A. Subject to the provisions of § 19.2-306.2, in any case in which the court has suspended the execution or imposition of sentence, the court may revoke the suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at any time within the probation period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the court. If neither a probation period nor a period of suspension was fixed by the court, then the court may revoke the suspension for any cause the court deems sufficient that occurred within the maximum period for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to be imprisoned.
B. The court may not conduct a hearing to revoke the suspension of sentence unless the court issues process to notify the accused or to compel his appearance before the court within 90 days of receiving notice of the alleged violation or within one year after the expiration of the period of probation or the period of suspension, whichever is sooner, or, in the case of a failure to pay restitution, within three years after such expiration. If neither a probation period nor a period of suspension was fixed by the court, then the court shall issue process within six months after the expiration of the maximum period for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to be incarcerated. Such notice and service of process may be waived by the defendant, in which case the court may proceed to determine whether the defendant has violated the conditions of suspension.
C. If the court, after hearing, finds good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension, then the court may revoke the suspension and impose a sentence in accordance with the provisions of § 19.2-306.1. The court may again suspend all or any part of this sentence for a period up to the statutory maximum period for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to be imprisoned, less any time already served, and may place the defendant upon terms and conditions or probation. The court shall measure the period of any suspension of sentence from the date of the entry of the original sentencing order. However, if a court finds that a defendant has absconded from the jurisdiction of the court, the court may extend the period of probation or suspended sentence for a period not to exceed the length of time that such defendant absconded.
D. If any court has, after hearing, found no cause to impose a sentence that might have been originally imposed, or to revoke a suspended sentence or probation, then any further hearing to impose a sentence or revoke a suspended sentence or probation, based solely on the alleged violation for which the hearing was held, shall be barred.
E. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to deprive any person of his right to appeal in the manner provided by law to the circuit court having criminal jurisdiction from a judgment or order revoking any suspended sentence.
Code 1950, § 53-275; 1958, c. 468; 1970, c. 275; 1975, c. 495; 1978, c. 687; 2002, c. 628; 2016, c. 718; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 538; 2022, cc. 569, 570.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
454
cases (
251 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case:
Hunter v. Commonwealth, 695 S.E.2d 567 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).
Hunter v. Commonwealth, 695 S.E.2d 567 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 40× “He contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation, asserting that his probation revocation hearing was held after the statutory time limitation prescribed by Code § 19.2-306 had expired. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.”
Andrew McQuay Jacobs v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 738 S.E.2d 519 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 28× “Appellant argues on appeal that “the trial court had no authority to impose 6 months of incarceration as the court had previously imposed only ninety days of incarceration and failed to re-suspend any of that sentence as required under Code § 19.2-306.” For the following…”
Briggs v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 512 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 68× “However, appellant contended that because the trial court provided no specific period of suspension in either the January 13, 1982 or November 10, 1983 orders, the statutory period of suspension under Code § 19.2-306 ran from the date of the first order.”
Charlie Luther Wilson, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 793 S.E.2d 15 (Va. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 16× “Nevertheless, our decision in this case is determined by our application of the plain language of Code § 19.2-306 and by the application of that statute to the sentencing and revocation orders, such as they are, that exist in this case.”
Clarke v. Commonwealth, 725 S.E.2d 158 (Va. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 24× “ANALYSIS On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred at the revocation hearing on May 21, 2010 by revoking his suspended time for behavior which occurred prior to a “previous sentencing event”—i.”
Pierce v. Commonwealth, 633 S.E.2d 755 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 23× “He contends that the trial court erred in its judgment because 1) the capias for his arrest for probation violations was invalid as it was based on the unsworn written statements of his probation officers; 2) the evidence was not sufficient to support issuance of the capias; 3)…”
Word v. Commonwealth, 586 S.E.2d 282 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 32× “" Code § 19.2-306 provides, "The court may, for any cause deemed by it sufficient.”
Dejuan Hodgins v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 733 S.E.2d 678 (Va. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 24× “In a March 16, 2011 letter opinion, the trial court judge denied appellant’s motion to strike, and found that Code § 19.2-306 gave him the authority to revoke the remaining six *106 years of appellant’s previously suspended sentence.”
Kirk T. Milam v. Sheila J. Milam, 778 S.E.2d 535 (Va. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 14× “The statute also provides that “[i]f the court, after hearing, finds good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension,” then the court may revoke the suspension.”
Davis v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 684 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 12× “In addition to asserting his revocation hearing was not held within the time limits established under Code § 19.2-306, Davis asserts the circuit court erred by admitting hearsay testimony concerning his conduct while on probation and by improperly considering his intervening…”
Carbaugh v. Commonwealth, 449 S.E.2d 264 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 16× “The statute’s first sentence is unwieldy and contains the following one hundred sixty-two words: The court may, for any cause deemed by it sufficient which occurred at any time within the probation period, or if none, within the period of suspension fixed by the court, or if…”
Green v. Commonwealth, 557 S.E.2d 230 (Va. 2002).
· cites it 8× “They rely primarily on Code § 19.2-306 and our decision in Southerly , arguing that since the circuit court retained jurisdiction under Code § 19.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-306(0) — 1 case
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-306(A) — 246 cases
Charlie Luther Wilson, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 793 S.E.2d 15 (Va. Ct. App. 2016).
“Nevertheless, our decision in this case is determined by our application of the plain language of Code § 19.2-306 and by the application of that statute to the sentencing and revocation orders, such as they are, that exist in this case.”
Kirk T. Milam v. Sheila J. Milam, 778 S.E.2d 535 (Va. Ct. App. 2015).
“The statute also provides that “[i]f the court, after hearing, finds good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension,” then the court may revoke the suspension.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-306(B) — 20 cases
Hunter v. Commonwealth, 695 S.E.2d 567 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).
“He contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation, asserting that his probation revocation hearing was held after the statutory time limitation prescribed by Code § 19.2-306 had expired. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.”
Kirk T. Milam v. Sheila J. Milam, 778 S.E.2d 535 (Va. Ct. App. 2015).
“The statute also provides that “[i]f the court, after hearing, finds good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension,” then the court may revoke the suspension.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-306(C) — 209 cases
Andrew McQuay Jacobs v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 738 S.E.2d 519 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
“Appellant argues on appeal that “the trial court had no authority to impose 6 months of incarceration as the court had previously imposed only ninety days of incarceration and failed to re-suspend any of that sentence as required under Code § 19.2-306.” For the following…”
Kirk T. Milam v. Sheila J. Milam, 778 S.E.2d 535 (Va. Ct. App. 2015).
“The statute also provides that “[i]f the court, after hearing, finds good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension,” then the court may revoke the suspension.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-306(C)(ii) — 51 cases
— Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-306(D) — 8 cases
Clarke v. Commonwealth, 725 S.E.2d 158 (Va. Ct. App. 2012).
“ANALYSIS On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred at the revocation hearing on May 21, 2010 by revoking his suspended time for behavior which occurred prior to a “previous sentencing event”—i.”
Kirk T. Milam v. Sheila J. Milam, 778 S.E.2d 535 (Va. Ct. App. 2015).
“The statute also provides that “[i]f the court, after hearing, finds good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension,” then the court may revoke the suspension.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.