Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 41.59.060 (2026)
✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist employee organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities.
(2)(a) Upon authorization of an employee within the bargaining unit and after the certification or recognition of the bargaining unit's exclusive bargaining representative, the employer must deduct from the payments to the employee the monthly amount of dues as certified by the secretary of the exclusive bargaining representative and must transmit the same to the treasurer of the exclusive bargaining representative.
(b) An employee's written, electronic, or recorded voice authorization to have the employer deduct membership dues from the employee's salary must be made by the employee to the exclusive bargaining representative. If the employer receives a request for authorization of deductions, the employer shall as soon as practicable forward the request to the exclusive bargaining representative.
(c) Upon receiving notice of the employee's authorization from the exclusive bargaining representative, the employer shall deduct from the employee's salary membership dues and remit the amounts to the exclusive bargaining representative.
(d) The employee's authorization remains in effect until expressly revoked by the employee in accordance with the terms and conditions of the authorization.
(e) An employee's request to revoke authorization for payroll deductions must be in writing and submitted by the employee to the exclusive bargaining representative in accordance with the terms and conditions of the authorization.
(f) After the employer receives confirmation from the exclusive bargaining representative that the employee has revoked authorization for deductions, the employer shall end the deduction no later than the second payroll after receipt of the confirmation.
(g) The employer shall rely on information provided by the exclusive bargaining representative regarding the authorization and revocation of deductions.
(3) If the employer and the exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit enter into a collective bargaining agreement that includes requirements for deductions of other payments, the employer must make such deductions upon authorization of the employee.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10
cases, 1997–2019 · leading case: Carey v. Inslee, 364 F. Supp. 3d 1220 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
Carey v. Inslee, 364 F. Supp. 3d 1220 (W.D. Wash. 2019). “See RCW 41.59.060, 41.59.100. However, on June 27, 2018, WEA and the State Defendants sent out communications discontinuing the practice of forcibly collecting fees from nonunion employees.”
Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 147 Wash. App. 704 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “Although this initial transfer was compelled by law (RCW 41.59.060, RCW 41.59.100, and the applicable CBA), so that it was lawful when made, it was also subject to the statutory condition, embodied in former RCW 42.”
Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 197 P.3d 686 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “Although this initial transfer was compelled by law (RCW 41.59.060, RCW 41.59.100, and the applicable CBA), so that it was lawful when made, it was also subject to the statutory condition, embodied in former RCW 42.”
State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 117 Wash. App. 625 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “” RCW 41.59.060(1). But the union cannot spend such nonmembers’ fees for political purposes without such employees’ affirmative authorization.”
Leer v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 172 F.R.D. 439 (W.D. Wash. 1997). “(2) Chargeabilitg Claim*: All nonmember employees who at any time from July 1, 1994 through the 1996-1997 school year were required to pay an agency fee to the WEA or NEA under a compulsory unionism agreement with a public employer authorized by RCW 41.59.060 & 41.59.100 and who…”
State Ex Rel. Pub. Disclosure Com'n v. Wea, 71 P.3d 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “See RCW 41.59.060(1); RCW 41.59.100; RCW 42.17.”
DeLacey v. Clover Park Sch. Dist., 117 Wash. App. 291 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “140(1) states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer: (a) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in RCW 41.59.060. (c) To encourage or discourage membership in any employee organization by discrimination in regard…”
DeLacey v. Clover Park Sch. Dist., 69 P.3d 877 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “140(1) states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer: (a) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in RCW 41.59.060. ... (c) To encourage or discourage membership in any employee organization by discrimination in…”
State Ex Rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm. v. Wea, 130 P.3d 352 (Wash. 2006). “¶ 68 However the existence of these mandatory withholding statutes does raise a very definite constitutional problem insofar as the statute is used to compel the nonmember to support the political advocacy of the union *366 without his consent.”
State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 156 Wash. 2d 543 (Wash. 2006). “¶71 However the existence of these mandatory withholding statutes does raise a very definite constitutional problem insofar as the statute is used to compel the nonmember to support the political advocacy of the union without his *573 consent.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 41.59.060(1) — 4 cases
Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 197 P.3d 686 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “Although this initial transfer was compelled by law (RCW 41.59.060, RCW 41.59.100, and the applicable CBA), so that it was lawful when made, it was also subject to the statutory condition, embodied in former RCW 42.”
Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 147 Wash. App. 704 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “Although this initial transfer was compelled by law (RCW 41.59.060, RCW 41.59.100, and the applicable CBA), so that it was lawful when made, it was also subject to the statutory condition, embodied in former RCW 42.”
State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 117 Wash. App. 625 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “” RCW 41.59.060(1). But the union cannot spend such nonmembers’ fees for political purposes without such employees’ affirmative authorization.”
State Ex Rel. Pub. Disclosure Com'n v. Wea, 71 P.3d 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “See RCW 41.59.060(1); RCW 41.59.100; RCW 42.17.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 41.59.060(2) — 6 cases
Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 147 Wash. App. 704 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “Although this initial transfer was compelled by law (RCW 41.59.060, RCW 41.59.100, and the applicable CBA), so that it was lawful when made, it was also subject to the statutory condition, embodied in former RCW 42.”
Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 197 P.3d 686 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “Although this initial transfer was compelled by law (RCW 41.59.060, RCW 41.59.100, and the applicable CBA), so that it was lawful when made, it was also subject to the statutory condition, embodied in former RCW 42.”
State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 117 Wash. App. 625 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “” RCW 41.59.060(1). But the union cannot spend such nonmembers’ fees for political purposes without such employees’ affirmative authorization.”
State Ex Rel. Pub. Disclosure Com'n v. Wea, 71 P.3d 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “See RCW 41.59.060(1); RCW 41.59.100; RCW 42.17.”
State Ex Rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm. v. Wea, 130 P.3d 352 (Wash. 2006). “¶ 68 However the existence of these mandatory withholding statutes does raise a very definite constitutional problem insofar as the statute is used to compel the nonmember to support the political advocacy of the union *366 without his consent.”
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