Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9A · Chapter 9A.36
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) A person is guilty of a hate crime offense if the person maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts in whole or in part because of their perception of another person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability:
(a) Assaults another person;
(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of another; or
(c) Threatens a specific person or group of persons and places that person, or members of the specific group of persons, in reasonable fear of harm to person or property. The fear must be a fear that a reasonable person would have under all the circumstances. For purposes of this section, a "reasonable person" is a reasonable person who is a member of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or who has the same gender expression or identity, or the same mental, physical, or sensory disability as the victim. Words alone do not constitute a hate crime offense unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute a hate crime offense if it is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the threat.
(2) In any prosecution for a hate crime offense, unless evidence exists which explains to the trier of fact's satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person's perception of the victim's or victims' race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability if the person commits one of the following acts:
(a) Burns a cross on property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of African American heritage;
(b) Defaces property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of Jewish heritage by defacing the property with a Nazi emblem, symbol, or hakenkreuz;
(c) Defaces religious real property with words, symbols, or items that are derogatory to persons of the faith associated with the property;
(d) Places a vandalized or defaced religious item or scripture on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of the faith with which that item or scripture is associated;
(e) Damages, destroys, or defaces religious garb or other faith-based attire belonging to the victim or attempts to or successfully removes religious garb or other faith-based attire from the victim's person without the victim's authorization; or
(f) Places a noose on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of a racial or ethnic minority group.
This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state's ability to prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do not fall within (a) through (f) of this subsection.
(3) It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, had a particular gender expression or identity, or had a mental, physical, or sensory disability.
(4) Evidence of expressions or associations of the accused may not be introduced as substantive evidence at trial unless the evidence specifically relates to the crime charged. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rules of evidence governing impeachment of a witness.
(5) Every person who commits another crime during the commission of a crime under this section may be punished and prosecuted for the other crime separately.
(6) For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Gender expression or identity" means having or being perceived as having a gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth.
(b) "Sexual orientation" means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.
(c) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:
(i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or
(ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a person threatened or that of any other person.
(7) Commission of a hate crime offense is a class C felony.
(8) The penalties provided in this section for hate crime offenses do not preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available under law.
(9) Nothing in this section confers or expands any civil rights or protections to any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws of the state of Washington.
[ 2025 c 249 s 1; 2024 c 34 s 1; 2023 c 52 s 1; 2019 c 271 s 2; 2010 c 119 s 1; 2009 c 180 s 1; 1993 c 127 s 2; 1989 c 95 s 1; 1984 c 268 s 1; 1981 c 267 s 1.]

Notes:

Severability—1993 c 127: See note following RCW 9A.36.078.
Construction—1989 c 95: "The provisions of this act shall be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose." [ 1989 c 95 s 3.]
Severability—1989 c 95: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1989 c 95 s 4.]
Harassment: Chapter 9A.46 RCW.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 45 cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1988–2026 · leading case: State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 2005).
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State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 2005). · cites it 52× “The primary inquiry in this case is whether Washington's hate crimes statute, malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, is an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights.”
State v. Haberman, 22 P.3d 264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 14× “Craig Haberman appeals his conviction for malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, based on angry racial comments and threats he made to a grocery clerk who had refused to sell him beer the previous night when Haberman appeared intoxicated.”
State v. Worl, 918 P.2d 905 (Wash. 1996). · cites it 6× “, who was convicted of malicious harassment under RCW 9A.36.080(1)(a). The Court of Appeals, without reference to the analysis in its earlier decision of the factors supporting an exceptional sentence, vacated Worl’s exceptional sentence, finding that the factors it had…”
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988). · cites it 2× “1987) provides: "In case the judgment or decree of the court below be affirmed, or the appellant fails to prosecute his appeal to effect, the supreme court shall render judgment against the appellant for damages, at the rate of fifteen percent (15%), as follows: If the judgment…”
State of West Virginia v. Steward Butler, 799 S.E.2d 718 (W. Va. 2017). · cites it 2× “Stat. §§ 31-18B-2, -3; N.Y. Penal Law § 485-05 ; R.”
State v. Read, 261 P.3d 207 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 6× “RCW 9A.36.080. Words alone cannot constitute malicious harassment “unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat” and it is apparent that the person can carry out the threat.”
State v. Haq, 268 P.3d 997 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “220 ¶136 To convict a defendant of malicious harassment under RCW 9A.36.080, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) A person .”
State v. Smith, 759 P.2d 372 (Wash. 1988). · cites it 2× “020 was enacted, address aggression and intimidation motivated by bigotry or other prejudices, RCW 9A.36.080 ("malicious harassment"), and certain forms of harassment, intimidation, torment or embarrassment effected by telephone, RCW 9.”
State v. Timothy K., 27 P.3d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 5× “[5] *1266 Timothy also relies on State v. Lynch , wherein we held that convictions of both malicious harassment and fourth degree (simple) assault violated double jeopardy, as the crimes charged were identical in fact, and proof of malicious harassment as charged under RCW 9A.”
State v. Johnson, 115 Wash. App. 890 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 3× “RCW 9A.36.080(1). Mr. Johnson makes a number of arguments on appeal.”
State v. Johnson, 64 P.3d 88 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 3× “RCW 9A.36.080(1). Mr. Johnson makes a number of arguments on appeal.”
