Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9A · Chapter 9A.56
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.150 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) A person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the first degree if he or she possesses stolen property, other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010 or a motor vehicle, which:
(a) Exceeds five thousand dollars in value; or
(b) Was property or equipment used by firefighters or emergency medical service providers that is critical to their work in an emergency setting and taken from a fire station, fire department vehicle, or emergency medical services building, facility, structure, or vehicle; and
(i) The loss of the property or equipment significantly hindered or delayed the firefighter's or emergency medical service provider's ability to respond to an ongoing emergency; or
(ii) The property or equipment exceeds $1,000 in value.
(2) Possessing stolen property in the first degree is a class B felony.
[ 2025 c 286 s 1; 2009 c 431 s 12; 2007 c 199 s 6; 1995 c 129 s 14 (Initiative Measure No. 159); 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.56.150.]

Notes:

Applicability—2009 c 431: See note following RCW 4.24.230.
Findings—Intent—Short title—2007 c 199: See notes following RCW 9A.56.065.
Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.
Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 29 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1978–2024 · leading case: State v. Pascal, 736 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1987).
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State v. Pascal, 736 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1987). · cites it 2× “070); first degree possession of stolen property (RCW 9A.56.150); theft of livestock (RCW 9A.”
State v. Cech, 2007 MT 184 (Mont. 2007). · cites it 2× “” Thus, the court decided that “concurrent jurisdiction fails because Montana and Washington courts lacked authority to prosecute equivalent offenses based on the same underlying conduct” and Cech, therefore, “fails to satisfy the first factor of the three-part test.”
State v. Rhinehart, 586 P.2d 124 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). · cites it 6× “RCW 9A.56.150(1). The trial judge agreed and dismissed.”
State v. Rhinehart, 602 P.2d 1188 (Wash. 1979). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.56.150(1) states "[a] person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the first degree if he possesses stolen property which exceeds one thousand five hundred dollars in value.”
In Re Shale, 158 P.3d 588 (Wash. 2007). “Pursuant to a plea bargain, the State amended the information to charge Shale with two counts of first degree possession of stolen property under RCW 9A.56.150(1). The amended information specifies that firearms were among the items possessed.”
State v. Lillard, 93 P.3d 969 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “[25] Instruction 6 provided: To convict the defendant of the crime of possessing stolen property in the first degree, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That on or about the 9th day of November, 2000, the defendant knowingly…”
State v. Haddock, 3 P.3d 733 (Wash. 2000). “Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.”
State v. Zakel, 812 P.2d 512 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). “070, and one count of possession of stolen property, namely another motor vehicle and its contents, in violation of RCW 9A.56.150. Zakel contends that the trial court erroneously refused to suppress evidence seized, based on the ruling that he had no expectation of privacy in…”
State v. Garcia, 166 P.3d 848 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “RCW 9A.56.150(1). Under the facts *858 of this case, the remaining untainted evidence overwhelmingly established Mr.”
State v. Alford, 611 P.2d 1268 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). “RCW 9A.56.150. Claborn argues that there must be a close causal connection between the assault and the alleged felony.”
State v. Garcia, 140 Wash. App. 609 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “RCW 9A.56.150(1). Under the facts of this case, the remaining untainted evidence overwhelmingly established Mr.”
State v. Brown, 630 P.2d 1378 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981). “Brown contends that the conviction is inadmissible because he did not know the actual offense he was admitting.”
Show all 29 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.150(1) — 10 cases
State v. Cech, 2007 MT 184 (Mont. 2007). “” Thus, the court decided that “concurrent jurisdiction fails because Montana and Washington courts lacked authority to prosecute equivalent offenses based on the same underlying conduct” and Cech, therefore, “fails to satisfy the first factor of the three-part test.”
State v. Rhinehart, 586 P.2d 124 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). “RCW 9A.56.150(1). The trial judge agreed and dismissed.”
State v. Rhinehart, 602 P.2d 1188 (Wash. 1979). “RCW 9A.56.150(1) states "[a] person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the first degree if he possesses stolen property which exceeds one thousand five hundred dollars in value.”
In Re Shale, 158 P.3d 588 (Wash. 2007). “Pursuant to a plea bargain, the State amended the information to charge Shale with two counts of first degree possession of stolen property under RCW 9A.56.150(1). The amended information specifies that firearms were among the items possessed.”
State v. Garcia, 166 P.3d 848 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “RCW 9A.56.150(1). Under the facts *858 of this case, the remaining untainted evidence overwhelmingly established Mr.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.150(2) — 1 case
State v. Koch, 685 P.2d 656 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
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