Wash. Rev. Code » Title 13 · Chapter 13.04
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Except as provided in this section, the juvenile courts in this state shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings:
(a) Under the interstate compact on placement of children as provided in chapter 26.34 RCW;
(b) Relating to children alleged or found to be dependent as provided in chapter 26.44 RCW and in RCW 13.34.030 through 13.34.161;
(c) Relating to the termination of a parent and child relationship as provided in RCW 13.34.180 through 13.34.210;
(d) To approve or disapprove out-of-home placement as provided in RCW 13.32A.170;
(e) Relating to juveniles alleged or found to have committed offenses, traffic or civil infractions, or violations as provided in RCW 13.40.020 through 13.40.230, unless:
(i) The juvenile court transfers jurisdiction of a particular juvenile to adult criminal court pursuant to RCW 13.40.110;
(ii) The statute of limitations applicable to adult prosecution for the offense, traffic or civil infraction, or violation has expired;
(iii) The alleged offense or infraction is a traffic, fish, boating, or game offense, or traffic or civil infraction committed by a juvenile 16 years of age or older and would, if committed by an adult, be tried or heard in a court of limited jurisdiction, in which instance the appropriate court of limited jurisdiction shall have jurisdiction over the alleged offense or infraction, and no guardian ad litem is required in any such proceeding due to the juvenile's age. If such an alleged offense or infraction and an alleged offense or infraction subject to juvenile court jurisdiction arise out of the same event or incident, the juvenile court may have jurisdiction of both matters. The jurisdiction under this subsection does not constitute "transfer" or a "decline" for purposes of RCW 13.40.110 (1) or (2) or (e)(i) of this subsection. Courts of limited jurisdiction which confine juveniles for an alleged offense or infraction may place juveniles in juvenile detention facilities under an agreement with the officials responsible for the administration of the juvenile detention facility in RCW 13.04.035 and 13.20.060;
(iv) The alleged offense is a traffic or civil infraction, a violation of compulsory school attendance provisions under chapter 28A.225 RCW, or a misdemeanor, and a court of limited jurisdiction has assumed concurrent jurisdiction over those offenses as provided in *RCW 13.04.0301; or
(v) The juvenile is 16 or 17 years old on the date the alleged offense is committed and the alleged offense is:
(A) A serious violent offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030;
(B) A violent offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030 and the juvenile has a criminal history consisting of: One or more prior serious violent offenses; two or more prior violent offenses; or three or more of any combination of the following offenses: Any class A felony, any class B felony, vehicular assault, or manslaughter in the second degree, all of which must have been committed after the juvenile's 13th birthday and prosecuted separately; or
(C) Rape of a child in the first degree.
(I) In such a case the adult criminal court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction, except as provided in (e)(v)(C)(II) and (III) of this subsection.
(II) The juvenile court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of any remaining charges in any case in which the juvenile is found not guilty in the adult criminal court of the charge or charges for which he or she was transferred, or is convicted in the adult criminal court of an offense that is not also an offense listed in (e)(v) of this subsection. The juvenile court shall maintain residual juvenile court jurisdiction up to age 25 if the juvenile has turned 18 years of age during the adult criminal court proceedings but only for the purpose of returning a case to juvenile court for disposition pursuant to RCW 13.40.300(2)(a)(ii).
(III) The prosecutor and respondent may agree to juvenile court jurisdiction and waive application of exclusive adult criminal jurisdiction in (e)(v)(A) through (C) of this subsection and remove the proceeding back to juvenile court with the court's approval.
If the juvenile challenges the state's determination of the juvenile's criminal history under (e)(v) of this subsection, the state may establish the offender's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence. If the criminal history consists of adjudications entered upon a plea of guilty, the state shall not bear a burden of establishing the knowing and voluntariness of the plea;
(f) Under the interstate compact on juveniles as provided in chapter 13.24 RCW;
(g) Relating to termination of a diversion agreement under RCW 13.40.080, including a proceeding in which the divertee has attained 18 years of age;
(h) Relating to court validation of a voluntary consent to an out-of-home placement under chapter 13.34 RCW, by the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child, except if the parent or Indian custodian and child are residents of or domiciled within the boundaries of a federally recognized Indian reservation over which the tribe exercises exclusive jurisdiction; and
(i) Relating to petitions to compel disclosure of information filed by the department of social and health services pursuant to RCW 74.13.042.
