Wash. Rev. Code » Title 16 · Chapter 16.08
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 16.08.070 (2026)

Dangerous dogs and related definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply throughout RCW 16.08.070 through 16.08.100.
(1) "Potentially dangerous dog" means any dog that when unprovoked: (a) Inflicts bites on a human or a domestic animal either on public or private property, or (b) chases or approaches a person upon the streets, sidewalks, or any public grounds in a menacing fashion or apparent attitude of attack, or any dog with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack unprovoked, to cause injury, or to cause injury or otherwise to threaten the safety of humans or domestic animals.
(2) "Dangerous dog" means any dog that (a) inflicts severe injury on a human being without provocation on public or private property, (b) kills a domestic animal without provocation while the dog is off the owner's property, or (c) has been previously found to be potentially dangerous because of injury inflicted on a human, the owner having received notice of such and the dog again aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety of humans.
(3) "Severe injury" means any physical injury that results in broken bones or disfiguring lacerations requiring multiple sutures or cosmetic surgery.
(4) "Proper enclosure of a dangerous dog" means, while on the owner's property, a dangerous dog shall be securely confined indoors or in a securely enclosed and locked pen or structure, suitable to prevent the entry of young children and designed to prevent the animal from escaping. Such pen or structure shall have secure sides and a secure top, and shall also provide protection from the elements for the dog.
(5) "Animal control authority" means an entity acting alone or in concert with other local governmental units for enforcement of the animal control laws of the city, county, and state and the shelter and welfare of animals.
(6) "Animal control officer" means any individual employed, contracted with, or appointed by the animal control authority for the purpose of aiding in the enforcement of this chapter or any other law or ordinance relating to the licensure of animals, control of animals, or seizure and impoundment of animals, and includes any state or local law enforcement officer or other employee whose duties in whole or in part include assignments that involve the seizure and impoundment of any animal.
(7) "Owner" means any person, firm, corporation, organization, or department possessing, harboring, keeping, having an interest in, or having control or custody of an animal.
[ 2002 c 244 s 1; 1987 c 94 s 1.]

Notes:

