Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.020 (2026)
✓ current as of May 2026
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The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of any other law of this state relating to discrimination because of race, color, creed, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, other than a law which purports to require or permit doing any act which is an unfair practice under this chapter. However, to the extent that distinction or differential treatment on the basis of citizenship or immigration status is authorized by federal or state law, regulation, or government contract, it is not an unfair practice. Nor shall anything herein contained be construed to deny the right to any person to institute any action or pursue any civil or criminal remedy based upon an alleged violation of his or her civil rights. This chapter shall not be construed to endorse any specific belief, practice, behavior, or orientation. Inclusion of sexual orientation in this chapter shall not be construed to modify or supersede state law relating to marriage.
[ 2020 c 52 s 2; 2007 c 187 s 2; 2006 c 4 s 2; 1993 c 510 s 2; 1973 1st ex.s. c 214 s 2; 1973 c 141 s 2; 1957 c 37 s 2; 1949 c 183 s 12; Rem. Supp. 1949 s 7614-30.]
Notes:
Severability—1993 c 510: See note following RCW 49.60.010.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 173
cases (28 in the last 5 years), 1968–2026 · leading case: Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788 (Wash. 1996).
Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788 (Wash. 1996). “RCW 49.60.020, .030. RCW 49.60.040 and .180 cannot be construed, as does the majority, to deny a private right of action to plaintiff Sharon Griffin for sex discrimination.”
Kilian v. Atkinson, 50 P.3d 638 (Wash. 2002). “010, the language in RCW 49.60.020, and this court’s decision in Marquis, Plaintiffs urge this court to add “age” to the protected classes listed in RCW 49.”
Holland v. Boeing Co., 583 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1978). “RCW 49.60.020. In 1973, the legislature amended the law against discrimination, RCW 49.”
Tina Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Solutions, LLC, 897 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 2017). “”); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.020 (1957) (“The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof.”
> FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES, TENINO AERIE NO. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002). “" RCW 49.60.020. The WLAD's proscription against discrimination "includes, but is not limited to, any place .”
Chuong Van Pham v. City of Seattle, 151 P.3d 976 (Wash. 2007). “RCW 49.60.020. However, the WLAD's liberal construction clause is not without limitation.”
Chuong Van Pham v. Seattle City Light, 159 Wash. 2d 527 (Wash. 2007). “RCW 49.60.020. However, the WLAD’s liberal construction clause is not without limitation.”
State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019). “4, § 2 (codified at RCW 49.60.020 )). Third, Stutzman argues that because the WLAD protects both sexual orientation and religion, it requires that courts balance those rights when they conflict.”
MacKay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., 898 P.2d 284 (Wash. 1995). “" RCW 49.60.020.... Allison, at 85-86. Washington's disdain for discrimination would be reduced to mere rhetoric if this court were to require proof that one of the attributes enumerated in RCW 49.”
Fahn v. Cowlitz Cnty., 610 P.2d 857 (Wash. 1981). “RCW 49.60.020. There is little doubt that the Human Rights Commission may prohibit preemployment inquiries which specifically discriminate against one of the protected categories set *375 forth in RCW 49.”
Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 731 P.2d 497 (Wash. 1987). “Because we must, for this appeal, accept the plaintiffs' claims of discrimination, we cannot ignore this unambiguous expression of legislative intent.”
Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 23 P.3d 440 (Wash. 2001). “[that] threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state,” RCW 49.60.010, the Legislature has mandated that WLAD provisions “shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.020(26) — 1 case
Delaplaine v. United Airlines, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
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