If upon examination it appears that the person held is the person charged with having
committed the crime alleged and that the person probably committed the crime, and,
except in cases arising under section 4946 of this title, that the person has fled from justice, the judge or magistrate shall commit the
person to jail by a warrant, reciting the accusation, for such a time, not exceeding
90 days, to be specified in the warrant as will enable the arrest of the accused to
be made under a warrant of the Governor on a requisition of the executive authority
of the state having jurisdiction of the offense, unless the accused give bail as provided
in section 4956 of this title, or until the person shall be legally discharged. On request of the state, the hearing
may be continued for up to three business days, only for the purpose of determining
whether the person probably committed the crime. Findings under this section may be
based upon hearsay evidence or upon copies of affidavits, whether certified or not,
made outside this State. It shall be sufficient for a finding that a person probably
committed the crime that there is a current grand jury indictment from another state. (Amended 1989, No. 289 (Adj. Sess.); 2025, No. 39, § 1, eff. May 28, 2025.)
Lovejoy v. State, 531 A.2d 921 (Vt. 1987). · cites it 6דThe amended petition recited four grounds for relief: 1) The information did not allege that petitioner “probably committed the crime,” as required by 13 V.S.A. § 4955. 2) No facts appear of record to support a finding that petitioner “probably committed the crime.”
In Re Hval, 537 A.2d 135 (Vt. 1987). · cites it 2ד2 *547 At oral argument petitioner also asserted that the district court did not make the mandatory finding under 13 V.S.A. § 4955 that the accused “probably committed the crime.”
In re Ropp, 541 A.2d 84 (Vt. 1987). · cites it 4דFollowing the examination required by 13 V.S.A. § 4955, 1 the district judge found that the petitioner was the person charged with having committed the crime alleged, that he probably committed the crime and that petitioner had fled from justice.”
In Re Bryant, 276 A.2d 628 (Vt. 1971). “13 V.S.A. § 4955 provides, in part, that a person held as a fugitive from justice from another state shall be committed to jail by a warrant, reciting the accusation, for a time not to exceed thirty days.”
State v. Jones, 709 A.2d 507 (Vt. 1998). · cites it 4דJones was arrested as a fugitive from justice, and released on bail pending extradition, under 13 VS.A. § 4955. Surety argues on appeal that his bail bond secured defendant’s availability for no longer than the thirty days provided in the statute, and that the court was required…”
In Re Iverson, 376 A.2d 23 (Vt. 1977). “He argues that by implication 13 V.S.A. §§ 4955, 4956 read together suggest that a legislative mandate exists for this relief, i.”
In re Lovejoy, 556 A.2d 79 (Vt. 1988). · cites it 2ד2d 921 (1987), we held that the resulting detention was illegal because the district court had failed to make the finding, required by 13 V.S.A. § 4955, that Lovejoy had “probably committed the crime.”
State v. Logan Clegg (Vt. 2022). “§ 4954, was first released before being rearrested under 13 V.S.A. § 4955, after the court learned that the underlying charges were punishable by life imprisonment.”
Palmer v. Fitzgerald, 413 A.2d 1218 (Vt. 1980). “There being no bail permissible after arrest upon a Governor’s warrant, 13 V.S.A. §§ 4955, 4956; In re Iverson, 135 Vt.”
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