Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.020 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) In order to convict a person of any crime defined in this chapter it shall not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim be corroborated.
(2) Evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior including but not limited to the victim's marital history; divorce history; general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or sexual mores contrary to community standards; or, unless it is related to the alleged offense, social media account, including any text, image, video, or picture, which depict sexual content, sexual history, nudity or partial nudity, intimate sexual activity, communications about sexual activity, communications about sex, sexual fantasies, and other information that appeals to a prurient interest is inadmissible on the issue of credibility and is inadmissible to prove the victim's consent except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, but when the perpetrator and the victim have engaged in sexual intercourse with each other in the past, and when the past behavior is material to the issue of consent, evidence concerning the past behavior between the perpetrator and the victim may be admissible on the issue of consent to the offense.
(3) In any prosecution for the crime of rape, trafficking pursuant to RCW 9A.40.100, or any of the offenses in chapter 9.68A RCW, or for an attempt to commit, or an assault with an intent to commit any such crime evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior including but not limited to the victim's marital behavior; divorce history; general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or sexual mores contrary to community standards; or, unless it is related to the alleged offense, social media account, including any text, image, video, or picture, which depict sexual content, sexual history, nudity or partial nudity, intimate sexual activity, communications about sexual activity, communications about sex, sexual fantasies, and other information that appeals to a prurient interest is not admissible if offered to attack the credibility of the victim and is admissible on the issue of consent, except where prohibited in the underlying criminal offense, only pursuant to the following procedure:
(a) A written pretrial motion shall be made in advance of the trial date by the defendant to the court and prosecutor stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy of evidence of the past sexual behavior of the victim proposed to be presented and its relevancy on the issue of the consent of the victim.
(b) The written motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit or affidavits in which the offer of proof shall be stated.
(c) If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court shall order a hearing out of the presence of the jury before the jury is empaneled, if any, and the hearing shall be closed except to the necessary witnesses, the defendant, counsel, and those who have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.
(d) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that the evidence proposed to be offered by the defendant regarding the past sexual behavior of the victim is relevant to the issue of the victim's consent; is not inadmissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice; and that its exclusion would result in denial of substantial justice to the defendant; the court shall make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant, which order may include the nature of the questions to be permitted. The defendant may then offer evidence pursuant to the order of the court.
(e) The victim, the victim's attorney, or a lawful representative of the victim may assert and seek enforcement of the procedures under this section.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit cross-examination of the victim on the issue of past sexual behavior when the prosecution presents evidence in its case in chief tending to prove the nature of the victim's past sexual behavior, but the court may require a hearing pursuant to subsection (3) of this section concerning such evidence.
[ 2024 c 297 s 12; 2023 c 197 s 10; 2013 c 302 s 7; 1975 1st ex.s. c 14 s 2. Formerly RCW 9.79.150.]

Notes:

Effective date2024 c 297: See note following RCW 7.68.127.
Effective date2013 c 302: See note following RCW 9.68A.090.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 155 cases (56 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case: State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1983).
State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1983). · cites it 16× “(dissenting) I concur fully in the majority's interpretation and analysis of the rape shield statute, RCW 9A.44.020. I dissent, however, because I believe the majority misapplies the statute in this case, inasmuch as the prosecution "opened the door".”
State v. Posey, 167 P.3d 560 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 11× “030 (2000), and whether the trial court improperly excluded e-mail evidence under the rape shield statute, RCW 9A.44.020. We reverse in part and affirm in part.”
State v. Horton, 68 P.3d 1145 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 11× “The State relies on RCW 9A.44.020, the rape shield statute. It argues that "prior inconsistent statements about past sexual behavior are not admissible for any purpose in a child sex case[,]" [22] and that "it cannot be deficient performance when an action not taken was an…”
State v. Posey, 161 Wash. 2d 638 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 9× “030 (2000), and whether the trial court improperly excluded e-mail evidence under the rape shield statute, RCW 9A.44.020. We reverse in part and affirm in part.”
State v. Horton, 116 Wash. App. 909 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 10× “The State relies on RCW 9A.44.020, the rape shield statute. It argues that “prior inconsistent statements about past sexual behavior are not admissible for any purpose in a child sex case[,]” 22 and that “it cannot be deficient performance when an action not taken was an action…”
State v. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d 713 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 3× “We hold that the trial court erred by (1) preventing the defendant from testifying about the events in question and (2) improperly applying the rape shield statute (RCW 9A.44.020(2)). Since this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse and remand for a new…”
State v. Aguirre, 168 Wash. 2d 350 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 4× “RCW 9A.44.020. Jury instruction 12 read, in part, “An assault is an intentional touching or striking of another person, with unlawful force, that is harmful or offensive regardless of whether any physical injury is done to the person.”
State v. Aguirre, 229 P.3d 669 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 4× “[2] RCW 9A.44.020. [3] Jury instruction 12 read, in part: "An assault is an intentional touching or striking of another person, with unlawful force, that is harmful or offensive regardless of whether any physical injury is done to the person.”
State v. Kalamarski, 620 P.2d 1017 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 10× “The State's interest in enacting RCW 9A.44.020 was to encourage the reporting of rape to aid crime prevention and protect the privacy of the complaining witness.”