(2) The family court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the juvenile court over all proceedings under this section if the superior court judges of a county authorize concurrent jurisdiction as provided in RCW 26.12.010.
(3) The juvenile court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the family or probate court over minor guardianship proceedings under chapter 11.130 RCW and parenting plans or residential schedules under chapter 26.09, 26.26A, or 26.26B RCW as provided for in RCW 13.34.155.
(4) A juvenile subject to adult superior court jurisdiction under subsection (1)(e)(i) through (v) of this section, who is detained pending trial, may be detained in a detention facility as defined in RCW 13.40.020 pending sentencing or a dismissal.
(5) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section deprives the superior courts in this state of original jurisdiction granted by the Constitution or by other laws.
[ 2024 c 232 s 2; 2024 c 117 s 3; 2022 c 243 s 2; 2020 c 41 s 4. Prior: 2019 c 322 s 9; 2019 c 46 s 5015; 2018 c 162 s 2; (2018 c 162 s 1 expired July 1, 2019); 2017 3rd sp.s. c 6 s 602; prior: 2009 c 526 s 1; 2009 c 454 s 1; prior: 2005 c 290 s 1; 2005 c 238 s 1; 2000 c 135 s 2; prior: 1997 c 386 s 17; 1997 c 341 s 3; 1997 c 338 s 7; prior: 1995 c 312 s 39; 1995 c 311 s 15; 1994 sp.s. c 7 s 519; 1988 c 14 s 1; 1987 c 170 s 1; 1985 c 354 s 29; 1984 c 272 s 1; 1981 c 299 s 1; 1980 c 128 s 6; 1979 c 155 s 3; 1977 ex.s. c 291 s 4; 1937 c 65 s 1; 1929 c 176 s 1; 1921 c 135 s 1; 1913 c 160 s 2; RRS s 1987-2.]

Notes:

Reviser's note: *(1) RCW 13.04.0301 was decodified September 2003.
(2) This section was amended by 2024 c 117 s 3 and by 2024 c 232 s 2, each without reference to the other. Both amendments are incorporated in the publication of this section under RCW 1.12.025(2). For rule of construction, see RCW 1.12.025(1).
Application—2024 c 117: See note following RCW 13.40.300.
Findings—Intent—2019 c 322: See note following RCW 72.01.410.
Effective date—2018 c 162 ss 2 and 7: "Sections 2 and 7 of this act take effect July 1, 2019." [ 2018 c 162 s 11.]
Expiration date—2018 c 162 ss 1 and 6: "Sections 1 and 6 of this act expire July 1, 2019." [ 2018 c 162 s 10.]
Effective date—2017 3rd sp.s. c 6 ss 601-631, 701-728, and 804: See note following RCW 13.04.011.
Conflict with federal requirements—2017 3rd sp.s. c 6: See RCW 43.216.908.
Application—1997 c 386: See note following RCW 13.50.010.
Finding—Intent—1997 c 341: "The legislature finds that a swift and certain response to a juvenile who begins engaging in acts of delinquency may prevent the offender from becoming a chronic or more serious offender. However, given pressing demands to address serious offenders, the system does not always respond to minor offenders expeditiously and effectively. Consequently, this act is adopted to implement an experiment to determine whether granting courts of limited jurisdiction concurrent jurisdiction over certain juvenile offenses will improve the system's effectiveness in curbing delinquency. The legislature may ascertain whether this approach might be successful on a larger scale by conducting an experiment with local governments, which are the laboratories of democracy." [ 1997 c 341 s 1.]
