A. Except as provided in subsection C, any court in which is pending an action, wherein for more than two years there has been no order or proceeding, except to continue it, may, in its discretion, order it to be struck from its docket and the action shall thereby be discontinued. However, no case shall be discontinued if either party requests that it be continued. The court shall thereafter enter a pretrial order pursuant to Rule 4:13 controlling the subsequent course of the case to ensure a timely resolution of that case. If the court thereafter finds that the case has not been timely prosecuted pursuant to its pretrial order, it may strike the case from its docket. The clerk of the court shall notify the parties in interest if known, or their counsel of record at his last known address, at least fifteen days before the entry of such order of discontinuance so that all parties may have an opportunity to be heard on it. Any case discontinued under the provisions of this subsection may be reinstated, on motion, after notice to the parties in interest if known or their counsel of record, within one year from the date of such order but not after.
B. Any court in which is pending a case wherein for more than three years there has been no order or proceeding, except to continue it, may, in its discretion, order it to be struck from its docket and the action shall thereby be discontinued. The court may dismiss cases under this subsection without any notice to the parties. The clerk shall provide the parties with a copy of the final order discontinuing or dismissing the case. Any case discontinued or dismissed under the provisions of this subsection may be reinstated, on motion, after notice to the parties in interest, if known, or their counsel of record within one year from the date of such order but not after.
C. If a civil action is pending in a circuit court on appeal from a general district court and (i) an appeal bond has been furnished by or on behalf of any party against whom judgment has been rendered for money or property and (ii) for more than one year there has been no order or proceeding, except to continue the matter, the action may, upon notice to the parties in accordance with subsection A, be dismissed and struck from the docket of the court. Upon dismissal pursuant to this subsection, the judgment of the general district court shall stand and the appeal bond shall be forfeited after application of any funds needed to satisfy the judgment.
D. Any court in which is pending a case wherein process has not been served within one year of the commencement of the case may, in its discretion, order it to be struck from the docket, and the action shall thereby be discontinued. The clerk of the court shall notify the plaintiff or his counsel of record at his last known address at least 30 days before the entry of an order of discontinuance so that the plaintiff may have an opportunity to show that service has been timely effected on the defendant or that due diligence has been exercised to have service timely effected on the defendant. Upon finding that service has been timely effected or that due diligence has been exercised to have service timely effected, the court shall maintain the action on the docket and, if service has not been timely effected but due diligence to effect service has been exercised, shall require the plaintiff to attempt service in any manner permitted under Chapter 8 (§ 8.01-285 et seq.) of this title. Nothing herein shall prevent the plaintiff from filing a nonsuit under § 8.01-380 before the entry of a discontinuance order pursuant to the provisions of this subsection. Nothing in this subsection shall apply to asbestos litigation.
Code 1950, § 8-154; 1954, c. 621; 1977, c. 617; 1990, c. 730; 1992, cc. 532, 792, 803, 835; 1994, c. 517; 1997, c. 680; 1999, c. 652; 2007, c. 498.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
57
cases (
7 in the last 5 years), 1982–2025 · leading case:
Collins v. Shepherd, 649 S.E.2d 672 (Va. 2007).
Collins v. Shepherd, 649 S.E.2d 672 (Va. 2007).
· cites it 26× “Collins further contended that circuit courts are authorized by statute to clear inactive cases from their dockets through the mechanism prescribed in Code § 8.01-335. Finally, Collins contended that the circuit court's Local Rule 2(F)(3) was invalid under Code § 8.”
JSR Mech., Inc. v. Aireco Supply, Inc., 786 S.E.2d 144 (Va. 2016).
· cites it 20× “We therefore find guidance in considering Code § 8.01-335 by reference to the terms of like statutes in Title 8.”
Rutter v. Oakwood Living Centers of Va., 710 S.E.2d 460 (Va. 2011).
· cites it 39× “In this appeal, we conclude that Code § 8.01-335(B), governing the discontinuance or dismissal of inactive cases, does not permit a trial court to discontinue or dismiss such a case with a self-executing, prospective order.”
Hicks Ex Rel. Hicks v. Mellis, 657 S.E.2d 142 (Va. 2008).
· cites it 25× “In this appeal, we consider the effect of an order reinstating a medical malpractice action under Code § 8.01-335(B) that was entered without notice to the defendant.”
Conger v. Barrett, 702 S.E.2d 117 (Va. 2010).
