A. The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee when his employer and he have accepted the provisions of this title respectively to pay and accept compensation on account of injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death.
B. If a court of the Commonwealth makes a finding in a final unappealed order based on an evidentiary hearing or a factual stipulation of the parties and participants thereto that the cause of action relating to an accident, injury, disease, or death is barred by this section, that finding shall be res judicata between those same parties and estop them and any employer, uninsured employer's fund, guarantee fund, responsible entities, or statutory employer from arguing before the Commission that the accident, injury, disease, or death did not arise out of and in the course of such employee's employment. If the Commission or a court on appeal from the Commission makes a finding in a final unappealed order based on an evidentiary hearing, hearing on the record, or a factual stipulation of the parties that the claims relating to an accident, injury, disease, or death did not arise out of or in the course of such employee's employment, then that finding shall be res judicata and estop those same parties from arguing before a court of the Commonwealth that the accident is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act. However, except in the case of a self-insured employer or business entity closely related to a party to the court proceeding, in order for the court finding to be res judicata as to a non-party, notice shall be provided in the same manner as allowed in subsection F of § 38.2-2206 or § 8.01-288 to any employer, uninsured employer's fund, guarantee fund, responsible entities, or statutory employer sought to be bound. In addition, any such entities so notified shall be given the same opportunity to be heard in that court proceeding as a party to the same, but limited to the issue of whether the accident, injury, disease, or death arose out of and in the course of the employee's employment. Failure to provide notice to any party to the court proceeding shall not affect the rights, privileges, or obligations of said parties thereto but shall affect only the applicability of this subsection and only as stated herein. Furthermore, the findings by either the Commission or the court under this subsection shall not prevent the parties and participants to those proceedings from raising or relying upon any and all other available defenses.
C. Notwithstanding this exclusion, nothing in the Act shall bar an employer from voluntarily agreeing to pay an employee compensation above and beyond those benefits provided for in the Act. Nothing herein, however, shall be deemed to affect or alter any existing right or remedy of the employer or employee under the Act.
Code 1950, § 65-37; 1968, c. 660, § 65.1-40; 1991, c. 355; 1999, c. 842; 2015, cc. 606, 624.
Notes of Decisions
Butler v. S. States Co-op., Inc., 620 S.E.2d 768 (Va. 2005).
· cites it 14× “Based on the facts as alleged in the motion for judgment, the trial court ruled that the employee's common-law action is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act provided by Code § 65.2-307, and that the exceptions to that exclusivity provision…”
Peck v. Safway Steel Prods., Inc., 551 S.E.2d 328 (Va. 2001).
· cites it 14× “In this appeal, we determine whether the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiff's action is barred by Code § 65.2-307, the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Code § 65.”
Hudson v. Jarrett, 606 S.E.2d 827 (Va. 2005).
· cites it 6× “The trial court dismissed Hudson's motion for judgment holding that VIT was the statutory employer of both Hudson and Jarrett and therefore the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-307, barred Hudson's tort action.”
Combs v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 525 S.E.2d 278 (Va. 2000).
· cites it 6× “” In the special plea, they asserted that the exclusivity provision of the Act, Code § 65.2-307, barred Combs’ claim and therefore deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction over her claim.”
Napper v. Abm Janitorial Servs., 726 S.E.2d 313 (Va. 2012).
· cites it 6× “In response to Napper's complaint, the Defendants filed a plea in bar, arguing that because Napper, a statutory employee, had been receiving workers' compensation benefits in connection with her injury, Napper's claims are barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity…”
Burch v. Hechinger Co., 563 S.E.2d 745 (Va. 2002).
· cites it 8× “In its defense, Hechinger filed a plea in bar alleging that at the time of her injury, Burch was a statutory employee of Hechinger and that her negligence action was therefore barred by the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-307. The…”
Safeway, Inc. v. DPI Midatlantic, Inc., 619 S.E.2d 76 (Va. 2005).
· cites it 6× “" In response to the third-party motion for judgment, DPI filed a plea in bar, stating that Williams' accident and resulting injuries occurred while he was acting within the scope of his employment for DPI and that, therefore, the third-party claim against Williams' employer is…”
David White Crane Serv. v. Howell, 714 S.E.2d 572 (Va. 2011).
· cites it 4× “Code § 65.2-307 provides that the rights and remedies granted by the Act to an employee, when he and his employer have accepted its provisions, shall exclude all other rights and remedies the employee may have on account of injury or death by accident.”
Sutter v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Virginia, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Va. 1996).
· cites it 8× “Third, defendants argue that both Counts III and IV are barred by the exclusive remedies provision of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act, Va.Code Ann. § 65.2-307. Fourth, Defendants argue that plaintiffs claim for punitive damages cannot stand in light of Virginia’s $350,000…”
Metro Mach. Corp. v. Mizenko, 419 S.E.2d 632 (Va. 1992).
· cites it 4× “1-40 (now Code § 65.2-307), barred Mizenko's negligence claim against Metro.”
Taylor v. Mobil Corp., 444 S.E.2d 705 (Va. 1994).
· cites it 4× “1-40, now Code § 65.2-307, the exclusive remedy provision of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act).”
— Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-307(A) — 32 cases
Napper v. Abm Janitorial Servs., 726 S.E.2d 313 (Va. 2012).
“In response to Napper's complaint, the Defendants filed a plea in bar, arguing that because Napper, a statutory employee, had been receiving workers' compensation benefits in connection with her injury, Napper's claims are barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity…”
Burch v. Hechinger Co., 563 S.E.2d 745 (Va. 2002).
“In its defense, Hechinger filed a plea in bar alleging that at the time of her injury, Burch was a statutory employee of Hechinger and that her negligence action was therefore barred by the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-307. The…”
Butler v. S. States Co-op., Inc., 620 S.E.2d 768 (Va. 2005).
“Based on the facts as alleged in the motion for judgment, the trial court ruled that the employee's common-law action is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act provided by Code § 65.2-307, and that the exceptions to that exclusivity provision…”
— Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-307(B) — 1 case
Safeway, Inc. v. DPI Midatlantic, Inc., 619 S.E.2d 76 (Va. 2005).
“" In response to the third-party motion for judgment, DPI filed a plea in bar, stating that Williams' accident and resulting injuries occurred while he was acting within the scope of his employment for DPI and that, therefore, the third-party claim against Williams' employer is…”
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