Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.040 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026

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(1) A right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who are jointly and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same injury, death or harm, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or any of them. It may be enforced either in the original action or by a separate action brought for that purpose. The basis for contribution among liable persons is the comparative fault of each such person. However, the court may determine that two or more persons are to be treated as a single person for purposes of contribution.

(2) Contribution is available to a person who enters into a settlement with a claimant only (a) if the liability of the person against whom contribution is sought has been extinguished by the settlement and (b) to the extent that the amount paid in settlement was reasonable at the time of the settlement.

(3) The common law right of indemnity between active and passive tort feasors is abolished: PROVIDED, That the common law right of indemnity between active and passive tort feasors is not abolished in those cases to which a right of contribution by virtue of RCW 4.22.920(2) does not apply.

[ 1982 c 100 s 1; 1981 c 27 s 12.]

Notes:

Severability—1982 c 100: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1982 c 100 s 4.]

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 107 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1973–2025 · leading case: Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 652 P.2d 948 (Wash. 1982).

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Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 652 P.2d 948 (Wash. 1982). · cites it 14× “The trial court ruled that an action for contribution under RCW 4.22.040 could be maintained against the employer.”

Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 840 P.2d 860 (Wash. 1992). · cites it 8× “"Conceptually, the question was whether a totally innocent plaintiff should be permitted to recover the full amount of his or her damages from a wrongdoer whose conduct had concurred with that of another wrongdoer to produce a single and indivisible injury or causally…”

Bird-Johnson Corp. v. Dana Corp., 833 P.2d 375 (Wash. 1992). · cites it 12× “[1, 2] Such a passing reference to the word "contribution" carries no independent significance. This language, by itself, is insufficient to create an MTCA-based right of contribution.”

Kottler v. State, 963 P.2d 834 (Wash. 1998). · cites it 12× “[2] Kottler then brought a separate contribution suit under RCW 4.22.040 against the State, alleging the State's negligence [3] was a cause of the Kottler accident and claiming the State should therefore bear proportionate liability for the damages paid by Kottler in settlement.”

Kottler v. State, 136 Wash. 2d 437 (Wash. 1998). · cites it 12× “2 Kottler then brought a separate contribution suit under RCW 4.22.040 against the State, alleging the State’s negligence 3 was a cause of the Kottler *440 accident and claiming the State should therefore bear proportionate liability for the damages paid by Kottler in settlement.”

Johnson v. Cont'l West, Inc., 663 P.2d 482 (Wash. 1983). · cites it 7× “Thus, on the date the instant cases were pending on a motion for summary judgment, no right of indemnity existed.”

Kirk v. Moe, 789 P.2d 84 (Wash. 1990). · cites it 10× “The remaining issue arises from Moe's contention that Kirk is estopped from maintaining a claim for contribution.”

Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 817 P.2d 1359 (Wash. 1991). · cites it 6× “[8] Under RCW 4.22.040, [a] right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who are jointly and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same injury, death or harm .”

Seattle W. Indus., Inc. v. David A. Mowat Co., 750 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1988). · cites it 6× “2d 1230 (1983), in which we *5 held that the last sentence of RCW 4.22.040(1) permits a trial judge to discharge a principal from liability when the victim and the tortfeasor-agent have entered into a settlement.”

Sabey v. Howard Johnson & Co., 101 Wash. App. 575 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 6× “Tacoma General Hospital, the Washington Supreme Court also noted that when RCW 4.22.040 and RCW 4.22.060 (regarding the effect of settlement agreements) are read together, they “form a comprehensive statutory scheme designed to allocate financial responsibility between…”

Sabey v. Howard Johnson Co., 5 P.3d 730 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 5× “Tacoma General Hospital, the Washington Supreme Court also noted that when RCW 4.22.040 and RCW 4.22.060 (regarding the effect of settlement agreements) are read together, they "form a comprehensive statutory scheme designed to allocate financial responsibility between…”

Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993). · cites it 2× “Hence, as a matter of law each party's potential contribution rights available under RCW 4.22.040 were extinguished. [32] RCW 4.”

Show all 107 citing cases →

— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.040(1) — 44 cases

Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 652 P.2d 948 (Wash. 1982). “The trial court ruled that an action for contribution under RCW 4.22.040 could be maintained against the employer.”

Bird-Johnson Corp. v. Dana Corp., 833 P.2d 375 (Wash. 1992). “[1, 2] Such a passing reference to the word "contribution" carries no independent significance. This language, by itself, is insufficient to create an MTCA-based right of contribution.”

Seattle W. Indus., Inc. v. David A. Mowat Co., 750 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1988). “2d 1230 (1983), in which we *5 held that the last sentence of RCW 4.22.040(1) permits a trial judge to discharge a principal from liability when the victim and the tortfeasor-agent have entered into a settlement.”

Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 421 P.3d 903 (Wash. 2018).

Kottler v. State, 963 P.2d 834 (Wash. 1998). “[2] Kottler then brought a separate contribution suit under RCW 4.22.040 against the State, alleging the State's negligence [3] was a cause of the Kottler accident and claiming the State should therefore bear proportionate liability for the damages paid by Kottler in settlement.”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.040(2) — 14 cases

Kirk v. Moe, 789 P.2d 84 (Wash. 1990). “The remaining issue arises from Moe's contention that Kirk is estopped from maintaining a claim for contribution.”

Bunce Rental, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 713 P.2d 128 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).

Kottler v. State, 136 Wash. 2d 437 (Wash. 1998). “2 Kottler then brought a separate contribution suit under RCW 4.22.040 against the State, alleging the State’s negligence 3 was a cause of the Kottler *440 accident and claiming the State should therefore bear proportionate liability for the damages paid by Kottler in settlement.”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.040(2)(a) — 2 cases

Kirk v. Moe, 789 P.2d 84 (Wash. 1990). “The remaining issue arises from Moe's contention that Kirk is estopped from maintaining a claim for contribution.”

Zamora v. Mobil Oil Corp., 704 P.2d 591 (Wash. 1985).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.040(3) — 21 cases

Johnson v. Cont'l West, Inc., 663 P.2d 482 (Wash. 1983). “Thus, on the date the instant cases were pending on a motion for summary judgment, no right of indemnity existed.”

Porter v. Kirkendoll, 449 P.3d 627 (Wash. 2019).

Cent. Washington Refrigeration, Inc. v. Barbee, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 273 (Wash. 1997).

Vanderpool v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 756 P.2d 111 (Wash. 1988).

Cent. Washington Refrigeration, Inc. v. Barbee, 913 P.2d 836 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).

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