Where a district court has found that there is probable cause to believe that an adult has committed a felony, the accused, if he is held continuously in custody thereafter, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for such offense if no trial is commenced in the circuit court within five months from the date such probable cause was found by the district court; and if the accused is not held in custody but has been recognized for his appearance in the circuit court to answer for such offense, he shall be forever discharged from prosecution therefor if no trial is commenced in the circuit court within nine months from the date such probable cause was found.
If there was no preliminary hearing in the district court, or if such preliminary hearing was waived by the accused, the commencement of the running of the five-month and nine-month periods, respectively, set forth in this section shall be from the date an indictment or presentment is found against the accused.
If an indictment or presentment is found against the accused but he has not been arrested for the offense charged therein, the five-month and nine-month periods, respectively, shall commence to run from the date of his arrest thereon.
Where a case is before a circuit court on appeal from a conviction of a misdemeanor or traffic infraction in a district court or by certification of a misdemeanor pursuant to § 19.2-190.1, the accused shall be forever discharged from prosecution for such offense if the trial de novo in the circuit court is not commenced (i) within five months from the date of the conviction or certification if the accused has been held continuously in custody or (ii) within nine months of the date of the conviction or certification if the accused has been recognized for his appearance in the circuit court to answer for such offense.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to such period of time as the failure to try the accused was caused:
1. By evaluations or restoration related to his competency or insanity pursuant to Chapter 11 (§ 19.2-167 et seq.) or by reason of his confinement in a hospital for care and observation;
2. By the witnesses for the Commonwealth being enticed or kept away, or prevented from attending by sickness or accident;
3. By the granting of a separate trial at the request of a person indicted jointly with others for a felony;
4. By continuance granted on the motion of the accused or his counsel, or by concurrence of the accused or his counsel in such a motion by the attorney for the Commonwealth, or by the failure of the accused or his counsel to make a timely objection to such a motion by the attorney for the Commonwealth, or by reason of his escaping from jail or failing to appear according to his recognizance;
5. By continuance ordered pursuant to subsection I or J of § 18.2-472.1 or subsection C or D of § 19.2-187.1;
6. By the inability of the jury to agree in their verdict; or
7. By a natural disaster, civil disorder, or act of God.
But the time during the pendency of any appeal in any appellate court shall not be included as applying to the provisions of this section.
For the purposes of this section, an arrest on an indictment or warrant or information or presentment is deemed to have occurred only when such indictment, warrant, information, or presentment or the summons or capias to answer such process is served or executed upon the accused and a trial is deemed commenced at the point when jeopardy would attach or when a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is tendered by the defendant. The lodging of a detainer or its equivalent shall not constitute an arrest under this section.
Code 1950, § 19.1-191; 1960, c. 366; 1974, c. 391; 1975, c. 495; 1984, c. 618; 1988, c. 33; 1993, c. 425; 1995, cc. 37, 352; 2002, c. 743; 2005, c. 650; 2007, c. 944; 2009, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 1, 4; 2025, cc. 81, 83, 87.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
274
cases (
60 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case:
Baity v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 891 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
Baity v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 891 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 149× “On appeal, he contends that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial as provided by Code § 19.2-243. Specifically, Baity contends that the fifteen day period granted by the trial court to permit him initially to obtain counsel was wrongfully charged against him when…”
Andrew Wallace v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 774 S.E.2d 482 (Va. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 40× “On appeal, Wallace argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the Commonwealth failed to bring him to trial within the period required by Code § 19.2-243 and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”
Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 899 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 94× “SPEEDY TRIAL REQUIREMENT Code § 19.2-243 provides, in pertinent part: Where a general district court has found that there is probable cause to believe that the accused has committed a felony, the accused, if he is held continuously in custody thereafter, shall be forever…”
Ragsdale v. Commonwealth, 565 S.E.2d 331 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 28× “[1] Prior to Ragsdale's trial, he filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, alleging that, pursuant to Code § 19.2-243, more than five months had passed since the determination of probable cause.”
Lee Antonio Turner v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 802 S.E.2d 814 (Va. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 26× “On May 2, Turner argued the indictment should be dismissed because the Commonwealth failed to commence Turner’s trial within the time set by Code § 19.2-243. The trial court denied Turner’s motion.”
Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 611 S.E.2d 631 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 26× “Appellant subsequently moved for dismissal of the charges against her on speedy trial grounds, noting that the rescheduled trial exceeded the five-month limitation set forth in Code § 19.2-243 by more than six weeks. In denying appellant’s motion to dismiss, the trial court…”
Shearer v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 828 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 44× “He moved the trial court to dismiss the charges because he was not tried within five months of the probable cause determination as required by Code § 19.2-243. Shearer contends that most of the delay between September 24, 1986, and his trial on October 14, 1987, was caused by…”
Moten v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 704 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 44× “He contends that he was denied his rights to a speedy trial under Code § 19.2-243 as well as under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution.”
Raymond Louis Harvey, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 796 S.E.2d 428 (Va. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 34× “On June 5, 2015, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictments arguing that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and…”
Heath v. Commonwealth, 526 S.E.2d 798 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 56× “On July 6, 1999, a panel of this Court reversed the murder conviction of Wayne Lenardo Heath based on its view that appellant's statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to Code § 19.2-243 had been violated. The Commonwealth filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which we…”
Brown v. Commonwealth, 702 S.E.2d 582 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 26× “Appellant argued the speedy trial limitations period set forth in Code § 19.2-243 should not have been tolled between October 31, 2008, the date Dr.”
Heath v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 906 (Va. 2001).
· cites it 22× “Code § 19.2-243 provides that if, while awaiting trial, an accused has been incarcerated continuously for more than five months after a district court finds probable cause to believe that he has committed a felony, he shall be “forever discharged from prosecution” for that…”
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-243(1) — 6 cases
Moten v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 704 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
“He contends that he was denied his rights to a speedy trial under Code § 19.2-243 as well as under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-243(2) — 6 cases
Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 611 S.E.2d 631 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
“Appellant subsequently moved for dismissal of the charges against her on speedy trial grounds, noting that the rescheduled trial exceeded the five-month limitation set forth in Code § 19.2-243 by more than six weeks. In denying appellant’s motion to dismiss, the trial court…”
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-243(3) — 2 cases
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-243(4) — 93 cases
Heath v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 906 (Va. 2001).
“Code § 19.2-243 provides that if, while awaiting trial, an accused has been incarcerated continuously for more than five months after a district court finds probable cause to believe that he has committed a felony, he shall be “forever discharged from prosecution” for that…”
Shearer v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 828 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
“He moved the trial court to dismiss the charges because he was not tried within five months of the probable cause determination as required by Code § 19.2-243. Shearer contends that most of the delay between September 24, 1986, and his trial on October 14, 1987, was caused by…”
Lee Antonio Turner v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 802 S.E.2d 814 (Va. Ct. App. 2017).
“On May 2, Turner argued the indictment should be dismissed because the Commonwealth failed to commence Turner’s trial within the time set by Code § 19.2-243. The trial court denied Turner’s motion.”
Andrew Wallace v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 774 S.E.2d 482 (Va. Ct. App. 2015).
“On appeal, Wallace argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the Commonwealth failed to bring him to trial within the period required by Code § 19.2-243 and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-243(5) — 3 cases
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-243(7) — 10 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.