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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 26Chapter 26.16

Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.030 (2025)

Community property defined—Management and control

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1954–2026 210citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 210 opinions since 1954, 28 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (3) (21 cases).

The 20 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.030 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENCooper's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Simmons, 617 P.2d 415 (Wash. 1980).
cites § 26.16.030 42×subsections: (5) 27× (3) 8×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“RCW 26.16.030. In addition, Mrs. Simmons asserts a counterclaim under the Consumer Protection Act.”
The case’s holding
A mobile home is not real property or a household good, so one spouse may alone transfer a community mobile home titled in that spouse's name.
2
GREENColorado Nat'l Bank v. Merlino, 668 P.2d 1304 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 26.16.030 12×subsections: (4) 11×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“RCW 26.16.030. By statutory exception, the opposite presumption arises from debt incurred in purchases of real property when executed by only one spouse.”
The case’s holding
A spouse's unilateral real property purchase does not bind the community unless the non-signing spouse joined, ratified, or is estopped by permitting and accepting benefits of the transaction.
Later courts cite it for
“a community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENUnited States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002).
cites § 26.16.030 2×cited by 442 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“§ 40-3—13 (1999); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.030 (3) (1994). Accordingly, the fact that respondent's husband could not unilaterally alienate the property does not preclude him from possessing "property and rights to property" for the purposes of § 6321.”
The case’s holding
A federal tax lien attaches to a taxpayer's interest in property held by the entireties because the taxpayer's individual rights constitute property or rights to property under federal law.
Later courts cite it for
“a common idiom describes property as a 'bundle of sticks' - a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property.” · 30 citing courts
4
GREENNichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 701 P.2d 1114 (Wash. 1985).
cites § 26.16.030 7×subsections: (2) 5× (5)cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“…the husband. Under the 1972 amendments to the community property laws, either spouse can manage community property. RCW 26.16.030.”
The case’s holding
Each spouse holds an undivided one-half interest in community property.
Later courts cite it for
“each spouse has an undivided one-half interest in community property.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Coria, 48 P.3d 980 (Wash. 2002).
cites § 26.16.030 5×subsections: (1)cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“Discussion I agree with the majority that “property of another” includes the one-half interest of a spouse in community property.”
The case’s holding
Property in which another person holds an interest constitutes property of another for malicious mischief purposes regardless of the defendant's concurrent ownership.
Later courts cite it for
“the rule of lenity does not preclude ordinary statutory construction.” · 4 citing courts
6
GREENIn re the Marriage of Brewer, 976 P.2d 102 (Wash. 1999).
cites § 26.16.030 4×cited by 132 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“” Under RCW 26.16.030 community property is property that is not defined as separate property under RCW 26.”
The case’s holding
Disability insurance payments intended to compensate for future income or pain and suffering constitute separate property rather than community property.
Later courts cite it for
“in the best position to assess the assets and liabilities of the parties” · 27 citing courts
7
GREENMatter of Marriage of Schweitzer, 937 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 26.16.030 4×subsections: (2) 4×cited by 74 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“The Legislature codified this principle in 1972 when it enacted RCW 26.16.030(2). Cross at 84. This statute prohibits either spouse from making a gift of community property "without the express or implied consent of the other.”
The case’s holding
Extrinsic evidence is generally inadmissible to contradict the terms of a written agreement unless there is clear and convincing evidence of fraud, accident, or mutual mistake.
Later courts cite it for
“appellate review of a trial court's findings of fact is generally limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings” · 1 citing court
8
GREENIn re the Marriage of Schweitzer, 132 Wash. 2d 318 (1997).
cites § 26.16.030 4×subsections: (2) 4×cited by 73 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“The Legislature codified this principle in 1972 when it enacted RCW 26.16.030(2). Cross at 84. This statute prohibits either spouse from making a gift of community property "without the express or implied consent of the other.”
9
GREENdeElche v. Jacobsen, 622 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1980).
cites § 26.16.030 4×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“The majority's holding effectively treats community property as a mere species of common law cotenancy, when it is in fact a type of property ownership intrinsically part of, dependent upon and overtly protective of the marital relationship.”
The case’s holding
A tortfeasor's one-half interest in community personal property is liable for torts not committed for the benefit of the community if separate property is insufficient to satisfy the judgment.
Later courts cite it for
“illogical, inconsistent and unjust results” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENIn re the Marriage of Mueller, 167 P.3d 568 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 26.16.030 3×subsections: (2)cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“2d 575 (1996) (citing RCW 26.16.030), aff’d, 132 Wn.2d 318 , 937 P.”
The case’s holding
A spouse seeking to convert community property into separate property must establish by clear and convincing evidence both the existence of the agreement and mutual observance of its terms.
Later courts cite it for
“a spouse seeking to enforce an agreement, whether oral or written, that purports to convert community property into separate property must establish with clear and convincing evidence both (1) the existence of the agreement and (2) that the parties mutually observed the terms of the agreement throughout their marriage.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENIn re the Marriage of Chumbley, 150 Wash. 2d 1 (2003).
cites § 26.16.030 3×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“13 , 28 (1986); RCW 26.16.030. To rebut the presumption, a party must present clear and convincing evidence that the acquisition fits within a separate property provision.”
