Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.110 (2026)

Escape in the first degree

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section WA-LEGapp.leg.wa.gov JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
(1) A person is guilty of escape in the first degree if he or she knowingly escapes from custody or a detention facility while being detained pursuant to a conviction of a felony or an equivalent juvenile offense.
(2) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that uncontrollable circumstances prevented the person from remaining in custody or in the detention facility or from returning to custody or to the detention facility, and that the person did not contribute to the creation of such circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to remain or return, and that the person returned to custody or the detention facility as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.
(3) Escape in the first degree is a class B felony.
[ 2001 c 264 s 1; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 s 23; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.76.110.]

Notes:

Effective date2001 c 264: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect July 1, 2001." [ 2001 c 264 s 9.]
Severability1982 1st ex.s. c 47: See note following RCW 9.41.190.
Term of escaped prisoner recaptured: RCW 9.31.090.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 81 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1978–2025 · leading case: State v. Ammons, 136 Wash. 2d 453 (Wash. 1998).
State v. Ammons, 136 Wash. 2d 453 (Wash. 1998). · cites it 18× “Ammons was subsequently arrested and charged with escape in the first degree, RCW 9A.76.110. Mr. Ammons was convicted on stipulated facts.”
State v. Ammons, 963 P.2d 812 (Wash. 1998). · cites it 18× “Ammons was subsequently arrested and charged with escape in the first degree, RCW 9A.76.110. Mr. Ammons was convicted on stipulated facts.”
State v. Hall, 706 P.2d 1074 (Wash. 1985). · cites it 24× “Upon being notified of its omission, the prosecutor promptly complied.”
State v. Danforth, 643 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1982). · cites it 8× “This case as appealed presented the issue of whether or not intoxication is a defense to the crime of escape, RCW 9A.76.110. Because we hold that petitioners were improperly charged under the escape statute, we find it unnecessary to resolve this issue.”
State v. Shriner, 681 P.2d 237 (Wash. 1984). · cites it 8× “This rule is consistent with general principles of statutory construction.”
State v. Gonzales, 693 P.2d 119 (Wash. 1985). · cites it 10× “This just *566 ain't right," and ran out of the building and down the street.”
State v. Descoteaux, 614 P.2d 179 (Wash. 1980). · cites it 5× “RCW 9A.76.110. At trial, he testified he did not report for work on November 8, 1977, because he was looking for a new, better-paying job.”
State v. Basford, 783 P.2d 129 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 10× “The State charged respondents with and the trial court convicted them of first degree escape, RCW 9A.76.110. Mr. Mutchler and Mr. Basford were found guilty after bench trials; Mr.”
State v. Thompson, 669 P.2d 1270 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 7× “The defendant, Roger Lee Thompson, appeals the judgment and sentence entered on his conviction of one count of escape in the first degree (RCW 9A.76.110). Because the guilty plea used to prove the underlying conviction in this escape prosecution was constitutionally invalid…”
State v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145 (Wash. 1983). · cites it 2× “2d 953 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a juvenile could not be convicted of first degree escape under RCW 9A.76.110 because a juvenile could not literally be convicted of a felony.”
State v. Bennett, 161 Wash. 2d 303 (Wash. 2007). “RCW 9A.76.110. He argues that the burden of proof instruction given, commonly referred to as the Castle instruction, 1 violated his constitutional right to due process.”
State v. McCraw, 898 P.2d 838 (Wash. 1995). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.76.110; RCW 9.94A.320. The standard range for an attempted crime is 75 percent of the range for the completed crime.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.110(1) — 42 cases
State v. Ammons, 136 Wash. 2d 453 (Wash. 1998). “Ammons was subsequently arrested and charged with escape in the first degree, RCW 9A.76.110. Mr. Ammons was convicted on stipulated facts.”
State v. Ammons, 963 P.2d 812 (Wash. 1998). “Ammons was subsequently arrested and charged with escape in the first degree, RCW 9A.76.110. Mr. Ammons was convicted on stipulated facts.”
State v. Gonzales, 693 P.2d 119 (Wash. 1985). “This just *566 ain't right," and ran out of the building and down the street.”
State v. Descoteaux, 614 P.2d 179 (Wash. 1980). “RCW 9A.76.110. At trial, he testified he did not report for work on November 8, 1977, because he was looking for a new, better-paying job.”
State v. Hall, 706 P.2d 1074 (Wash. 1985). “Upon being notified of its omission, the prosecutor promptly complied.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.110(2) — 5 cases
State v. Mannering, 75 P.3d 961 (Wash. 2003).
State v. Mannering, 150 Wash. 2d 277 (Wash. 2003).
State v. Walls, 106 Wash. App. 792 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
State v. Walls, 25 P.3d 1052 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.110(3) — 2 cases
State v. Eichelberger, 144 Wash. App. 61 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.