Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670 (2026)

Special sex offender sentencing alternative

✓ current as of May 2026

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(1) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this subsection apply to this section only.

(a) "Sex offender treatment provider" or "treatment provider" means a certified sex offender treatment provider or a certified affiliate sex offender treatment provider as defined in RCW 18.155.020.

(b) "Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury that involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or that causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any body part or organ, or that causes a fracture of any body part or organ.

(c) "Victim" means any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a result of the crime charged. "Victim" also means a parent or guardian of a victim who is a minor child unless the parent or guardian is the perpetrator of the offense.

(2) An offender is eligible for the special sex offender sentencing alternative if:

(a) The offender has been convicted of a sex offense other than a violation of RCW 9A.44.050 or a sex offense that is also a serious violent offense. If the conviction results from a guilty plea, the offender must, as part of his or her plea of guilty, voluntarily and affirmatively admit he or she committed all of the elements of the crime to which the offender is pleading guilty. This alternative is not available to offenders who plead guilty to the offense charged under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) and State v. Newton, 87 Wash.2d 363, 552 P.2d 682 (1976);

(b) The offender has no prior convictions for a sex offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030 or any other felony sex offenses in this or any other state;

(c) The offender has no prior adult convictions for a violent offense that was committed within five years of the date the current offense was committed;

(d) The offense did not result in substantial bodily harm to the victim;

(e) The offender had an established relationship with, or connection to, the victim such that the sole connection with the victim was not the commission of the crime; and

(f) The offender's standard sentence range for the offense includes the possibility of confinement for less than eleven years.

(3) If the court finds the offender is eligible for this alternative, the court, on its own motion or the motion of the state or the offender, may order an examination to determine whether the offender is amenable to treatment.

(a) The report of the examination shall include at a minimum the following:

(i) The offender's version of the facts and the official version of the facts;

(ii) The offender's offense history;

(iii) An assessment of problems in addition to alleged deviant behaviors;

(iv) The offender's social and employment situation; and

(v) Other evaluation measures used.

The report shall set forth the sources of the examiner's information.

(b) The examiner shall assess and report regarding the offender's amenability to treatment and relative risk to the community. A proposed treatment plan shall be provided and shall include, at a minimum:

(i) Frequency and type of contact between offender and therapist;

(ii) Specific issues to be addressed in the treatment and description of planned treatment modalities;

(iii) Monitoring plans, including any requirements regarding living conditions, lifestyle requirements, and monitoring by family members and others;

(iv) Anticipated length of treatment; and

(v) Recommended crime-related prohibitions and affirmative conditions, which must include, to the extent known, an identification of specific activities or behaviors that are precursors to the offender's offense cycle, including, but not limited to, activities or behaviors such as viewing or listening to pornography or use of alcohol or controlled substances.

(c) The court on its own motion may order, or on a motion by the state shall order, a second examination regarding the offender's amenability to treatment. The examiner shall be selected by the party making the motion. The offender shall pay the cost of any second examination ordered unless the court finds the defendant to be indigent in which case the state shall pay the cost.

(4) After receipt of the reports, the court shall consider whether the offender and the community will benefit from use of this alternative, consider whether the alternative is too lenient in light of the extent and circumstances of the offense, consider whether the offender has victims in addition to the victim of the offense, consider whether the offender is amenable to treatment, consider the risk the offender would present to the community, to the victim, or to persons of similar age and circumstances as the victim, and consider the victim's opinion whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this section. The court shall give great weight to the victim's opinion whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this section. If the sentence imposed is contrary to the victim's opinion, the court shall enter written findings stating its reasons for imposing the treatment disposition. The fact that the offender admits to his or her offense does not, by itself, constitute amenability to treatment. If the court determines that this alternative is appropriate, the court shall then impose a sentence or, pursuant to RCW 9.94A.507, a minimum term of sentence, within the standard sentence range. If the sentence imposed is less than eleven years of confinement, the court may suspend the execution of the sentence as provided in this section.