State v. Pollard, 906 P.2d 976 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 5× “The State charged Pollard with malicious harassment under former RCW 9A.36.080, fourth degree assault, and second degree criminal trespass.”
Show all 45 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(1) — 14 cases
State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 2005). “The primary inquiry in this case is whether Washington's hate crimes statute, malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, is an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights.”
State v. Haberman, 22 P.3d 264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “Craig Haberman appeals his conviction for malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, based on angry racial comments and threats he made to a grocery clerk who had refused to sell him beer the previous night when Haberman appeared intoxicated.”
State v. Johnson, 115 Wash. App. 890 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “RCW 9A.36.080(1). Mr. Johnson makes a number of arguments on appeal.”
State v. Johnson, 64 P.3d 88 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “RCW 9A.36.080(1). Mr. Johnson makes a number of arguments on appeal.”
State v. Worl, 875 P.2d 659 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(1)(a) — 8 cases
State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 2005). “The primary inquiry in this case is whether Washington's hate crimes statute, malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, is an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights.”
State v. Worl, 918 P.2d 905 (Wash. 1996). “, who was convicted of malicious harassment under RCW 9A.36.080(1)(a). The Court of Appeals, without reference to the analysis in its earlier decision of the factors supporting an exceptional sentence, vacated Worl’s exceptional sentence, finding that the factors it had…”
State v. Timothy K., 27 P.3d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “[5] *1266 Timothy also relies on State v. Lynch , wherein we held that convictions of both malicious harassment and fourth degree (simple) assault violated double jeopardy, as the crimes charged were identical in fact, and proof of malicious harassment as charged under RCW 9A.”
State v. Worl, 918 P.2d 905 (Wash. 1996).
State v. Timothy K., 107 Wash. App. 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(1)(b) — 4 cases
State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 2005). “The primary inquiry in this case is whether Washington's hate crimes statute, malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, is an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights.”
State v. Timothy K., 27 P.3d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “[5] *1266 Timothy also relies on State v. Lynch , wherein we held that convictions of both malicious harassment and fourth degree (simple) assault violated double jeopardy, as the crimes charged were identical in fact, and proof of malicious harassment as charged under RCW 9A.”
State v. Timothy K., 107 Wash. App. 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
State v. Haberman, 22 P.3d 264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(1)(b)(i) — 1 case
State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 2005). “The primary inquiry in this case is whether Washington's hate crimes statute, malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, is an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(1)(b)(iii) — 1 case
State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 2005). “The primary inquiry in this case is whether Washington's hate crimes statute, malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, is an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(1)(c) — 7 cases
State v. Haberman, 22 P.3d 264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
State v. Read, 261 P.3d 207 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “RCW 9A.36.080. Words alone cannot constitute malicious harassment “unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat” and it is apparent that the person can carry out the threat.”
State Of Washington, Resp-cross App V. Jason L. Skyta, Appellant-cross Resp (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
State Of Washington v. Michael T. Dornery (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
State of Washington v. Donald Lucas Prichard (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(2) — 1 case
State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 2005). “The primary inquiry in this case is whether Washington's hate crimes statute, malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, is an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(3) — 1 case
State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 2005). “The primary inquiry in this case is whether Washington's hate crimes statute, malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, is an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(4) — 2 cases
State v. Johnson, 115 Wash. App. 890 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “RCW 9A.36.080(1). Mr. Johnson makes a number of arguments on appeal.”
State v. Johnson, 64 P.3d 88 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “RCW 9A.36.080(1). Mr. Johnson makes a number of arguments on appeal.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(5) — 6 cases
State v. Parmelee, 32 P.3d 1029 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
State v. Timothy K., 107 Wash. App. 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
State v. Timothy K., 27 P.3d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “[5] *1266 Timothy also relies on State v. Lynch , wherein we held that convictions of both malicious harassment and fourth degree (simple) assault violated double jeopardy, as the crimes charged were identical in fact, and proof of malicious harassment as charged under RCW 9A.”
State v. Robertson, 947 P.2d 765 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
State v. Lynch, 970 P.2d 769 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(7) — 1 case
State Of Washington v. Raven Brealan (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(l)(a) — 3 cases
State v. Worl, 918 P.2d 905 (Wash. 1996). “, who was convicted of malicious harassment under RCW 9A.36.080(1)(a). The Court of Appeals, without reference to the analysis in its earlier decision of the factors supporting an exceptional sentence, vacated Worl’s exceptional sentence, finding that the factors it had…”
State v. Lynch, 970 P.2d 769 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(l)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Haberman, 22 P.3d 264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “Craig Haberman appeals his conviction for malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, based on angry racial comments and threats he made to a grocery clerk who had refused to sell him beer the previous night when Haberman appeared intoxicated.”
State v. Pollard, 906 P.2d 976 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). “The State charged Pollard with malicious harassment under former RCW 9A.36.080, fourth degree assault, and second degree criminal trespass.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(l)(c) — 1 case
State v. Haberman, 22 P.3d 264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “Craig Haberman appeals his conviction for malicious harassment, RCW 9A.36.080, based on angry racial comments and threats he made to a grocery clerk who had refused to sell him beer the previous night when Haberman appeared intoxicated.”
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