· cites it 22× “2d 825 (1984), in which we considered the difference between "discontinuance" and "dismissal" for the purposes of Code § 8.01-335, the circuit court held that its earlier dismissal restarted the limitation period established in Code § 8.”
Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter, 383 S.E.2d 28 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 20× “2d 825, 827 (1984): “[T]he purpose of Subsection A [Code § 8.01-335] is to enable trial courts to identify cases which *604 litigants or their counsel are not interested in pursuing to a conclusion.”
Glenda H. Milot v. David S. Milot, 748 S.E.2d 655 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 40× “On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in 1) dismissing the case without notice under Code § 8.01-335(B) because appellant had a minimum due process right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, and 2) denying appellant’s motion to vacate the dismissal…”
Smith v. Smith, 354 S.E.2d 816 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 18× “2 The parties mistakenly briefed and argued this case as a dismissal under the “two-year rule” of Code § 8.01-335. Because we hold that a pendente lite order does not survive dismissal of the action, we do not consider it necessary to the outcome of the case to discuss *151 the…”
Nash v. Jewell, 315 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1984).
· cites it 11× “Code § 8.01-335 provides in pertinent part as follows: § 8.”
Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 408 S.E.2d 556 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 20× “Code § 8.01-335 is more than a tool for docket control and management; subsection (A) provides for “discontinuing” the action when it is stricken from the docket after no order has been entered or proceeding has taken place in two years; however, subsection (B) provides “the…”
David Milot v. Glenda A. Milot, 765 S.E.2d 861 (Va. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 12× “) Code § 8.01-335(B) authorizes a circuit court to dismiss any pending civil action “wherein for more than three years there has been no order or proceeding.”
Faysal M. Zedan v. Sylvie E. Westheim, 729 S.E.2d 785 (Va. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 2× “In Hicks , the Court held that the trial court’s failure to provide notice to a party in interest that it was reinstating an action under Code § 8.01-335(B) rendered the order voidable rather than void ab initio.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-335(8) — 1 case
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-335(A) — 10 cases
Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter, 383 S.E.2d 28 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
“2d 825, 827 (1984): “[T]he purpose of Subsection A [Code § 8.01-335] is to enable trial courts to identify cases which *604 litigants or their counsel are not interested in pursuing to a conclusion.”
Collins v. Shepherd, 649 S.E.2d 672 (Va. 2007).
“Collins further contended that circuit courts are authorized by statute to clear inactive cases from their dockets through the mechanism prescribed in Code § 8.01-335. Finally, Collins contended that the circuit court's Local Rule 2(F)(3) was invalid under Code § 8.”
Smith v. Smith, 354 S.E.2d 816 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
“2 The parties mistakenly briefed and argued this case as a dismissal under the “two-year rule” of Code § 8.01-335. Because we hold that a pendente lite order does not survive dismissal of the action, we do not consider it necessary to the outcome of the case to discuss *151 the…”
Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 408 S.E.2d 556 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
“Code § 8.01-335 is more than a tool for docket control and management; subsection (A) provides for “discontinuing” the action when it is stricken from the docket after no order has been entered or proceeding has taken place in two years; however, subsection (B) provides “the…”
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-335(B) — 30 cases
Rutter v. Oakwood Living Centers of Va., 710 S.E.2d 460 (Va. 2011).
“In this appeal, we conclude that Code § 8.01-335(B), governing the discontinuance or dismissal of inactive cases, does not permit a trial court to discontinue or dismiss such a case with a self-executing, prospective order.”
Hicks Ex Rel. Hicks v. Mellis, 657 S.E.2d 142 (Va. 2008).
“In this appeal, we consider the effect of an order reinstating a medical malpractice action under Code § 8.01-335(B) that was entered without notice to the defendant.”
Conger v. Barrett, 702 S.E.2d 117 (Va. 2010).
“2d 825 (1984), in which we considered the difference between "discontinuance" and "dismissal" for the purposes of Code § 8.01-335, the circuit court held that its earlier dismissal restarted the limitation period established in Code § 8.”
Glenda H. Milot v. David S. Milot, 748 S.E.2d 655 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
“On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in 1) dismissing the case without notice under Code § 8.01-335(B) because appellant had a minimum due process right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, and 2) denying appellant’s motion to vacate the dismissal…”
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-335(C) — 1 case
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-335(D) — 2 cases
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