Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120 (2026)
Assault of a child in the first degree
✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of the crime of assault of a child in the first degree if the child is under the age of thirteen and the person:
(a) Commits the crime of assault in the first degree, as defined in RCW 9A.36.011, against the child; or
(b) Intentionally assaults the child and either:
(i) Recklessly inflicts great bodily harm; or
(ii) Causes substantial bodily harm, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice either of (A) assaulting the child which has resulted in bodily harm that is greater than transient physical pain or minor temporary marks, or (B) causing the child physical pain or agony that is equivalent to that produced by torture.
(2) Assault of a child in the first degree is a class A felony.
[ 1992 c 145 s 1.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 48
cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1997–2025 · leading case: State v. Marchi, 158 Wash. App. 823 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Marchi, 158 Wash. App. 823 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶16 Based on the vulnerability of young victims, the legislature passed RCW 9A.36.120 to enhance penalties and to address concerns arising from an adult perpetrator’s ongoing child abuse of a child younger than 13.”
State v. Harris, 164 Wash. App. 377 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “Here, the law governing Harris’s child assault charge is expressed in RCW 9A.36.120(1)(b)(i), the statute defining first degree child assault.”
State v. Jennings, 24 P.3d 430 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “He argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to two counts of first degree assault of a child (RCW 9A.36.120) because at sentencing the court erroneously referenced a standard range higher than the correct standard range listed on his Statement of Defendant in…”
State v. Jennings, 24 P.3d 430 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “He argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to two counts of first degree assault of a child (RCW 9A.36.120) because at sentencing, the court erroneously referenced a standard range higher than the correct standard range listed on his Statement of Defendant…”
State v. Venegas, 155 Wash. App. 507 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “RCW 9A.36.120. The corrected amended information charges Venegas with second degree assault under RCW 9A.”
State v. Venegas, 228 P.3d 813 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “[3] RCW 9A.36.120 [4] The corrected amended information charges Venegas with second degree assault under RCW 9A.”
State v. Marchi, 243 P.3d 556 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶ 16 Based on the vulnerability of young victims, the legislature passed RCW 9A.36.120 to enhance penalties and to address concerns arising from an adult perpetrator's ongoing child abuse of a child younger than 13.”
State v. Womac, 160 Wash. 2d 643 (Wash. 2007). “RCW 9A.36.120(1) (emphasis added). Before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, “the presence of multiple convictions [was] apt to affect the minimum sentence set by the parole board.”
State v. Womac, 160 P.3d 40 (Wash. 2007). “[i]ntentionally assaults the child and either: (i)[r]ecklessly inflicts great bodily harm; or (ii)[c]auses substantial bodily harm, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice either of (A) assaulting the child which has resulted in bodily harm that is greater…”
State v. Harris, 263 P.3d 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “[i]ntentionally assaults the child and ... [r]ecklessly inflicts great bodily harm.”
State v. Norlin, 951 P.2d 1131 (Wash. 1998). “The State charged Norlin in King County Superior Court, pursuant to RCW 9A.36.120(1)(b)(i), [1] with first degree assault of a child.”
State v. Norlin, 134 Wash. 2d 570 (Wash. 1998). “The State charged Norlin in King County Superior Court, pursuant to RCW 9A.36.120(l)(b)(i), 1 with first degree assault of a child.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(1) — 5 cases
State v. Womac, 160 Wash. 2d 643 (Wash. 2007). “RCW 9A.36.120(1) (emphasis added). Before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, “the presence of multiple convictions [was] apt to affect the minimum sentence set by the parole board.”
State Of Washington v. Jennifer Mothershead (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
State Of Washington, V Chad A. Tibbits (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
State Of Washington v. Christopher Joel Sefton (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
In the Matter of the Pers. Restraint of: Reuben D. Mulamba (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(1)(a) — 6 cases
State v. Womac, 160 P.3d 40 (Wash. 2007). “[i]ntentionally assaults the child and either: (i)[r]ecklessly inflicts great bodily harm; or (ii)[c]auses substantial bodily harm, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice either of (A) assaulting the child which has resulted in bodily harm that is greater…”
State v. Marchi, 243 P.3d 556 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶ 16 Based on the vulnerability of young victims, the legislature passed RCW 9A.36.120 to enhance penalties and to address concerns arising from an adult perpetrator's ongoing child abuse of a child younger than 13.”
