Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 4.96.010 (2026)
✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) All local governmental entities, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or in good faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation. Filing a claim for damages within the time allowed by law shall be a condition precedent to the commencement of any action claiming damages. The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.
(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, for the purposes of this chapter, "local governmental entity" means a county, city, town, special district, municipal corporation as defined in RCW 39.50.010, quasi-municipal corporation, any joint municipal utility services authority, any entity created by public agencies under RCW 39.34.030, or public hospital.
(3) For the purposes of this chapter, "volunteer" is defined according to RCW 51.12.035.
Notes:
Short title—Purpose—Intent—2011 c 258: See RCW 39.106.010.
Purpose—1993 c 449: "This act is designed to provide a single, uniform procedure for bringing a claim for damages against a local governmental entity. The existing procedures, contained in chapter 36.45 RCW, counties, chapter 35.31 RCW, cities and towns, chapter 35A.31 RCW, optional municipal code, and chapter 4.96 RCW, other political subdivisions, municipal corporations, and quasi-municipal corporations, are revised and consolidated into chapter 4.96 RCW." [ 1993 c 449 s 1.]
Severability—1993 c 449: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1993 c 449 s 15.]
Purpose—1967 c 164: "It is the purpose of this act to extend the doctrine established in chapter 136, Laws of 1961, as amended, to all political subdivisions, municipal corporations and quasi municipal corporations of the state." [ 1967 c 164 s 17.]
Severability—1967 c 164: "If any provision of this act, or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act, or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1967 c 164 s 18.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 222
cases (47 in the last 5 years), 1971–2026 · leading case: J & B Dev. Co. v. King Cnty., 669 P.2d 468 (Wash. 1983).
J & B Dev. Co. v. King Cnty., 669 P.2d 468 (Wash. 1983). “The Court of Appeals rejects the "public duty doctrine" as merely another form of "sovereign immunity" abrogated by RCW 4.96.010. This is not correct. The two concepts exist independently.”
Wilson v. City of Seattle, 863 P.2d 1336 (Wash. 1993). “A Seattle first argues its ordinance is authorized by RCW 4.96.010, which provides a city may require the filing of a claim as a condition precedent to bringing a lawsuit.”
Bosteder v. City of Renton, 117 P.3d 316 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 4.96.010 is comparable to the section in Boss that identified what types of grievances the claim filing procedure applied to rather than to the operative language that actually barred suit for failing to comply.”
Medina v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 147 Wash. 2d 303 (Wash. 2002). “Medina’s 1995 claim As a preliminary matter, we first consider whether, in light of RCW 4.96.010, Medina’s 1995 claim for property damage satisfies the provisions of RCW 4.”
Medina v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 53 P.3d 993 (Wash. 2002). “Medina's 1995 claim As a preliminary matter, we first consider whether, in light of RCW 4.96.010, Medina's 1995 claim for property damage satisfies the provisions of RCW 4.”
Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wash. 2d 18 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 4.96.010 is comparable to the section in Boss that identified what types of grievances the claim filing procedure applied to rather than to the operative language that actually barred suit for failing to comply.”
Locke v. City of Seattle, 172 P.3d 705 (Wash. 2007). “We have already held that RCW 4.96.010 waives sovereign immunity for LEOFF Plan I members under an identical "right to sue" provision.”
Chambers-Castanes v. King Cnty., 669 P.2d 451 (Wash. 1983). “" We find, however, the statement is overly broad and does not accurately state the limited exception to governmental immunity.”
Locke v. City of Seattle, 162 Wash. 2d 474 (Wash. 2007). “¶12 The Court of Appeals held that RCW 4.96.010 waives the City’s sovereign immunity, holding that “[t]he correct interpretation of RCW 4.”
Bender v. City of Seattle, 664 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1983). “792 (RCW 4.96.010), [2] the Legislature effectively abolished the principle of sovereign immunity in Washington.”
Woods v. Bailet, 67 P.3d 511 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “We affirm because we hold that the doctors' employer was a "local government entity" as that term was defined by RCW 4.96.010 at the time this lawsuit was filed, and Woods was required to file a claim before suing the entity or its employees acting within the scope of their…”
Woods v. Bailet, 116 Wash. App. 658 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “We affirm because we hold that the doctors’ employer was a “local governmental entity” as that term was defined by RCW 4.96.010 at the time this lawsuit was filed, and Woods was required to file a claim before suing the entity or its employees acting within the scope of their…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.96.010(1) — 95 cases
Bosteder v. City of Renton, 117 P.3d 316 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 4.96.010 is comparable to the section in Boss that identified what types of grievances the claim filing procedure applied to rather than to the operative language that actually barred suit for failing to comply.”
Renner v. City of Marysville, 168 Wash. 2d 540 (Wash. 2010).
Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wash. 2d 18 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 4.96.010 is comparable to the section in Boss that identified what types of grievances the claim filing procedure applied to rather than to the operative language that actually barred suit for failing to comply.”
Renner v. City of Marysville, 230 P.3d 569 (Wash. 2010).
Harberd v. City of Kettle Falls, 84 P.3d 1241 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 4.96.010(2) — 8 cases
Bosteder v. City of Renton, 117 P.3d 316 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 4.96.010 is comparable to the section in Boss that identified what types of grievances the claim filing procedure applied to rather than to the operative language that actually barred suit for failing to comply.”
Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wash. 2d 18 (Wash. 2005). “RCW 4.96.010 is comparable to the section in Boss that identified what types of grievances the claim filing procedure applied to rather than to the operative language that actually barred suit for failing to comply.”
Woods v. Bailet, 67 P.3d 511 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “We affirm because we hold that the doctors' employer was a "local government entity" as that term was defined by RCW 4.96.010 at the time this lawsuit was filed, and Woods was required to file a claim before suing the entity or its employees acting within the scope of their…”
Woods v. Bailet, 116 Wash. App. 658 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “We affirm because we hold that the doctors’ employer was a “local governmental entity” as that term was defined by RCW 4.96.010 at the time this lawsuit was filed, and Woods was required to file a claim before suing the entity or its employees acting within the scope of their…”
Hous. Auth. City of Pasco & Franklin Cty. v. Pleasant, 109 P.3d 422 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
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