12
GREENIn re Marriage of Chumbley, 74 P.3d 129 (Wash. 2003).
cites § 26.16.030 3×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“13, 28 (1986); RCW 26.16.030. To rebut the presumption, a party must present clear and convincing evidence that the acquisition fits within a separate property provision.”
The case’s holding
Separate property remains separate through transitions if it remains traceable and identifiable, but becomes community property if it is so commingled that it cannot be apportioned.
Later courts cite it for
“separate property will remain separate property through changes and transitions, if the separate property remains traceable and identifiable; however, if the property becomes so commingled that it is impossible to distinguish or apportion it, then the entire amount becomes community property.” · 3 citing courts
13
GREENPac. Gamble Robinson Co. v. Lapp, 622 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1980).
cites § 26.16.030 5×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“Beyers , at 70; RCW 26.16.030. On the other hand, if a debt is characterized under Washington law as separate, or for the benefit of the husband's separate property, then it may not be satisfied from the earnings of either spouse, because earnings during coverture are community…”
The case’s holding
In the absence of an effective choice of law, the law of the state with the most significant relationship to a contract governs its validity and effect.
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, the validity and effect of a contract are governed by the law of the state having the most significant relationship with the contract.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENIn re the Marriage of Brown, 675 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1984).
cites § 26.16.030 3×cited by 71 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“RCW 26.16.030. This change made Hawkins and its progeny obsolete to the extent they had held that the husband, as manager of the community property, was a necessary party to his wife's personal injury action.”
The case’s holding
Recovery for personal injury from a third party is the separate property of the injured spouse except for amounts compensating the community for lost wages or injury-related expenses.
Later courts cite it for
“community property consists only of that which is acquired by onerous title, or in exchange for other community property.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENMele v. Mele (In re Mele), 501 B.R. 357 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).
cites § 26.16.030 2×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“RCW 26.16.030. Each spouse stands in a relationship of trust to the other and, even after separation, owes a fiduciary duty to manage and preserve the community assets for the benefit of the community.”
The case’s holding
Washington law does not make marriage an express or technical trust, so spouses are not fiduciaries for purposes of the section 523(a)(4) exception to bankruptcy discharge.
Later courts cite it for
“we consider a matter anew, as if no decision had been rendered previously.” · 15 citing courts
16
REDEst. of Madsen v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 650 P.2d 196 (Wash. 1982).
cites § 26.16.030 4×cited by 25 cases
Overruled by Aetna Life Insurance v. Wadsworth on other grounds: 9 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“2d 369 (1978), we held that an insured spouse had the right to give up to one-half of his community interest in a life insurance policy to persons other than the beneficiary spouse under RCW 26.16.030. We went on to state: This statute [RCW 26.”
The case’s holding
Naming a spouse as beneficiary does not convert community property life insurance policies into the sole and separate property of that spouse.
Later courts cite it for
“community property life insurance policies into the sole and separate property of the beneficiary spouse.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENLyon v. Lyon, 670 P.2d 272 (Wash. 1983).
cites § 26.16.030 4×subsections: (1) 2× (2) 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“RCW 26.16.030(1). Without the unity of interest, the joint tenancy failed and was converted into a tenancy in common.”
The case’s holding
A community property agreement labels after-acquired property community immediately upon receipt rather than instantaneously conveying initially separate property to the community.
Later courts cite it for
“a community property agreement as applied to after acquired property does not instantaneously convey initially separate property to the community but merely labels all after acquired property community immediately upon receipt.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENReid v. Cramer, 603 P.2d 851 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
cites § 26.16.030 4×subsections: (4) 2× (6) 2×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“We hold that the joinder requirement of RCW 26.16.030(4) may not be used as a sword to allow the community to disaffirm contracts later found to be unprofitable, and that Mrs.”
Later courts cite it for
“between the two contracting parties, a note is only a simple contract to pay money.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENSeizer v. Sessions, 940 P.2d 261 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 26.16.030 2×subsections: (1)cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“RCW 26.16.030; Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 5.02.”
The case’s holding
Washington courts engage in a conflict of laws analysis only when an actual conflict exists between the laws or interests of Washington and another state.
Later courts cite it for
“when parties dispute choice of law, there must be an actual conflict between the laws or interests of washington and the laws or interests of another state before washington courts will engage in a conflict of laws analysis.” · 9 citing courts
20
GREENIn re Marriage of Kaseburg, 108 P.3d 1278 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 26.16.030 2×subsections: (3)cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 26.16.030
“RCW 26.16.030. ¶ 41 In summary, we affirm the general principle that in a dissolution action a court has discretion to consider allegations of concealment, fiscal misconduct, and waste of community debts and assets.”
The case’s holding
A person waives the right to contest underlying obligations on a property in foreclosure proceedings by failing to employ available presale remedies.
Later courts cite it for
“a person waives the right to contest the underlying obligations on the property in foreclosure proceedings when there is no attempt to employ the presale remedies.” · 4 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
195419902026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 15 cases in 2000–2001. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash. Ct. App.124Wash.51Tax Ct.7Bankr. W.D. Wash.7W.D. Wash.7N.M.3Ala. Civ. App.29th Cir. BAP2

