Wash. Rev. Code » Title 61 · Chapter 61.30
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.110 (2026)

Forfeiture may be restrained or enjoined

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) The forfeiture may be restrained or enjoined or the time for cure may be extended by court order only as provided in this section. A certified copy of any restraining order or injunction may be recorded in each county in which any part of the property is located.
(2) Any person entitled to cure the default may bring or join in an action under this section. No other person may bring such an action without leave of court first given for good cause shown. Any such action shall be commenced by filing and serving the summons and complaint before the declaration of forfeiture is recorded. Service shall be made upon the seller or the seller's agent or attorney, if any, who gave the notice of intent to forfeit. Concurrently with commencement of the action, the person bringing the action shall record a lis pendens in each county in which any part of the property is located. A court may preliminarily enjoin the giving and recording of the declaration of forfeiture upon a prima facie showing of the grounds set forth in this section for a permanent injunction. If the court issues an order restraining or enjoining the forfeiture then until such order expires or is vacated or the court otherwise permits the seller to proceed with the forfeiture, the declaration of forfeiture shall not be given or recorded. However, the commencement of the action shall not of itself extend the time for cure.
(3) The forfeiture may be permanently enjoined only when the person bringing the action proves that there is no default as claimed in the notice of intent to forfeit or that the purchaser has a claim against the seller which releases, discharges, or excuses the default claimed in the notice of intent to forfeit, including by offset, or that there exists any material noncompliance with this chapter. The time for cure may be extended only when the default alleged is other than the failure to pay money, the nature of the default is such that it cannot practically be cured within the time stated in the notice of intent to forfeit, action has been taken and is diligently being pursued which would cure the default, and any person entitled to cure is ready, willing, and able to timely perform all of the purchaser's other contract obligations.
[ 1988 c 86 s 11; 1985 c 237 s 11.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases, 1988–2009 · leading case: Schultz v. Werelius, 803 P.2d 1334 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
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Schultz v. Werelius, 803 P.2d 1334 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 4× “RCW 61.30.110(2) provides that any person permitted to cure the default can bring an action to restrain the recording of the declaration of forfeiture.”
Hill v. Cox, 110 Wash. App. 394 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “130(2) provides: “In actions under RCW 61.30.110 and 61.30.120, the court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action to the prevailing party, except for such fees and costs incurred by a person requesting a public sale of the property.”
Hill v. Cox, 41 P.3d 495 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “130(2) provides: "In actions under RCW 61.30.110 and 61.30.120, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action to the prevailing party, except for such fees and costs incurred by a person requesting a public sale of the property.”
In Re McDaniel, 89 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1988). · cites it 2× “RCW 61.30.110. Second, the purchaser, and those claiming through the purchaser, may bring an action to compel the public sale of the property in lieu of forfeiture.”
McLean v. McLean, 754 P.2d 1033 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 5× “140 should have been raised prior to the filing of the declaration of forfeiture in an action under RCW 61.30.110 to enjoin or restrain the same.”
Galladora v. Richter, 764 P.2d 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). “Even if the taxes were improperly included, Mr. Galladora's remedy was to request a court order to restrain or enjoin the forfeiture on the grounds there was no default for personal property taxes.”
Powell v. Moss, 754 P.2d 697 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “130(2) provides that " [i]n actions under RCW 61.30.110 [the section under which a purchaser contests forfeiture] .”
Bays v. Bays (In Re Bays), 413 B.R. 866 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2009). “The complaint included this language “THIS COMPLAINT is made pursuant to RCW 61.30.110, ...” among other terms. [AP # 1, pg.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.110(2) — 2 cases
Schultz v. Werelius, 803 P.2d 1334 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). “RCW 61.30.110(2) provides that any person permitted to cure the default can bring an action to restrain the recording of the declaration of forfeiture.”
In Re McDaniel, 89 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1988). “RCW 61.30.110. Second, the purchaser, and those claiming through the purchaser, may bring an action to compel the public sale of the property in lieu of forfeiture.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.110(3) — 1 case
Powell v. Moss, 754 P.2d 697 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). “130(2) provides that " [i]n actions under RCW 61.30.110 [the section under which a purchaser contests forfeiture] .”
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