Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.040 (2026)

Inference of intent

✓ current as of May 2026
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In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent.
[ 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.52.040.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 84 cases (12 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case: State v. Jackson, 774 P.2d 1211 (Wash. 1989).
State v. Jackson, 774 P.2d 1211 (Wash. 1989). · cites it 22× “040 creates an "inference of intent" as applied to burglary and trespass as follows: In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein,…”
State v. Johnson, 674 P.2d 145 (Wash. 1983). · cites it 14× “The first is the constitutionality of an instruction given in the language of RCW 9A.52.040, which allows the trier of fact to *610 presume (or infer) intent to commit a crime from unlawful entry.”
State v. Cantu, 132 P.3d 725 (Wash. 2006). · cites it 12× “Permissive presumptions do not necessarily deprive the State of its obligation to prove every element of the crime, and thus the statute is not facially invalid.”
State v. Drum, 225 P.3d 237 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 8× “¶1 This case requires us to determine the effect of a stipulation to the sufficiency of the evidence in a drug court contract, as well as whether the inference of criminal intent allowed under RCW 9A.52.040 constitutes an impermissible mandatory presumption.”
State v. Bergeron, 711 P.2d 1000 (Wash. 1985). · cites it 7× “01) may appropriately be given as the trial court considers most helpful to the jury under the facts of the particular case.”
State v. Deal, 911 P.2d 996 (Wash. 1996). · cites it 4× “The fact that the instruction is based on a statute, RCW 9A.52.040, does not lessen the violation of the Defendant's due process rights.”
State Of Washington, V. Heather Azevedo, 547 P.3d 287 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 3× “” RCW 9A.52.040. The jury was so instructed in jury instruction 11.”
State v. McCullum, 656 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1983). · cites it 2× “The Legislature has also provided that a defendant may rebut certain inferences by presenting evidence raising reasonable inferences to the contrary: RCW 9A.52.040 (presumption of intent to deprive or defraud — burglary); RCW 9A.”
State v. Blight, 569 P.2d 1129 (Wash. 1977). · cites it 2× “030 was repealed in 1975 and replaced by RCW 9A.52.040. The presumption of intent to commit a crime arising from the fact of unlawful entry was replaced by an inference of such intent in the new statute, which went into effect on July 1, 1976.”
State v. Brunson, 905 P.2d 346 (Wash. 1995). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.52.040. With the exception of the clause following the word "unless", the jury instructions followed the language of the statutory inference.”
State v. Powell, 162 P.3d 1180 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 3× “That statute only authorized such an instruction when there was an actual entry into a building: In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted *1187 with intent to commit a crime against a person or…”
State v. Brunson, 128 Wash. 2d 98 (Wash. 1995). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.52.040. With the exception of the clause following the word "unless,” the jury instructions followed the language of the statutory inference.”
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