced” when all manufacturing and assembling processes necessary to make the engine “saleable” have occurred.”

Valley Ice & Fuel Co., Inc. v. United States, 30 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. 1994). “§ 4902 (4) (defining “ultimate purchaser” with respect to noise control prevention measures concerning purchased automobiles); 42 U.S.C. § 7550 (5) (1988) (defining “ultimate purchaser” with respect to air pollution prevention measures concerning purchased motor vehicles).”

People Ex Rel. State Air Resources Bd. v. Wilmshurst, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). “( 42 U.S.C. § 7550 (3), (5).) By contrast, California law (as previously noted) “conclusively” presumes for vehicles with fewer than 7,500 odometer miles that the person acquiring the vehicle does not have the status of ultimate purchaser (regardless of the actual intent of the…”

TIG Ins v. Woodsboro Farmers Coop, 117 F.4th 715 (5th Cir. 2024). “The Supreme Court of Texas quoted with approval a case from the Illinois Supreme Court that described what was needed to show physical injury apart from “intangible damage, such as diminution in value”: “a harmful change in appearance, shape, composition, or some other physical…”

Anderson Shipping Co. v. Env't Prot. Agency, Lee M. Thomas, Adm'r, & United States of Am., 852 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1988). “42 U.S.C. § 7550 (3). The broader view of the statutory scheme supports EPA’s jurisdiction.”

Georgia Auto. Importers Compliance v. Bowers, 639 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Ga. 1986). “42 U.S.C. § 7550 (3) (1982). [8] The Pennsylvania statute upon which the original suit revolved, 419 F.”

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