Finding—Evaluation—Report—1997 c 338: See note following RCW 13.40.0357.
Severability—Effective dates—1997 c 338: See notes following RCW 5.60.060.
Short title—1995 c 312: See note following RCW 13.32A.010.
Application of 1994 sp.s. c 7 amendments: "Provisions governing exceptions to juvenile court jurisdiction in the amendments to RCW 13.04.030 contained in section 519, chapter 7, Laws of 1994 sp. sess. shall apply to serious violent and violent offenses committed on or after June 13, 1994. The criminal history which may result in loss of juvenile court jurisdiction upon the alleged commission of a serious violent or violent offense may have been acquired on, before, or after June 13, 1994." [ 1994 sp.s. c 7 s 540.]
Finding—Intent—Severability—Effective dates—Contingent expiration date—1994 sp.s. c 7: See notes following RCW 43.70.540.
Savings—1988 c 14: "Any court validation of a voluntary consent to relinquishment or adoption of an Indian child which was obtained in a juvenile court or superior court pursuant to chapter 26.33 RCW after July 25, 1987, and before June 9, 1988, shall be valid and effective in all respects." [ 1988 c 14 s 2.]
Severability—1987 c 170: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1987 c 170 s 15.]
Effective date—Severability—1980 c 128: See notes following RCW 46.63.060.
Effective date—Severability—1979 c 155: See notes following RCW 13.04.011.
Effective dates—Severability—1977 ex.s. c 291: See notes following RCW 13.04.005.
Court commissioners: Chapter 2.24 RCW, state Constitution Art. 4 s 23.
Jurisdiction of superior courts: State Constitution Art. 4 s 6 (Amendment 65).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 176 cases (22 in the last 5 years), 1959–2026 · leading case: State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2018).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2018). · cites it 67× “That principle does not factor into our determination of whether a jurisdictional statute like former RCW 13.04.030 (2009) is constitutional because resolving this issue does not require us to assess a youthful defendant's culpability or subjective mental state.”
State v. Cornejo, 925 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1996). · cites it 38× “The Legislature amended RCW 13.04.030 to bring certain offenses committed by 16- and 17-year-olds under the "exclusive original jurisdiction” of the adult criminal court.”
In Re Boot, 925 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1996). · cites it 39× “The Legislature amended RCW 13.04.030 to bring certain offenses committed by 16- and 17-year-olds under the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the adult criminal court.”
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Joseph Leif Wolf, 384 P.3d 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 23× “030(1)(e)(v),1 the “automatic decline” statute, adult criminal court has exclusive jurisdiction and juvenile court must automatically decline jurisdiction when a juvenile who is at 1 The legislature has amended RCW 13.04.030 since the events of this case transpired.”
State v. Salavea, 86 P.3d 125 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 25× “Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of…”
State v. Salavea, 151 Wash. 2d 133 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 25× “Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of…”
State v. Posey, 272 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2012). · cites it 26× “¶ 14 In 1977, the legislature added the language in RCW 13.04.030, which grants the juvenile courts "exclusive original jurisdiction" over all juvenile proceedings.”
In Re Pers. Restraint Petition of Dalluge, 100 P.3d 279 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 18× “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wash. 2d 772 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 17× “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
State v. Posey, 167 P.3d 560 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 16× “¶ 1 This case asks us to determine whether a juvenile's acquittal in adult court on an assault charge automatically restores juvenile court jurisdiction over remaining charges under the statute then in effect, former RCW 13.04.030 (2000), and whether the trial court improperly…”
State v. Posey, 161 Wash. 2d 638 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 15× “*641 ¶1 This case asks us to determine whether a juvenile’s acquittal in adult court on an assault charge automatically restores juvenile court jurisdiction over remaining charges under the statute then in effect, former RCW 13.04.030 (2000), and whether the trial court…”
State v. Manro, 125 Wash. App. 165 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 22× “Manro was tried in adult court because first degree assault is a serious violent offense, which results in automatic transfer to adult court under RCW 13.04.030. ¶4 Before trial, Manro moved to dismiss the first degree assault charge on the grounds that the State did not have…”
Show all 176 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1) — 23 cases
State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2018). “That principle does not factor into our determination of whether a jurisdictional statute like former RCW 13.04.030 (2009) is constitutional because resolving this issue does not require us to assess a youthful defendant's culpability or subjective mental state.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wash. 2d 772 (Wash. 2004). “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
In Re Pers. Restraint Petition of Dalluge, 100 P.3d 279 (Wash. 2004). “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
State v. Posey, 272 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2012). “¶ 14 In 1977, the legislature added the language in RCW 13.04.030, which grants the juvenile courts "exclusive original jurisdiction" over all juvenile proceedings.”