State v. Summers, 853 P.2d 953 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 5× “He also contends that the court's conclusion that any probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect *433 was an abuse of discretion and that the exclusion of the evidence deprived him of his right to present a defense.”
State v. Jones, 230 P.3d 576 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 3× “We hold that the trial court erred by (1) preventing the defendant from testifying about the events in question and (2) improperly applying the rape shield statute (RCW 9A.44.020(2)). Since this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse and remand for a new…”
State v. Gresham, 269 P.3d 207 (Wash. 2012). “”); see also RCW 9A.44.020 (codification of the “rape shield statute,” making certain types of relevant evidence inadmissible in certain circumstances); RCW 9A.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.020(1) — 60 cases
State v. Zimmerman, 121 P.3d 1216 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Zimmerman, 130 Wash. App. 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Chenoweth, 354 P.3d 13 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
State v. Black, 745 P.2d 12 (Wash. 1987).
State Of Washington, V. Joel Duane Zwald, 555 P.3d 467 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.020(2) — 45 cases
State v. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d 713 (Wash. 2010). “We hold that the trial court erred by (1) preventing the defendant from testifying about the events in question and (2) improperly applying the rape shield statute (RCW 9A.44.020(2)). Since this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse and remand for a new…”
State v. Aguirre, 168 Wash. 2d 350 (Wash. 2010). “RCW 9A.44.020. Jury instruction 12 read, in part, “An assault is an intentional touching or striking of another person, with unlawful force, that is harmful or offensive regardless of whether any physical injury is done to the person.”
State v. Aguirre, 229 P.3d 669 (Wash. 2010). “[2] RCW 9A.44.020. [3] Jury instruction 12 read, in part: "An assault is an intentional touching or striking of another person, with unlawful force, that is harmful or offensive regardless of whether any physical injury is done to the person.”
State v. Jones, 230 P.3d 576 (Wash. 2010). “We hold that the trial court erred by (1) preventing the defendant from testifying about the events in question and (2) improperly applying the rape shield statute (RCW 9A.44.020(2)). Since this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse and remand for a new…”
State v. Horton, 68 P.3d 1145 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “The State relies on RCW 9A.44.020, the rape shield statute. It argues that "prior inconsistent statements about past sexual behavior are not admissible for any purpose in a child sex case[,]" [22] and that "it cannot be deficient performance when an action not taken was an…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.020(3) — 24 cases
State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1983). “(dissenting) I concur fully in the majority's interpretation and analysis of the rape shield statute, RCW 9A.44.020. I dissent, however, because I believe the majority misapplies the statute in this case, inasmuch as the prosecution "opened the door".”
Collins v. State, 2009 OK CR 32 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009).
State v. Mounsey, 643 P.2d 892 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
State v. Horton, 68 P.3d 1145 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “The State relies on RCW 9A.44.020, the rape shield statute. It argues that "prior inconsistent statements about past sexual behavior are not admissible for any purpose in a child sex case[,]" [22] and that "it cannot be deficient performance when an action not taken was an…”
State v. Horton, 116 Wash. App. 909 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “The State relies on RCW 9A.44.020, the rape shield statute. It argues that “prior inconsistent statements about past sexual behavior are not admissible for any purpose in a child sex case[,]” 22 and that “it cannot be deficient performance when an action not taken was an action…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.020(3)(a) — 11 cases
State v. Lynch, 309 P.3d 482 (Wash. 2013).
State v. Sheets, 128 Wash. App. 149 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Sheets, 115 P.3d 1004 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201 (Wash. 2006).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.020(3)(b) — 2 cases
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.020(3)(c) — 6 cases
State v. Lynch, 309 P.3d 482 (Wash. 2013).
State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201 (Wash. 2006).
State Of Washington v. James Delong (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
State v. Lynch (Wash. 2013).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.020(3)(d) — 10 cases
State v. Posey, 167 P.3d 560 (Wash. 2007). “030 (2000), and whether the trial court improperly excluded e-mail evidence under the rape shield statute, RCW 9A.44.020. We reverse in part and affirm in part.”
State v. Posey, 161 Wash. 2d 638 (Wash. 2007). “030 (2000), and whether the trial court improperly excluded e-mail evidence under the rape shield statute, RCW 9A.44.020. We reverse in part and affirm in part.”
State v. Summers, 853 P.2d 953 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). “He also contends that the court's conclusion that any probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect *433 was an abuse of discretion and that the exclusion of the evidence deprived him of his right to present a defense.”
State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201 (Wash. 2006).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.020(4) — 12 cases
State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1983). “(dissenting) I concur fully in the majority's interpretation and analysis of the rape shield statute, RCW 9A.44.020. I dissent, however, because I believe the majority misapplies the statute in this case, inasmuch as the prosecution "opened the door".”
State v. Horton, 68 P.3d 1145 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “The State relies on RCW 9A.44.020, the rape shield statute. It argues that "prior inconsistent statements about past sexual behavior are not admissible for any purpose in a child sex case[,]" [22] and that "it cannot be deficient performance when an action not taken was an…”
State v. Horton, 116 Wash. App. 909 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “The State relies on RCW 9A.44.020, the rape shield statute. It argues that “prior inconsistent statements about past sexual behavior are not admissible for any purpose in a child sex case[,]” 22 and that “it cannot be deficient performance when an action not taken was an action…”
State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201 (Wash. 2006).
State v. Camara, 781 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1989).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.