(5) As conditions of the suspended sentence, the court must impose the following:

(a) A term of confinement of up to twelve months or the maximum term within the standard range, whichever is less. The court may order the offender to serve a term of confinement greater than twelve months or the maximum term within the standard range based on the presence of an aggravating circumstance listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3). In no case shall the term of confinement exceed the statutory maximum sentence for the offense. The court may order the offender to serve all or part of his or her term of confinement in partial confinement. An offender sentenced to a term of confinement under this subsection is not eligible for earned release under RCW 9.92.151 or 9.94A.728.

(b) A term of community custody equal to the length of the suspended sentence, the length of the maximum term imposed pursuant to RCW 9.94A.507, or three years, whichever is greater, and require the offender to comply with any conditions imposed by the department under RCW 9.94A.703.

(c) Treatment for any period up to five years in duration. The court, in its discretion, shall order outpatient sex offender treatment or inpatient sex offender treatment, if available. A community mental health center may not be used for such treatment unless it has an appropriate program designed for sex offender treatment. The offender shall not change sex offender treatment providers or treatment conditions without first notifying the prosecutor, the community corrections officer, and the court. If any party or the court objects to a proposed change, the offender shall not change providers or conditions without court approval after a hearing.

(d) Specific prohibitions and affirmative conditions relating to the known precursor activities or behaviors identified in the proposed treatment plan under subsection (3)(b)(v) of this section or identified in an annual review under subsection (8)(b) of this section.

(6) As conditions of the suspended sentence, the court may impose one or more of the following:

(a) Crime-related prohibitions;

(b) Require the offender to devote time to a specific employment or occupation;

(c) Require the offender to remain within prescribed geographical boundaries and notify the court or the community corrections officer prior to any change in the offender's address or employment;

(d) Require the offender to report as directed to the court and a community corrections officer;

(e) Require the offender to pay all court-ordered legal financial obligations as provided in RCW 9.94A.030;

(f) Require the offender to perform community restitution work; or

(g) Require the offender to reimburse the victim for the cost of any counseling required as a result of the offender's crime.

(7) At the time of sentencing, the court shall set a treatment termination hearing for three months prior to the anticipated date for completion of treatment.

(8)(a) The sex offender treatment provider shall submit quarterly reports on the offender's progress in treatment to the court and the parties. The report shall reference the treatment plan and include at a minimum the following: Dates of attendance, offender's compliance with requirements, treatment activities, the offender's relative progress in treatment, and any other material specified by the court at sentencing.

(b) The court shall conduct a hearing on the offender's progress in treatment at least once a year. At least fourteen days prior to the hearing, notice of the hearing shall be given to the victim. The victim shall be given the opportunity to make statements to the court regarding the offender's supervision and treatment. At the hearing, the court may modify conditions of community custody including, but not limited to, crime-related prohibitions and affirmative conditions relating to activities and behaviors identified as part of, or relating to precursor activities and behaviors in, the offender's offense cycle or revoke the suspended sentence.

(9) At least fourteen days prior to the treatment termination hearing, notice of the hearing shall be given to the victim. The victim shall be given the opportunity to make statements to the court regarding the offender's supervision and treatment. Prior to the treatment termination hearing, the treatment provider and community corrections officer shall submit written reports to the court and parties regarding the offender's compliance with treatment and monitoring requirements, and recommendations regarding termination from treatment, including proposed community custody conditions. The court may order an evaluation regarding the advisability of termination from treatment by a sex offender treatment provider who may not be the same person who treated the offender under subsection (5) of this section or any person who employs, is employed by, or shares profits with the person who treated the offender under subsection (5) of this section unless the court has entered written findings that such evaluation is in the best interest of the victim and that a successful evaluation of the offender would otherwise be impractical. The offender shall pay the cost of the evaluation. At the treatment termination hearing the court may: (a) Modify conditions of community custody, and either (b) terminate treatment, or (c) extend treatment in two-year increments for up to the remaining period of community custody.

(10)(a) If a violation of conditions other than a second violation of the prohibitions or affirmative conditions relating to precursor behaviors or activities imposed under subsection (5)(d) or (8)(b) of this section occurs during community custody, the department shall either impose sanctions as provided for in RCW 9.94A.633(1) or refer the violation to the court and recommend revocation of the suspended sentence as provided for in subsections (7) and (9) of this section.