Washington State Coalition for the Homeless v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 949 P.2d 1291 (Wash. 1997).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(1994) — 1 case
State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2018). “That principle does not factor into our determination of whether a jurisdictional statute like former RCW 13.04.030 (2009) is constitutional because resolving this issue does not require us to assess a youthful defendant's culpability or subjective mental state.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(2009) — 1 case
State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2018). “That principle does not factor into our determination of whether a jurisdictional statute like former RCW 13.04.030 (2009) is constitutional because resolving this issue does not require us to assess a youthful defendant's culpability or subjective mental state.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(E)(II) — 1 case
State v. Posey, 167 P.3d 560 (Wash. 2007). “¶ 1 This case asks us to determine whether a juvenile's acquittal in adult court on an assault charge automatically restores juvenile court jurisdiction over remaining charges under the statute then in effect, former RCW 13.04.030 (2000), and whether the trial court improperly…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(a) — 1 case
Custody Of A.n.d.m. (Wash. Ct. App. 2023).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(b) — 4 cases
Blume v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 106 Wash. App. 714 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
In Re Dependency of JWH, 24 P.3d 1105 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
State Of Washington, V. Shane Mathew Brown (Wash. Ct. App. 2023).
In Re Dependency of EH, 243 P.3d 160 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(e) — 18 cases
State v. Posey, 272 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2012). “¶ 14 In 1977, the legislature added the language in RCW 13.04.030, which grants the juvenile courts "exclusive original jurisdiction" over all juvenile proceedings.”
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Joseph Leif Wolf, 384 P.3d 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “030(1)(e)(v),1 the “automatic decline” statute, adult criminal court has exclusive jurisdiction and juvenile court must automatically decline jurisdiction when a juvenile who is at 1 The legislature has amended RCW 13.04.030 since the events of this case transpired.”
In Re Pers. Restraint Petition of Dalluge, 100 P.3d 279 (Wash. 2004). “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
State v. Knippling, 206 P.3d 332 (Wash. 2009).
State v. Mora, 977 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1999).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(e)(C)(III) — 1 case
State of Washington v. Arturo Pineda-Feliciano (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(e)(i) — 7 cases
In Re Pers. Restraint Petition of Dalluge, 100 P.3d 279 (Wash. 2004). “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
In Re Hegney, 158 P.3d 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Posey, 272 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2012). “¶ 14 In 1977, the legislature added the language in RCW 13.04.030, which grants the juvenile courts "exclusive original jurisdiction" over all juvenile proceedings.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Hegney, 138 Wash. App. 511 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Vichai Saly (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(e)(iii) — 2 cases
State v. Dion, 129 P.3d 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
In the Matter of the Pers. Restraint of Vy Thang (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv) — 8 cases
In Re Boot, 925 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1996). “The Legislature amended RCW 13.04.030 to bring certain offenses committed by 16- and 17-year-olds under the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the adult criminal court.”
State v. Salavea, 86 P.3d 125 (Wash. 2004). “Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of…”
State v. Mora, 977 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1999).
State v. Ramos, 217 P.3d 384 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
State v. Wooten, 945 P.2d 1144 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv)(A) — 3 cases
In Re Boot, 925 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1996). “The Legislature amended RCW 13.04.030 to bring certain offenses committed by 16- and 17-year-olds under the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the adult criminal court.”