State v. Jennings, 24 P.3d 430 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “He argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to two counts of first degree assault of a child (RCW 9A.36.120) because at sentencing the court erroneously referenced a standard range higher than the correct standard range listed on his Statement of Defendant in…”
State v. Jennings, 24 P.3d 430 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). “He argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to two counts of first degree assault of a child (RCW 9A.36.120) because at sentencing, the court erroneously referenced a standard range higher than the correct standard range listed on his Statement of Defendant…”
State Of Washington v. Ryan Andrew Stephenson (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(1)(b) — 6 cases
State v. Marchi, 243 P.3d 556 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶ 16 Based on the vulnerability of young victims, the legislature passed RCW 9A.36.120 to enhance penalties and to address concerns arising from an adult perpetrator's ongoing child abuse of a child younger than 13.”
State v. Kiser, 940 P.2d 308 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
In the Matter of the Pers. Restraint of: Reuben D. Mulamba (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
State Of Washington v. Christopher Joel Sefton (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
State Of Washington v. Evaristo Angel Mendez (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(1)(b)(i) — 11 cases
State v. Harris, 164 Wash. App. 377 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “Here, the law governing Harris’s child assault charge is expressed in RCW 9A.36.120(1)(b)(i), the statute defining first degree child assault.”
State v. Harris, 263 P.3d 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “[i]ntentionally assaults the child and ... [r]ecklessly inflicts great bodily harm.”
State v. Norlin, 951 P.2d 1131 (Wash. 1998). “The State charged Norlin in King County Superior Court, pursuant to RCW 9A.36.120(1)(b)(i), [1] with first degree assault of a child.”
State v. Johnson, 297 P.3d 710 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
State v. Taylor, 996 P.2d 571 (Wash. 2000).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(1)(b)(ii) — 6 cases
State v. Christman, 249 P.3d 680 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State Of Washington v. Christopher Joel Sefton (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
State of Washington v. Tyler Lee Jamison (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Larry Paul Williams (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
State Of Washington, V Cynthia Sue Miller (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(1)(b)(ii)(A) — 2 cases
In the Matter of the Pers. Restraint of: Reuben D. Mulamba (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
State of Washington v. Tyson Joseph Romaneschi (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(1)(b)(ii)(B) — 1 case
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Larry Paul Williams (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(2) — 2 cases
State v. Marchi, 158 Wash. App. 823 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶16 Based on the vulnerability of young victims, the legislature passed RCW 9A.36.120 to enhance penalties and to address concerns arising from an adult perpetrator’s ongoing child abuse of a child younger than 13.”
State v. Marchi, 243 P.3d 556 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶ 16 Based on the vulnerability of young victims, the legislature passed RCW 9A.36.120 to enhance penalties and to address concerns arising from an adult perpetrator's ongoing child abuse of a child younger than 13.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(b)(i) — 2 cases
In re Pers. Restraint of Fero (Wash. 2018).
In re Pers. Restraint of Fero (Wash. 2018).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(b)(ii) — 1 case
State v. Kiser, 940 P.2d 308 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(l)(a) — 1 case
State v. Marchi, 158 Wash. App. 823 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶16 Based on the vulnerability of young victims, the legislature passed RCW 9A.36.120 to enhance penalties and to address concerns arising from an adult perpetrator’s ongoing child abuse of a child younger than 13.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(l)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Marchi, 158 Wash. App. 823 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶16 Based on the vulnerability of young victims, the legislature passed RCW 9A.36.120 to enhance penalties and to address concerns arising from an adult perpetrator’s ongoing child abuse of a child younger than 13.”
State v. Nason, 981 P.2d 866 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(l)(b)(i) — 4 cases
State v. Harris, 164 Wash. App. 377 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “Here, the law governing Harris’s child assault charge is expressed in RCW 9A.36.120(1)(b)(i), the statute defining first degree child assault.”
State v. Norlin, 134 Wash. 2d 570 (Wash. 1998). “The State charged Norlin in King County Superior Court, pursuant to RCW 9A.36.120(l)(b)(i), 1 with first degree assault of a child.”
State v. Taylor, 140 Wash. 2d 229 (Wash. 2000).
State of Washington v. Tyler Lee Jamison (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(l)(b)(ii) — 1 case
State v. Christman, 160 Wash. App. 741 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.120(l)(b)(ii)(A) — 1 case
State v. Nason, 981 P.2d 866 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
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