(b) If a second violation of the prohibitions or affirmative conditions relating to precursor behaviors or activities imposed under subsection (5)(d) or (8)(b) of this section occurs during community custody, the department shall refer the violation to the court and recommend revocation of the suspended sentence as provided in subsection (11) of this section.

(11) The court may revoke the suspended sentence at any time during the period of community custody and order execution of the sentence if: (a) The offender violates the conditions of the suspended sentence, or (b) the court finds that the offender is failing to make satisfactory progress in treatment. All confinement time served during the period of community custody shall be credited to the offender if the suspended sentence is revoked.

(12) If the offender violates a requirement of the sentence that is not a condition of the suspended sentence pursuant to subsection (5) or (6) of this section, the department may impose sanctions pursuant to RCW 9.94A.633(1).

(13) The offender's sex offender treatment provider may not be the same person who examined the offender under subsection (3) of this section or any person who employs, is employed by, or shares profits with the person who examined the offender under subsection (3) of this section, unless the court has entered written findings that such treatment is in the best interests of the victim and that successful treatment of the offender would otherwise be impractical. Examinations and treatment ordered pursuant to this subsection shall only be conducted by certified sex offender treatment providers or certified affiliate sex offender treatment providers under chapter 18.155 RCW unless the court finds that:

(a) The offender has already moved to another state or plans to move to another state for reasons other than circumventing the certification requirements; or

(b)(i) No certified sex offender treatment providers or certified affiliate sex offender treatment providers are available for treatment within a reasonable geographical distance of the offender's home; and

(ii) The evaluation and treatment plan comply with this section and the rules adopted by the department of health.

(14) If the offender is less than eighteen years of age when the charge is filed, the state shall pay for the cost of initial evaluation and treatment.

[ 2009 c 28 s 9; 2008 c 231 s 31; 2006 c 133 s 1. Prior: 2004 c 176 s 4; 2004 c 38 s 9; 2002 c 175 s 11; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 s 316; 2000 c 28 s 20.]

Notes:

Effective date—2009 c 28: See note following RCW 2.24.040.

Intent—Application—Application of repealers—Effective date—2008 c 231: See notes following RCW 9.94A.701.

Severability—2008 c 231: See note following RCW 9.94A.500.

Severability—Effective date—2004 c 176: See notes following RCW 9.94A.515.

Effective date—2004 c 38: See note following RCW 18.155.075.

Effective date—2002 c 175: See note following RCW 7.80.130.

Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.

Application—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 ss 301-363: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.

Technical correction bill—2000 c 28: See note following RCW 9.94A.015.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 174 cases (38 in the last 5 years), 2002–2026 · leading case: John Doe G v. Dep't of Corr., 410 P.3d 1156 (Wash. 2018).

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John Doe G v. Dep't of Corr., 410 P.3d 1156 (Wash. 2018). · cites it 39× “RCW 9.94A.670. Before the court orders a SSOSA,a certified sex offender treatment provider evaluates "whether the offender is amenable to treatment.”

State Of Washington v. Jason Spaulding, 476 P.3d 205 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 19× “For purposes of RCW 9.94A.670, the court finds that an established relationship is not created by a few phone calls and social media contacts over a few days, followed by in person contact for a few hours prior to the commission of the crime.”

State v. Pratt, 479 P.3d 680 (Wash. 2021). · cites it 20× “Pratt requested a SSOSA sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.670. The State objected, arguing that Pratt was ineligible because he did not have an “established relationship” with M.”

State v. McInally, 106 P.3d 794 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 25× “” 10 In the alternative, the State argued that because Mclnally was ordered to undergo sexual deviancy treatment for the juvenile offense, allowing another opportunity for treatment would “undercut the intent and spirit of RCW 9.94A.670.” 11 ¶8 Mclnally claimed he was eligible…”

State v. McInally, 106 P.3d 794 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 25× “" [10] In the alternative, the State argued that because McInally was ordered to undergo sexual deviancy treatment for the juvenile offense, allowing another opportunity for treatment would "undercut the intent and spirit of RCW 9.94A.670." [11] McInally claimed he was eligible…”

John Doe G v. Dep't of Corr., 391 P.3d 496 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 12× “The statute sets exacting standards for eligible offenders: the offender had no prior sex crime convictions or convictions for violent crimes in the previous 5 years, the offense did not result in bodily harm, the victim was not a stranger to the offender, and the offender’s…”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Lord, 152 Wash. 2d 182 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 4× “We have also established that RCW 9.94A.670 requires that an offender must be found amenable for a treatment by a SSOSA evaluator before he or she is deemed eligible for a SSOSA.”