State v. Carpenter, 72 P.3d 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Terrance T. Powell (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) — 27 cases
State v. Salavea, 86 P.3d 125 (Wash. 2004). “Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of…”
In Re Pers. Restraint Petition of Dalluge, 100 P.3d 279 (Wash. 2004). “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Joseph Leif Wolf, 384 P.3d 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “030(1)(e)(v),1 the “automatic decline” statute, adult criminal court has exclusive jurisdiction and juvenile court must automatically decline jurisdiction when a juvenile who is at 1 The legislature has amended RCW 13.04.030 since the events of this case transpired.”
State v. Manro, 104 P.3d 708 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 474 P.3d 507 (Wash. 2020).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A) — 15 cases
State v. Posey, 167 P.3d 560 (Wash. 2007). “¶ 1 This case asks us to determine whether a juvenile's acquittal in adult court on an assault charge automatically restores juvenile court jurisdiction over remaining charges under the statute then in effect, former RCW 13.04.030 (2000), and whether the trial court improperly…”
State v. Posey, 161 Wash. 2d 638 (Wash. 2007). “*641 ¶1 This case asks us to determine whether a juvenile’s acquittal in adult court on an assault charge automatically restores juvenile court jurisdiction over remaining charges under the statute then in effect, former RCW 13.04.030 (2000), and whether the trial court…”
State v. Salavea, 86 P.3d 125 (Wash. 2004). “Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of…”
In Re Pers. Restraint Petition of Dalluge, 100 P.3d 279 (Wash. 2004). “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 482 P.3d 276 (Wash. 2021).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(C) — 13 cases
State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409 (Wash. 2017).
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Joseph Leif Wolf, 384 P.3d 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “030(1)(e)(v),1 the “automatic decline” statute, adult criminal court has exclusive jurisdiction and juvenile court must automatically decline jurisdiction when a juvenile who is at 1 The legislature has amended RCW 13.04.030 since the events of this case transpired.”
In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 482 P.3d 276 (Wash. 2021).
State v. Salavea, 86 P.3d 125 (Wash. 2004). “Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of…”
State v. Meridieth, 144 Wash. App. 47 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(E) — 13 cases
State v. Posey, 272 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2012). “¶ 14 In 1977, the legislature added the language in RCW 13.04.030, which grants the juvenile courts "exclusive original jurisdiction" over all juvenile proceedings.”
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Joseph Leif Wolf, 384 P.3d 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “030(1)(e)(v),1 the “automatic decline” statute, adult criminal court has exclusive jurisdiction and juvenile court must automatically decline jurisdiction when a juvenile who is at 1 The legislature has amended RCW 13.04.030 since the events of this case transpired.”
State v. Mora, 977 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1999).
State v. Posey, 161 Wash. 2d 638 (Wash. 2007). “*641 ¶1 This case asks us to determine whether a juvenile’s acquittal in adult court on an assault charge automatically restores juvenile court jurisdiction over remaining charges under the statute then in effect, former RCW 13.04.030 (2000), and whether the trial court…”
State v. Manro, 125 Wash. App. 165 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “Manro was tried in adult court because first degree assault is a serious violent offense, which results in automatic transfer to adult court under RCW 13.04.030. ¶4 Before trial, Manro moved to dismiss the first degree assault charge on the grounds that the State did not have…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(III) — 2 cases
State of Washington v. Adrian Mendoza (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
State of Washington v. Arturo Pineda-Feliciano (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(1)(v) — 3 cases
State Of Washington, V Dakota Mikalle Collins (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
State Of Washington, V Malisha Miranda Morales (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
State of Washington v. Kayden Ray Chisum (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(2) — 9 cases
State v. Cornejo, 925 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1996). “The Legislature amended RCW 13.04.030 to bring certain offenses committed by 16- and 17-year-olds under the "exclusive original jurisdiction” of the adult criminal court.”
