Wash. Rev. Code » Title 4 · Chapter 4.56
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 4.56.210 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, after the expiration of ten years from the date of the entry of any judgment heretofore or hereafter rendered in this state, it shall cease to be a lien or charge against the estate or person of the judgment debtor. No suit, action or other proceeding shall ever be had on any judgment rendered in this state by which the lien shall be extended or continued in force for any greater or longer period than ten years.
(2) An underlying judgment or judgment lien entered after *the effective date of this act for accrued child support shall continue in force for ten years after the eighteenth birthday of the youngest child named in the order for whom support is ordered. All judgments entered after *the effective date of this act shall contain the birthdate of the youngest child for whom support is ordered.
(3) A lien based upon an underlying judgment continues in force for an additional ten-year period if the period of execution for the underlying judgment is extended under RCW 6.17.020.
[ 1995 c 75 s 1; 1989 c 360 s 2; 1979 ex.s. c 236 s 1; 1929 c 60 s 7; RRS ss 459, 460. Formerly RCW 4.56.210 and 4.56.220. Prior: 1897 c 39 ss 1, 2.]

Notes:

*Reviser's note: This act [1989 c 360] has three effective dates. Sections 9, 10, and 16 are effective May 12, 1989, section 39 is effective July 1, 1990, and the remainder of this act is effective July 23, 1989.
Entry of judgments—Superior court—District court—Small claims: RCW 6.01.020.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 35 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1954–2024 · leading case: Bell v. Heflin, 383 P.3d 1031 (Wash. 2016).
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Bell v. Heflin, 383 P.3d 1031 (Wash. 2016). · cites it 24× “This supports finding that Washington’s identical statute is not a “remedy” and is therefore not governed by the remedies section of the UIFSA choice of law provision. ¶10 The other option, which Bell and amicus advocate for, is that RCW 4.”
Am. Disc. Corp. v. Shepherd, 160 Wash. 2d 93 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 15× “This case also involves the interplay between RCW 4.56.210, which establishes a time limit for judgment enforceability, and RCW 6.”
Am. Disc. Corp. v. Shepherd, 156 P.3d 858 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 15× “This case also involves the interplay between RCW 4.56.210, which establishes a time limit for judgment enforceability, and RCW 6.”
Am. Disc. Corp. v. Shepherd, 120 P.3d 96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 9× “llowable period to execute on a judgment expires, the judgment lien ceases to exist and no action can be taken under the judgment: (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, after the expiration of ten years from the date of the entry of any judgment…”
Hazel v. Van Beek, 954 P.2d 1301 (Wash. 1998). · cites it 5× “190, and dies by statute, RCW 4.56.210."). If the judgment life-span was a normal statute of limitation, which it is not, Hazel could attempt to argue equitable tolling.”
Valley v. Selfridge, 639 P.2d 225 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 5× “2d 864 (1966) (citing other cases); RCW 4.56.210. 3 A proceeding to enforce a judgment for arrearages may be commenced within the 6 years after the installment was due.”
Hazel v. Van Beek, 135 Wash. 2d 45 (Wash. 1998). · cites it 4× “190, and dies by statute, RCW 4.56.210.”). If the judgment life-span were a normal statute of limitation, which it is not, Hazel could attempt to argue equitable tolling.”
Summers v. Dep't of Revenue for State, 14 P.3d 902 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 3× “[2] RCW 4.56.210 Cessation of lien-Extension prohibited-Exception.”
Summers v. Dep't of Revenue, 104 Wash. App. 87 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 3× “” “RCW 4.56.210 Cessation of lien—Extension prohibited—Exception.”
Ferry Cnty. Title & Escrow Co. v. Fogle's Garage, Inc., 484 P.2d 458 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). · cites it 5× “In that case, a judgment creditor caused a writ of garnishment to be issued against a third party alleging indebtedness to the judgment debtor.”
Mueller v. Miller, 917 P.2d 604 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “Mueller contends that (1) the sheriffs sale was void because it occurred more than 10 years after the original judgment was entered; (2) the confirmation of the sheriffs sale could not cure the void sale; and (3) the writ ordering redemption did not validate the void sale.”
Matter of Marriage of Wintermute, 855 P.2d 1186 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 3× “She also takes the position that the period prescribed in RCW 4.56.210 for enforcement of judgment liens had expired by the time Leslie sought to enforce his Hen.”
Show all 35 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.56.210(1) — 20 cases
Hazel v. Van Beek, 954 P.2d 1301 (Wash. 1998). “190, and dies by statute, RCW 4.56.210."). If the judgment life-span was a normal statute of limitation, which it is not, Hazel could attempt to argue equitable tolling.”
Hazel v. Van Beek, 135 Wash. 2d 45 (Wash. 1998). “190, and dies by statute, RCW 4.56.210.”). If the judgment life-span were a normal statute of limitation, which it is not, Hazel could attempt to argue equitable tolling.”
Bell v. Heflin, 383 P.3d 1031 (Wash. 2016). “This supports finding that Washington’s identical statute is not a “remedy” and is therefore not governed by the remedies section of the UIFSA choice of law provision. ¶10 The other option, which Bell and amicus advocate for, is that RCW 4.”
Summers v. Dep't of Revenue for State, 14 P.3d 902 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “[2] RCW 4.56.210 Cessation of lien-Extension prohibited-Exception.”
Summers v. Dep't of Revenue, 104 Wash. App. 87 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “” “RCW 4.56.210 Cessation of lien—Extension prohibited—Exception.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.56.210(2) — 6 cases
Bell v. Heflin, 383 P.3d 1031 (Wash. 2016). “This supports finding that Washington’s identical statute is not a “remedy” and is therefore not governed by the remedies section of the UIFSA choice of law provision. ¶10 The other option, which Bell and amicus advocate for, is that RCW 4.”
Am. Disc. Corp. v. Shepherd, 120 P.3d 96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “llowable period to execute on a judgment expires, the judgment lien ceases to exist and no action can be taken under the judgment: (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, after the expiration of ten years from the date of the entry of any judgment…”
In re Paternity of M.H. (Wash. 2016).
Gwedolyn D. Webster v. Eric K. Webster (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
In Re The Paternity Of M.h., Stephanie Bell v. Juan S. Heflin (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.56.210(3) — 4 cases
Am. Disc. Corp. v. Shepherd, 120 P.3d 96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “llowable period to execute on a judgment expires, the judgment lien ceases to exist and no action can be taken under the judgment: (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, after the expiration of ten years from the date of the entry of any judgment…”
Larry Spokoiny v. The Wa State Youth Soccer Ass'n (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
State Of Washington v. Ted James Grimes (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
Pierce Cnty. v. Richard E. Sorrels (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
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