No action, suit, scire facias, or other proceeding which is pending before October 1, 1977, shall be barred by this chapter, and any action, suit, scire facias or other proceeding so pending shall be subject to the same limitation, if any, which would have been applied if this chapter had not been enacted. If a cause of action, as to which no action, suit, scire facias, or other proceeding is pending, exists before October 1, 1977, then this chapter shall not apply and the limitation as to such cause of action shall be the same, if any, as would apply had this chapter not been enacted. Any new limitation period imposed by this chapter, where no limitation previously existed or which is different from the limitation existing before this chapter was enacted, shall apply only to causes or rights of action accruing on or after October 1, 1977.
Code 1950, § 8-37; 1977, c. 617.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
18
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1981–2025 · leading case:
Haynes v. Haggerty, 784 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 2016).
Haynes v. Haggerty, 784 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 2016).
· cites it 6× “Chapter 4 also includes Code § 8.01-256. Code § 8.01-256 states, in relevant part, If a cause of action, as to which no action, suit, scire facias, or other proceeding is pending, exists before October 1, 1977, then this chapter shall not apply and the limitation as to such…”
Starnes v. Cayouette, 419 S.E.2d 669 (Va. 1992).
· cites it 6× “In what became the "Limitations of Actions" chapter of the new title, the 1977 Act further provided that "[i]f a cause of action, as to which no action ... is pending, exists before October 1, 1977, then this chapter shall not apply and the limitation as to such cause of action…”
Stone v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 1986).
· cites it 6× “01-246 was not effective until October 1, 1977, see Code § 8.01-256; 2 thus, Code § 8.2-725 governs.”
Strickland v. Simpkins, 273 S.E.2d 539 (Va. 1981).
· cites it 7× “) Code § 8.01-256 is the last section of Title 4, and provides: No action, suit, scire facias, or other proceeding which is pending before October one, nineteen hundred seventy-seven, shall be barred by this chapter, and any action, suit, scire facias or other proceeding so…”
Eshbaugh v. Amoco Oil Co., 360 S.E.2d 350 (Va. 1987).
· cites it 4× “Pursuant to the cancellation agreement with Amoco, Eshbaugh's sublease expired on May 31, 1977, and Hornsby ordered Eshbaugh to vacate the premises within 30 days thereafter.”
Sherman v. Hercules, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 305 (W.D. Va. 1986).
· cites it 7× “01-229(E)(3), the 1977 version. When the 1977 version of § 8.01-229(E)(3) was enacted, another provision was also enacted which plainly stated that the 1977 version was to apply only to causes of action accruing on or after October 1, 1977.”
Potomac Hosp. Corp. v. Dillon, 329 S.E.2d 41 (Va. 1985).
· cites it 2× “ Except as may be otherwise provided in § 8.01-256 of Chapter 4 (§ 8.01-228 et seq.”
Heirs of Roberts v. Coal Processing, 369 S.E.2d 188 (Va. 1988).
· cites it 2× “Code § 8.01-256 provides that the limitation periods existing under the prior law are to continue to govern actions pending as well as rights of action existing on October 1, 1977.”
Riddett v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 495 S.E.2d 819 (Va. 1998).
“That statute provides: “Except as may be otherwise provided in § 8.01-256 [governing limitations affecting actions pending on October 1, 1977] .”
Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Celotex Corp., 273 S.E.2d 542 (Va. 1981).
· cites it 2× “See Code § 8.01-256. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court overruling Fidelity’s plea of the statute of limitations is reversed and final judgment will be entered here for Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.