In Re Boot, 925 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1996). “The Legislature amended RCW 13.04.030 to bring certain offenses committed by 16- and 17-year-olds under the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the adult criminal court.”
In Re Marriage of Rich, 907 P.2d 1234 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
City of Seattle v. Eun Yong Shin, 748 P.2d 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
In Re the Welfare of Hansen, 599 P.2d 1304 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(2009) — 1 case
State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2018). “That principle does not factor into our determination of whether a jurisdictional statute like former RCW 13.04.030 (2009) is constitutional because resolving this issue does not require us to assess a youthful defendant's culpability or subjective mental state.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(3) — 7 cases
State v. Turner, 658 P.2d 658 (Wash. 1983).
In Re Dependency of JWH, 57 P.3d 266 (Wash. 2002).
In re the Dependency of E.H., 158 Wash. App. 757 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
Blume v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 147 Wash. 2d 687 (Wash. 2002).
In Re Dependency of EH, 243 P.3d 160 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(5) — 4 cases
State v. Knowles, 730 P.2d 738 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
State v. Getty, 777 P.2d 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
State v. J.B., 958 P.2d 368 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
State v. JB, 958 P.2d 368 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(5)(c) — 1 case
State v. Schatmeier, 866 P.2d 51 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(6) — 4 cases
State v. Calderon, 684 P.2d 1293 (Wash. 1984).
State v. Jacks, 605 P.2d 363 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
State v. Inglis, 649 P.2d 163 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
State v. Werner, 906 P.2d 342 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(6)(a) — 3 cases
In Re the Pers. Restraint of Smiley, 640 P.2d 7 (Wash. 1982).
State v. Sharon, 655 P.2d 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
State v. Mitchell, 648 P.2d 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(e)(v)(A) — 1 case
State v. Luna (Wash. 2025).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(e)(v)(C) — 1 case
State v. Meridieth, 180 P.3d 867 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(e)(v)(C)(lll) — 1 case
State Of Washington v. Cristian Alexander Quijas (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(b) — 2 cases
Blume v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 106 Wash. App. 714 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
In re the Dependency of E.H., 158 Wash. App. 757 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(e) — 10 cases
State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2018). “That principle does not factor into our determination of whether a jurisdictional statute like former RCW 13.04.030 (2009) is constitutional because resolving this issue does not require us to assess a youthful defendant's culpability or subjective mental state.”
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Joseph Leif Wolf, 384 P.3d 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “030(1)(e)(v),1 the “automatic decline” statute, adult criminal court has exclusive jurisdiction and juvenile court must automatically decline jurisdiction when a juvenile who is at 1 The legislature has amended RCW 13.04.030 since the events of this case transpired.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wash. 2d 772 (Wash. 2004). “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
State v. Mora, 138 Wash. 2d 43 (Wash. 1999).
State v. Golden, 112 Wash. App. 68 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(e)(i) — 5 cases
In re the Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wash. 2d 772 (Wash. 2004). “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
State v. Pritchard, 900 P.2d 560 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Posey, 272 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2012). “¶ 14 In 1977, the legislature added the language in RCW 13.04.030, which grants the juvenile courts "exclusive original jurisdiction" over all juvenile proceedings.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Hegney, 138 Wash. App. 511 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Saenz, 283 P.3d 1094 (Wash. 2012).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(e)(iii) — 2 cases
State v. Dion, 131 Wash. App. 729 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Kravchuk, 936 P.2d 1161 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(e)(iv) — 7 cases
State v. Cornejo, 925 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1996). “The Legislature amended RCW 13.04.030 to bring certain offenses committed by 16- and 17-year-olds under the "exclusive original jurisdiction” of the adult criminal court.”