Severability—1987 c 94: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1987 c 94 s 6.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1988–2025 · leading case: State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1996).
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State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1996). · cites it 12× “The clause can also be read to mean "whether the dog has previously been declared potentially dangerous or whether the dog has been previously declared dangerous,” i.”
Rabon v. City of Seattle, 135 Wash. 2d 278 (Wash. 1998). · cites it 9× “” 7 RCW 16.08.070. While the statute expressly allows local *298 authorities to place restrictions on potentially dangerous dogs, it does not completely relinquish jurisdiction of dangerous dogs to local authorities.”
Rabon v. City of Seattle, 957 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1998). · cites it 9× “" [1] RCW 16.08.070. While the statute expressly allows local authorities to place restrictions on potentially dangerous dogs, it does not completely relinquish jurisdiction of dangerous dogs to local authorities.”
Steven Oliver v. Henry W. Cook, 377 P.3d 265 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 3× “Oliver conceded that Scrappy was not a dangerous dog under RCW 16.08.070; however, he argued the County sheriff’s department nonetheless breached its “statutory duty” created by its own *538 departmental policies to declare Scrappy dangerous.”
Clemmons v. Fidler, 791 P.2d 257 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “or (c) has been previously found to be potentially dangerous [defined in subsection (1)], the owner having received notice of such and the dog again aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety of humans or domestic animals.”
Gorman v. Pierce Cnty., 307 P.3d 795 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). “…governs “dangerous dogs,” but it also directs municipalities and counties to regulate “potentially dangerous dogs.” RCW 16.08.070(2), .090(2).”
State v. Richards, 559 P.3d 107 (Wash. 2024). “” RCW 16.08.070(2). 4 State v. Richards, No.”
Beeler v. Hickman, 750 P.2d 1282 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). “RCW 16.08.070. The Hickmans contend there was no genuine issue of material fact as to ownership because it was undisputed Mrs.”
State Of Washington v. Jennifer A. Richards, 537 P.3d 1118 (Wash. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 3× “010 does not preempt RCW 16.08.070(2).3 II. CHALLENGES TO RICHARDS’ CONVICTION FOR A GROSS MISDEMEANOR Richards argues that her conduct did not meet the elements for a violation of the county code or of state law.”
Kary L. Caldwell, Respondent, v. the City of Hoquiam, Appellant, 373 P.3d 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “28 RCW 16.08.070(2). 29 RCW 16.08.070(2)(c) (emphasis added).”
King v. Hutson, 987 P.2d 655 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 4× “” RCW 16.08.070(1). Under the statute, the dogs would qualify as “dangerous” if they again bit, attacked or endangered the safety of humans or domestic animals.”
State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1996). · cites it 12× “The clause can also be read to mean "whether the dog has previously been declared potentially dangerous or whether the dog has been previously declared dangerous," i.”
Show all 17 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 16.08.070(1) — 8 cases
State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1996). “The clause can also be read to mean "whether the dog has previously been declared potentially dangerous or whether the dog has been previously declared dangerous,” i.”
Rabon v. City of Seattle, 957 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1998). “" [1] RCW 16.08.070. While the statute expressly allows local authorities to place restrictions on potentially dangerous dogs, it does not completely relinquish jurisdiction of dangerous dogs to local authorities.”
Rabon v. City of Seattle, 135 Wash. 2d 278 (Wash. 1998). “” 7 RCW 16.08.070. While the statute expressly allows local *298 authorities to place restrictions on potentially dangerous dogs, it does not completely relinquish jurisdiction of dangerous dogs to local authorities.”
State of Washington v. Tiffany R. Denney (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
King v. Hutson, 987 P.2d 655 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “” RCW 16.08.070(1). Under the statute, the dogs would qualify as “dangerous” if they again bit, attacked or endangered the safety of humans or domestic animals.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 16.08.070(1)(b) — 1 case
State of Washington v. Tiffany R. Denney (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 16.08.070(2) — 11 cases
State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1996). “The clause can also be read to mean "whether the dog has previously been declared potentially dangerous or whether the dog has been previously declared dangerous,” i.”
Rabon v. City of Seattle, 135 Wash. 2d 278 (Wash. 1998). “” 7 RCW 16.08.070. While the statute expressly allows local *298 authorities to place restrictions on potentially dangerous dogs, it does not completely relinquish jurisdiction of dangerous dogs to local authorities.”
Rabon v. City of Seattle, 957 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1998). “" [1] RCW 16.08.070. While the statute expressly allows local authorities to place restrictions on potentially dangerous dogs, it does not completely relinquish jurisdiction of dangerous dogs to local authorities.”
Gorman v. Pierce Cnty., 307 P.3d 795 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). “…governs “dangerous dogs,” but it also directs municipalities and counties to regulate “potentially dangerous dogs.” RCW 16.08.070(2), .090(2).”
State v. Richards, 559 P.3d 107 (Wash. 2024). “” RCW 16.08.070(2). 4 State v. Richards, No.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 16.08.070(2)(a) — 2 cases
State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1996). “The clause can also be read to mean "whether the dog has previously been declared potentially dangerous or whether the dog has been previously declared dangerous,” i.”
State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1996). “The clause can also be read to mean "whether the dog has previously been declared potentially dangerous or whether the dog has been previously declared dangerous," i.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 16.08.070(2)(c) — 6 cases
State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1996). “The clause can also be read to mean "whether the dog has previously been declared potentially dangerous or whether the dog has been previously declared dangerous,” i.”
Steven Oliver v. Henry W. Cook, 377 P.3d 265 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “Oliver conceded that Scrappy was not a dangerous dog under RCW 16.08.070; however, he argued the County sheriff’s department nonetheless breached its “statutory duty” created by its own *538 departmental policies to declare Scrappy dangerous.”
State Of Washington v. Jennifer A. Richards, 537 P.3d 1118 (Wash. Ct. App. 2023). “010 does not preempt RCW 16.08.070(2).3 II. CHALLENGES TO RICHARDS’ CONVICTION FOR A GROSS MISDEMEANOR Richards argues that her conduct did not meet the elements for a violation of the county code or of state law.”
Kary L. Caldwell, Respondent, v. the City of Hoquiam, Appellant, 373 P.3d 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “28 RCW 16.08.070(2). 29 RCW 16.08.070(2)(c) (emphasis added).”
King v. Hutson, 987 P.2d 655 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “” RCW 16.08.070(1). Under the statute, the dogs would qualify as “dangerous” if they again bit, attacked or endangered the safety of humans or domestic animals.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 16.08.070(3) — 4 cases
State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1996). “The clause can also be read to mean "whether the dog has previously been declared potentially dangerous or whether the dog has been previously declared dangerous,” i.”
Rabon v. City of Seattle, 135 Wash. 2d 278 (Wash. 1998). “” 7 RCW 16.08.070. While the statute expressly allows local *298 authorities to place restrictions on potentially dangerous dogs, it does not completely relinquish jurisdiction of dangerous dogs to local authorities.”
Rabon v. City of Seattle, 957 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1998). “" [1] RCW 16.08.070. While the statute expressly allows local authorities to place restrictions on potentially dangerous dogs, it does not completely relinquish jurisdiction of dangerous dogs to local authorities.”
State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1996). “The clause can also be read to mean "whether the dog has previously been declared potentially dangerous or whether the dog has been previously declared dangerous," i.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 16.08.070(5) — 1 case
King v. Hutson, 987 P.2d 655 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “” RCW 16.08.070(1). Under the statute, the dogs would qualify as “dangerous” if they again bit, attacked or endangered the safety of humans or domestic animals.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 16.08.070(7) — 1 case
Clemmons v. Fidler, 791 P.2d 257 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). “or (c) has been previously found to be potentially dangerous [defined in subsection (1)], the owner having received notice of such and the dog again aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety of humans or domestic animals.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 16.08.070(l) — 1 case
Rabon v. City of Seattle, 135 Wash. 2d 278 (Wash. 1998). “” 7 RCW 16.08.070. While the statute expressly allows local *298 authorities to place restrictions on potentially dangerous dogs, it does not completely relinquish jurisdiction of dangerous dogs to local authorities.”
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