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 13 courts in all.

By subsection
(1)9 cases
Lyon v. Lyon, 670 P.2d 272 (Wash. 1983).“RCW 26.16.030(1). Without the unity of interest, the joint tenancy failed and was converted into a tenancy in common.”
State v. Coria, 48 P.3d 980 (Wash. 2002).“Discussion I agree with the majority that “property of another” includes the one-half interest of a spouse in community property.”
Seizer v. Sessions, 940 P.2d 261 (Wash. 1997).“RCW 26.16.030; Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 5.02.”
Seizer v. Sessions, 132 Wash. 2d 642 (1997).
Olver v. Fowler, 131 Wash. App. 135 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(2)14 cases
Matter of Marriage of Schweitzer, 937 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1997).“The Legislature codified this principle in 1972 when it enacted RCW 26.16.030(2). Cross at 84. This statute prohibits either spouse from making a gift of community property "without the express or implied consent of the other.”
In re the Marriage of Schweitzer, 132 Wash. 2d 318 (1997).“The Legislature codified this principle in 1972 when it enacted RCW 26.16.030(2). Cross at 84. This statute prohibits either spouse from making a gift of community property "without the express or implied consent of the other.”
Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 701 P.2d 1114 (Wash. 1985).“…the husband. Under the 1972 amendments to the community property laws, either spouse can manage community property. RCW 26.16.030.”
In re the Marriage of Mueller, 167 P.3d 568 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).“2d 575 (1996) (citing RCW 26.16.030), aff’d, 132 Wn.2d 318 , 937 P.”
Lyon v. Lyon, 670 P.2d 272 (Wash. 1983).
Showing the top 5 of 14. More in the list view →
(3)21 cases
Cooper's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Simmons, 617 P.2d 415 (Wash. 1980).“RCW 26.16.030. In addition, Mrs. Simmons asserts a counterclaim under the Consumer Protection Act.”
In re Marriage of Wallace, 45 P.3d 1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
In re the Marriage of Wallace, 111 Wash. App. 697 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
In re Marriage of Kaseburg, 108 P.3d 1278 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).“RCW 26.16.030. ¶ 41 In summary, we affirm the general principle that in a dissolution action a court has discretion to consider allegations of concealment, fiscal misconduct, and waste of community debts and assets.”
In re the Marriage of Kaseburg, 126 Wash. App. 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
Showing the top 5 of 21. More in the list view →
(4)9 cases
Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Merlino, 668 P.2d 1304 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).“RCW 26.16.030. By statutory exception, the opposite presumption arises from debt incurred in purchases of real property when executed by only one spouse.”
Reid v. Cramer, 603 P.2d 851 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).“We hold that the joinder requirement of RCW 26.16.030(4) may not be used as a sword to allow the community to disaffirm contracts later found to be unprofitable, and that Mrs.”
Klaas v. Haueter, 745 P.2d 870 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
Daily v. Warren, 558 P.2d 1374 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).
G.W. Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Mt. McKinley Fence Co., 982 P.2d 114 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
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(5)6 cases
Cooper's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Simmons, 617 P.2d 415 (Wash. 1980).
Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 701 P.2d 1114 (Wash. 1985).
Everest v. Levenson, 551 P.2d 159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
Daily v. Warren, 558 P.2d 1374 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).
United States v. 19.7 Acres of Land, 692 P.2d 809 (Wash. 1984).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(6)5 cases
Reid v. Cramer, 603 P.2d 851 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
Consumers Ins. v. Cimoch, 848 P.2d 763 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
Everest v. Levenson, 551 P.2d 159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
Lyzanchuk v. Yakima Ranches Owners Ass'n, 866 P.2d 695 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
Pixton v. Silva, 534 P.2d 135 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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