State v. Pannell, 267 P.3d 349 (Wash. 2011). · cites it 11× “We hold that under the plain language of the SSOSA statute, RCW 9.94A.670, and in light of the overarching statutory scheme, an offender is not entitled to credit against the maximum sentence for nonconfined time spent when a sentence is suspended pursuant to a SSOSA.”

State v. Sims, 256 P.3d 285 (Wash. 2011). · cites it 5× “¶ 37 I respectfully dissent. I CONCUR: BARBARA A. MADSEN, Chief Justice.”

Doe P v. Thurston Cnty., 199 Wash. App. 280 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 13× “2 RCW 9.94A.670 and RCW 13.40.162, respectively.”

State v. Landsiedel, 269 P.3d 347 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 8× “RCW 9.94A.670. He reiterated his SSOSA request at the sentencing hearing, arguing that the term “victim” as defined in the SSOSA statute included his friends and family who suffered as a result of his crime.”

State v. Petterson, 394 P.3d 385 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 11× “Under SSOSA, if an offender charged with a sex offense qualifies for a sentencing alternative, the superior court may suspend the offender’s sentence for the offender to engage in treatment.”

Show all 174 citing cases →

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(1)(a) — 1 case

John Doe G v. Dep't of Corr., 410 P.3d 1156 (Wash. 2018). “RCW 9.94A.670. Before the court orders a SSOSA,a certified sex offender treatment provider evaluates "whether the offender is amenable to treatment.”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(1)(c) — 8 cases

State v. Landsiedel, 269 P.3d 347 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “RCW 9.94A.670. He reiterated his SSOSA request at the sentencing hearing, arguing that the term “victim” as defined in the SSOSA statute included his friends and family who suffered as a result of his crime.”

State Of Washington v. Amjad Pervez (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

State Of Washington v. Christopher Seavoy (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

State Of Washington v. Benjamin Michael Duschene (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

In the Matter of the Pers. Restraint of: Kyle Robert Sickels (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(1)(e) — 1 case

In the Matter of the Pers. Restraint of: Kyle Robert Sickels (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(10) — 21 cases

State v. McCormick, 213 P.3d 32 (Wash. 2009).

State v. McCormick, 166 Wash. 2d 689 (Wash. 2009).

State v. Canfield, 116 P.3d 391 (Wash. 2008).

State v. Canfield, 154 Wash. 2d 698 (Wash. 2005).

State v. Pannell, 267 P.3d 349 (Wash. 2011). “We hold that under the plain language of the SSOSA statute, RCW 9.94A.670, and in light of the overarching statutory scheme, an offender is not entitled to credit against the maximum sentence for nonconfined time spent when a sentence is suspended pursuant to a SSOSA.”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(10)(a) — 1 case

State v. Partee, 170 P.3d 60 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(11) — 26 cases

State v. Miller, 325 P.3d 230 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).

State Of Washington, V Frederick Mitchell Detwiler (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

State Of Washington v. Justin Ross Wheeler (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

State Of Washington v. Christopher A. Miller (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(11)(a) — 3 cases

State of Washington v. Adam Ross Hendron (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).

State Of Washington, V. Christopher Booth (Wash. Ct. App. 2026).

State Of Washington v. Kenneth W. Whiteman, Sr. (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(11)(b) — 1 case

State Of Washington v. Marc J. Dewitt (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(12) — 1 case

State Of Washington, V Frederick Mitchell Detwiler (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(13) — 4 cases

Doe P v. Thurston Cnty., 199 Wash. App. 280 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “2 RCW 9.94A.670 and RCW 13.40.162, respectively.”

