Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.190 (2026)

Statute tolled by personal disability

✓ current as of May 2026
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Unless otherwise provided in this section, if a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter, except for a penalty or forfeiture, or against a sheriff or other officer, for an escape, be at the time the cause of action accrued either under the age of eighteen years, or incompetent or disabled to such a degree that he or she cannot understand the nature of the proceedings, such incompetency or disability as determined according to chapter 11.130 RCW, or imprisoned on a criminal charge prior to sentencing, the time of such disability shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of action.
[ 2023 c 102 s 4; 2020 c 312 s 702; 2006 c 8 s 303; 1993 c 232 s 1; 1977 ex.s. c 80 s 2; 1971 ex.s. c 292 s 74; Code 1881 s 37; 1877 p 9 s 38; 1869 p 10 s 38; 1861 p 61 s 1; 1854 p 364 s 11; RRS s 169.]

Notes:

Effective dates2020 c 312: See note following RCW 11.130.915.
FindingsIntentPart headings and subheadings not lawSeverability2006 c 8: See notes following RCW 5.64.010.
PurposeIntent1977 ex.s. c 80: "It is the purpose of the legislature in enacting this 1977 amendatory act to provide for a comprehensive revision of out-dated and offensive language, procedures and assumptions that have previously been used to identify and categorize mentally, physically, and sensory handicapped citizens. It is legislative intent that language references such as idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded or defective persons be deleted and replaced with more appropriate references to reflect current statute law more recently enacted by the federal government and this legislature. It is legislative belief that use of the undefined term "insanity" be avoided in preference to the use of a process for defining incompetency or disability as fully set forth in chapter 11.88 RCW; that language that has allowed or implied a presumption of incompetency or disability on the basis of an apparent condition or appearance be deleted in favor of a reference to necessary due process allowing a judicial determination of the existence or lack of existence of such incompetency or disability." [ 1977 ex.s. c 80 s 1.]
Severability1977 ex.s. c 80: "If any provision of this 1977 amendatory act, or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act, or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1977 ex.s. c 80 s 76.]
Severability1971 ex.s. c 292: See note following RCW 26.28.010.
Adverse possession, personal disability, limitation tolled: RCW 7.28.090.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 120 cases (29 in the last 5 years), 1952–2026 · leading case: Schroeder v. Weighall, 316 P.3d 482 (Wash. 2014).
Schroeder v. Weighall, 316 P.3d 482 (Wash. 2014). · cites it 55× “Statutes of limitation further encourage claimants to bring actions in a timely manner while evidence is still fresh.”
Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 770 P.2d 182 (Wash. 1989). · cites it 24× “The first is whether the appointment of a guardian ad litem to a legally incompetent person activates the statute of limitations, overriding the tolling statute for such persons, RCW 4.16.190. We hold that it does not and reverse the ruling of the trial court.”
Gilbert v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 900 P.2d 552 (Wash. 1995). · cites it 42× “350 nullify the tolling effects of RCW 4.16.190 as applied to a minor. RCW 4.”
Rivas v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr., 164 Wash. 2d 261 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 12× “” Former RCW 4.16.190 (1993). 1 We must decide what “as determined” means; whether the legislature intended to incorporate the temporal and procedural requirements of our guardianship statutes or only the substantive standards for incompetency.”
Rivas v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr., 189 P.3d 753 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 11× “" Former RCW 4.16.190 (1993). [1] We must decide what "as determined" means; whether the legislature intended to incorporate the temporal and procedural requirements of our guardianship statutes; or only the substantive standards for incompetency.”
Unruh v. Cacchiotti, 257 P.3d 631 (Wash. 2011). · cites it 19× “¶7 The legislature also amended RCW 4.16.190, the general provision that tolls statutes of limitations for minor *104 plaintiffs in civil actions, including cases of medical malpractice.”
Gausvik v. Perez, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (E.D. Wash. 2002). · cites it 20× “According to plaintiff, the statutes of limitations were tolled in his case pursuant to RCW 4.16.190 because the criminal judgment and sentence against him were vacated due to constitutional violations and therefore, rendered void.”
Gausvik v. Abbey, 107 P.3d 98 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 11× “Even though he was incarcerated, RCW 4.16.190 only tolls the statute of limitations when he was imprisoned before sentencing, not while he is serving a sentence; it satisfies the rational basis test and is constitutional.”
Gausvik v. Abbey, 107 P.3d 98 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 11× “Even though he was incarcerated, RCW 4.16.190 only tolls the statute of limitations when he was imprisoned before sentencing, not while he is serving a sentence; it satisfies the rational basis test and is constitutional.”
Atchison v. Great W. Malting Co., 161 Wash. 2d 372 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 5× “RCW 4.16.190 (emphasis added). Kaela argues that the statute of limitations tolled during her minority and that the time for filing began to run only on her 18th birthday.”
Atchison v. Great W. Malting Co., 166 P.3d 662 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 5× “RCW 4.16.190 (emphasis added). Kaela argues that the statute of limitations tolled during her minority and that the time for filing began to run only on her 18th birthday.”
Merrigan v. Epstein, 773 P.2d 78 (Wash. 1989). · cites it 9× “Appellant contends that this action was commenced before expiration of the 1-year statute of limitations following imputed knowledge or discovery of the elements of the cause of action, and before expiration of the 8-years-from-act-or-omission limitation period which was tolled…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.190(1) — 11 cases
Bennett v. Seattle Mental Health, 269 P.3d 1079 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
Kelley v. Centennial Contractors Enter., Inc., 169 Wash. 2d 381 (Wash. 2010).
Kelley v. Centennial Contractors, 236 P.3d 197 (Wash. 2010).
Wahl v. The Boeing Co. (W.D. Wash. 2020).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.190(2) — 4 cases
Schroeder v. Weighall, 316 P.3d 482 (Wash. 2014). “Statutes of limitation further encourage claimants to bring actions in a timely manner while evidence is still fresh.”
Bennett v. United States, 539 P.3d 361 (Wash. 2023).
Schroeder v. Weighall (Wash. 2014).
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