State v. Stackhouse, 947 P.2d 777 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
State v. Gilmer, 981 P.2d 902 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
State v. Salavea, 151 Wash. 2d 133 (Wash. 2004). “Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of…”
State v. Mora, 138 Wash. 2d 43 (Wash. 1999).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(e)(iv)(A) — 4 cases
State v. Gilmer, 981 P.2d 902 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
State v. Cornejo, 925 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1996). “The Legislature amended RCW 13.04.030 to bring certain offenses committed by 16- and 17-year-olds under the "exclusive original jurisdiction” of the adult criminal court.”
State v. Carpenter, 117 Wash. App. 673 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
State v. Stackhouse, 947 P.2d 777 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(e)(v) — 16 cases
State v. Salavea, 151 Wash. 2d 133 (Wash. 2004). “Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of…”
State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2018). “That principle does not factor into our determination of whether a jurisdictional statute like former RCW 13.04.030 (2009) is constitutional because resolving this issue does not require us to assess a youthful defendant's culpability or subjective mental state.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wash. 2d 772 (Wash. 2004). “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
State v. Manro, 125 Wash. App. 165 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “Manro was tried in adult court because first degree assault is a serious violent offense, which results in automatic transfer to adult court under RCW 13.04.030. ¶4 Before trial, Manro moved to dismiss the first degree assault charge on the grounds that the State did not have…”
State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409 (Wash. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(e)(v)(2009) — 1 case
State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2018). “That principle does not factor into our determination of whether a jurisdictional statute like former RCW 13.04.030 (2009) is constitutional because resolving this issue does not require us to assess a youthful defendant's culpability or subjective mental state.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(e)(v)(A) — 10 cases
State v. Salavea, 151 Wash. 2d 133 (Wash. 2004). “Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of…”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wash. 2d 772 (Wash. 2004). “The Mora court held that: With the exception of those offenses set forth in RCW 13.04.030, the Legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain not only exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juveniles, but also discretionary authority to determine…”
State v. Posey, 272 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2012). “¶ 14 In 1977, the legislature added the language in RCW 13.04.030, which grants the juvenile courts "exclusive original jurisdiction" over all juvenile proceedings.”
State Of Washington, V Guadalupe Solis Diaz, 376 P.3d 458 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
State v. Saenz, 283 P.3d 1094 (Wash. 2012).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(e)(v)(C) — 4 cases
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Joseph Leif Wolf, 384 P.3d 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “030(1)(e)(v),1 the “automatic decline” statute, adult criminal court has exclusive jurisdiction and juvenile court must automatically decline jurisdiction when a juvenile who is at 1 The legislature has amended RCW 13.04.030 since the events of this case transpired.”
State v. Salavea, 151 Wash. 2d 133 (Wash. 2004). “Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of…”
State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2018). “That principle does not factor into our determination of whether a jurisdictional statute like former RCW 13.04.030 (2009) is constitutional because resolving this issue does not require us to assess a youthful defendant's culpability or subjective mental state.”
State v. Houston-Sconiers, 365 P.3d 177 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(e)(v)(D) — 1 case
State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2018). “That principle does not factor into our determination of whether a jurisdictional statute like former RCW 13.04.030 (2009) is constitutional because resolving this issue does not require us to assess a youthful defendant's culpability or subjective mental state.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(l)(e)(v)(E) — 3 cases
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Joseph Leif Wolf, 384 P.3d 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “030(1)(e)(v),1 the “automatic decline” statute, adult criminal court has exclusive jurisdiction and juvenile court must automatically decline jurisdiction when a juvenile who is at 1 The legislature has amended RCW 13.04.030 since the events of this case transpired.”
State v. Mora, 138 Wash. 2d 43 (Wash. 1999).
State v. Posey, 130 Wash. App. 262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(lXe)(iv) — 1 case
State v. Ollens, 949 P.2d 407 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030(lXe)(v)(A) — 1 case
State v. Manro, 125 Wash. App. 165 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “Manro was tried in adult court because first degree assault is a serious violent offense, which results in automatic transfer to adult court under RCW 13.04.030. ¶4 Before trial, Manro moved to dismiss the first degree assault charge on the grounds that the State did not have…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.