John Doe G v. Dep't of Corr., 391 P.3d 496 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “The statute sets exacting standards for eligible offenders: the offender had no prior sex crime convictions or convictions for violent crimes in the previous 5 years, the offense did not result in bodily harm, the victim was not a stranger to the offender, and the offender’s…”

Pers. Restraint Petition Of: Dylan Raymond Becker (Wash. Ct. App. 2023).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(13)(a) — 1 case

State of Washington v. Phillip Sherman Ingram (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(2) — 40 cases

State Of Washington v. Jason Spaulding, 476 P.3d 205 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “For purposes of RCW 9.94A.670, the court finds that an established relationship is not created by a few phone calls and social media contacts over a few days, followed by in person contact for a few hours prior to the commission of the crime.”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Lord, 152 Wash. 2d 182 (Wash. 2004). “We have also established that RCW 9.94A.670 requires that an offender must be found amenable for a treatment by a SSOSA evaluator before he or she is deemed eligible for a SSOSA.”

State v. McInally, 106 P.3d 794 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “” 10 In the alternative, the State argued that because Mclnally was ordered to undergo sexual deviancy treatment for the juvenile offense, allowing another opportunity for treatment would “undercut the intent and spirit of RCW 9.94A.670.” 11 ¶8 Mclnally claimed he was eligible…”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(2)(a) — 8 cases

State Of Washington, V. William Lattin (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).

Merrill Brick, V. King Cnty. Prosecuting Attorney (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).

State Of Washington, V Ronald James Smith (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(2)(b) — 5 cases

State v. McInally, 106 P.3d 794 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “" [10] In the alternative, the State argued that because McInally was ordered to undergo sexual deviancy treatment for the juvenile offense, allowing another opportunity for treatment would "undercut the intent and spirit of RCW 9.94A.670." [11] McInally claimed he was eligible…”

State Of Washington v. Christopher Seavoy (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

State Of Washington v. Justin Ross Wheeler (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

State Of Washington, V. William Lattin (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(2)(c) — 6 cases

In Re Lord, 94 P.3d 952 (Wash. 2004).

State Of Washington v. Steven James Van Noy, 416 P.3d 751 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).

State v. Adams, 82 P.3d 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(2)(d) — 2 cases

State Of Washington v. Christopher Seavoy (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

State Of Washington, V. William Lattin (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(2)(e) — 8 cases

State v. Pratt, 479 P.3d 680 (Wash. 2021). “Pratt requested a SSOSA sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.670. The State objected, arguing that Pratt was ineligible because he did not have an “established relationship” with M.”

State Of Washington, Appellant/cross-resp v. Cory Pratt, Resp./cross-appellant, 454 P.3d 875 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).

State Of Washington v. Darin Vance (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).

In the Matter of the Pers. Restraint of: Kyle Robert Sickels (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(3) — 26 cases

State v. Osman, 139 P.3d 334 (Wash. 2006).

State v. Canfield, 116 P.3d 391 (Wash. 2008).

Doe P v. Thurston Cnty., 199 Wash. App. 280 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “2 RCW 9.94A.670 and RCW 13.40.162, respectively.”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(3)(a) — 7 cases

State v. Osman, 126 Wash. App. 575 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).

Koenig v. Thurston Cnty., 229 P.3d 910 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).

Koenig v. Thurston Cnty., 155 Wash. App. 398 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(3)(a)(ii) — 1 case

State Of Washington, V. Justin R. Smith (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(3)(a)(iii) — 3 cases

State Of Washington v. Christopher Seavoy (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

State Of Washington, V. William Lattin (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(3)(a)(iv) — 1 case

Doe P v. Thurston Cnty., 199 Wash. App. 280 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “2 RCW 9.94A.670 and RCW 13.40.162, respectively.”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(3)(b) — 10 cases

Doe P v. Thurston Cnty., 199 Wash. App. 280 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “2 RCW 9.94A.670 and RCW 13.40.162, respectively.”

State Of Washington v. Marlon Octavius Luvell House (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

State Of Washington v. Derek John Dossantos (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(3)(b)(i) — 1 case

State Of Washington v. Derek John Dossantos (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(3)(b)(v) — 4 cases

Doe P v. Thurston Cnty., 199 Wash. App. 280 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “2 RCW 9.94A.670 and RCW 13.40.162, respectively.”

State Of Washington v. Derek John Dossantos (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).

State Of Washington, V Frederick Mitchell Detwiler (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

State Of Washington, V. Justin R. Smith (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(3)(c) — 1 case

State Of Washington v. Marlon Octavius Luvell House (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(4) — 61 cases

State v. Hai Minh Nguyen, 425 P.3d 847 (Wash. 2018).

State v. Osman, 139 P.3d 334 (Wash. 2006).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(4)(a) — 4 cases

In Re Pullman, 218 P.3d 913 (Wash. 2009).

In re the Pers. Restraint of Pullman, 167 Wash. 2d 205 (Wash. 2009).

State v. Petterson, 394 P.3d 385 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “Under SSOSA, if an offender charged with a sex offense qualifies for a sentencing alternative, the superior court may suspend the offender’s sentence for the offender to engage in treatment.”

In Re the Pers. Restraint of Talley, 260 P.3d 868 (Wash. 2011).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(4)(b) — 1 case

State Of Washington, V Marlowe M. Westra (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(4)(c) — 1 case

State Of Washington, V Marlowe M. Westra (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(5) — 9 cases

State v. Sims, 256 P.3d 285 (Wash. 2011). “¶ 37 I respectfully dissent. I CONCUR: BARBARA A. MADSEN, Chief Justice.”

Koenig v. Thurston Cnty., 287 P.3d 523 (Wash. 2012).

State v. Button, 339 P.3d 182 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).

Pamela K. Scott, V. Louise Love (Wash. Ct. App. 2022).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(5)(a) — 8 cases

State v. McCormick, 213 P.3d 32 (Wash. 2009).

State v. McCormick, 166 Wash. 2d 689 (Wash. 2009).

Koenig v. Thurston Cnty., 229 P.3d 910 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).

Koenig v. Thurston Cnty., 155 Wash. App. 398 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(5)(b) — 9 cases

State Of Washington v. Derek John Dossantos (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).

State Of Washington, V Kyle Thomas Whitney Bell (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(5)(c) — 2 cases

State Of Washington v. Derek John Dossantos (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).

Pers. Restraint Petition Of: Dylan Raymond Becker (Wash. Ct. App. 2023).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(5)(d) — 4 cases

State Of Washington, V Frederick Mitchell Detwiler (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

State Of Washington, V. Justin R. Smith (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).

State of Washington v. Steven Ruiz Sibaja (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).

State Of Washington v. Derek John Dossantos (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(6) — 3 cases

State v. Sims, 171 Wash. 2d 436 (Wash. 2011).

State v. Sims, 256 P.3d 285 (Wash. 2011). “¶ 37 I respectfully dissent. I CONCUR: BARBARA A. MADSEN, Chief Justice.”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(6)(a) — 4 cases

State Of Washington, V Frederick Mitchell Detwiler (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

State Of Washington, V Ronald James Smith (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

State Of Washington v. Derek John Dossantos (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).

State Of Washington v. Syr Rumsey (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(6)(c) — 1 case

State v. Sims, 256 P.3d 285 (Wash. 2011). “¶ 37 I respectfully dissent. I CONCUR: BARBARA A. MADSEN, Chief Justice.”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(6)(g) — 1 case

State Of Washington v. Christoval Manuel Gutierrez (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(7) — 2 cases

State v. Nelson (Wash. 2025).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(8) — 2 cases

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(8)(b) — 1 case

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(9) — 5 cases

State v. Petterson (Wash. 2018).

State Of Washington, V. Marshall Sidell Crew (Wash. Ct. App. 2023).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(9)(a) — 5 cases

State v. Gartrell, 138 Wash. App. 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).

State v. C.D.C., 186 P.3d 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).

State v. Gartrell, 158 P.3d 636 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).

State v. Petterson (Wash. 2018).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(e)(2) — 1 case

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(l)(a) — 2 cases

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(l)(c) — 1 case

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(l)(e) — 1 case

State v. Willhoite, 268 P.3d 994 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.670(l1) — 1 case

State of Washington v. Perry Anthony Zuvela (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).

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